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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-63257

Dietl, Helmut Max; Duschl, Tobias; Franck, Egon; Markus, Lang (2012). A contest model of a professional sports league with two-sided markets. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 232(3):336-359.

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Abstract

This paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network externalities by integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a two-stage contest model. In professional team sports, the competition of the clubs functions as a platform that enables sponsors to interact with fans. In these club-mediated interactions, positive network effects operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while positive or negative network effects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. We show that the size of these network effects determines the level of competitive balance within the league. If the market potential of the sponsors is small (large), competitive balance increases (decreases) with stronger combined network effects. We further deduce that clubs benefit from stronger combined network effects through higher profits and that network externalities can mitigate the negative effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance. Finally, we derive implications for improving competitive balance by taking advantage of network externalities. For example, our model suggests that an increase in the market potential of sponsors produces a more balanced league.

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Business Administration
DDC:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2012
Deposited On:10 Jul 2012 17:26
Last Modified:01 Dec 2013 21:38
Publisher:Lucius & Lucius
ISSN:0021-4027
Related URLs:http://www.zora.uzh.ch/55882/
http://www.jbnst.de/en/
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:7105
Citations:Web of Science®
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