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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-66107

Maggetti, Martino (2012). The media accountability of independent regulatory agencies. European Political Science Review, 4(3):385-408.

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Abstract

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are increasingly attracting academic and societal attention, as they represent the institutional cornerstone of the regulatory state and play a key role in policy-making. Besides the expected benefits in terms of credibility and efficiency, these regulators are said to bring about a ‘democratic deficit’, following their statutory separation from democratic institutions. Consequently, a ‘multi-pronged system of control’ is required. This article focuses on a specific component of this system, that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether media coverage of IRAs meets the necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential ‘accountability forum’ for regulators. The results of a comparison of two contrasted cases – the British and Swiss competition commissions – mostly support the expectations, because they show that media coverage of IRAs corresponds to that of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Political Science
DDC:320 Political science
Language:English
Date:2012
Deposited On:01 Nov 2012 10:44
Last Modified:02 Dec 2013 02:06
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISSN:1755-7739
Additional Information:Copyright: Cambridge University Press
Publisher DOI:10.1017/S1755773911000208

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