Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-62712
Kiedaisch, Christian (2012). Intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model with persistent leadership. Working paper series / Department of Economics 78, University of Zurich.
This article analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting non-expiring forward protection reduces the rate of innovation and imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces R&D spending. It is shown that full protection against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes the average innovation rate.
|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics|
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
|JEL Classification:||L40, O31, O34|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Intellectual property rights, persistent leadership, cumulative innovation, preemption, forward protection, non-obviousness requirement, patent policy|
|Deposited On:||30 May 2012 19:23|
|Last Modified:||19 Mar 2013 14:03|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Department of Economics|
|Number of Pages:||54|
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