Quick Search:

uzh logo
Browse by:
bullet
bullet
bullet
bullet

Zurich Open Repository and Archive 

Bochsler, Daniel (2012). A quasi-proportional electoral system ‘only for honest men’? The hidden potential for manipulating mixed compensatory electoral systems. International Political Science Review, 33(4):401-420.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Mixed compensatory systems have risen in popularity in recent years. Under such systems, single-seat districts elect only the leader of the local suffrage, but the systems nevertheless produce (nearly) proportional outcomes overall, via compensatory mandates. Elections in Albania, Italy, Lesotho, and Venezuela, however, demonstrate a particular loophole for such systems: strategic voting, organized by political parties. Large parties can achieve over-representation by encouraging their voters to split their votes. In this way, they outsmart the compensatory mechanism designed to lead to proportional results. These disproportional results are particularly controversial, since they are deliberate and strategic. This article takes the 2005 Albanian elections as its main case study, and uses simulations to illustrate its political consequences.

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Political Science
DDC:320 Political science
Language:English
Date:September 2012
Deposited On:19 Oct 2012 10:35
Last Modified:27 Nov 2013 23:30
Publisher:Sage Publications
ISSN:0192-5121
Publisher DOI:10.1177/0192512111420770
Official URL:http://ips.sagepub.com/content/33/4/382.full.pdf+html
Related URLs:http://ips.sagepub.com/content/33/4.toc
Citations:Web of Science®
Google Scholar™
Scopus®. Citation Count: 4

Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item

Repository Staff Only: item control page