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Unique equilibrium in incomplete information contests with budget constraints


Ewerhart, Christian; Quartieri, Federico (2015). Unique equilibrium in incomplete information contests with budget constraints. Working paper series / Department of Economics 133, University of Zurich.

Abstract

Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the conflict, including the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest allows a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The tightness of the condi- tions is discussed. Examples are used to illustrate the main result. lt is also shown that any active contestant ends up with a positive net rent.

Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the conflict, including the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest allows a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The tightness of the condi- tions is discussed. Examples are used to illustrate the main result. lt is also shown that any active contestant ends up with a positive net rent.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C72, D23, D72, D82
Uncontrolled Keywords:Imperfectly discriminating contests, private information, budget constraints, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, rent dissipation
Language:English
Date:July 2015
Deposited On:27 Nov 2013 13:47
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 17:11
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:28
ISSN:1664-7041
Additional Information:Revised version ; former title: "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information"
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp133.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers-new.php
Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-85621

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