Bochsler, Daniel (2012). A quasi-proportional electoral system ‘only for honest men’? The hidden potential for manipulating mixed compensatory electoral systems. International Political Science Review, 33(4):401-420.
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Mixed compensatory systems have risen in popularity in recent years. Under such systems, single-seat districts elect only the leader of the local suffrage, but the systems nevertheless produce (nearly) proportional outcomes overall, via compensatory mandates. Elections in Albania, Italy, Lesotho, and Venezuela, however, demonstrate a particular loophole for such systems: strategic voting, organized by political parties. Large parties can achieve over-representation by encouraging their voters to split their votes. In this way, they outsmart the compensatory mechanism designed to lead to proportional results. These disproportional results are particularly controversial, since they are deliberate and strategic. This article takes the 2005 Albanian elections as its main case study, and uses simulations to illustrate its political consequences.
|Item Type:||Journal Article, refereed, original work|
|Communities & Collections:||06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Political Science|
|DDC:||320 Political science|
|Deposited On:||19 Oct 2012 10:35|
|Last Modified:||27 Nov 2013 23:30|
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