UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Regime design and cooperation: Differential treatment of parties in international environmental agreements


Castro, Paula (2013). Regime design and cooperation: Differential treatment of parties in international environmental agreements. In: ECPR General Conference - Panel 'Designing Multilevel Policies and Institutions', Bordeaux, 4 September 2013 - 7 September 2013.

Abstract

Many international environmental agreements (IEAs) have adopted differentiated rules for groups of countries, based on the recognition of the different circumstances of parties, such as special needs of certain parties (especially developing countries), or the different contribution of parties to the environmental problem at hand. The resulting differential treatment usually consists of differences in the stringency of obligations, different timing of their application, and/or international financial, capacitybuilding or technological assistance. The existence (and design) of preferential treatment for some groups of parties may be a precondition for their entering the agreement in the first place. But in the long term, some types of preferential treatment may lead to new incentives that make broader (and deeper) cooperation more difficult, as observed for the climate change regime by Castro et al. (2011).

In this article, I consider the relationship between the existence of differential treatment of parties to an IEA and the outcomes of the bargaining process that led to the adoption of the IEA as well as its effectiveness in terms of compliance and problem-solving. Following the literature on the rational design of international agreements, I regard country differentiation as akin to other flexibility provisions that are expected to facilitate deeper cooperation among parties. Using data from the International Regimes Database (IRD), I test whether country differentiation facilitates countries’ participation in an agreement, improves compliance of parties with the agreement’s provisions, and ultimately improves problem solving by the agreement.

Many international environmental agreements (IEAs) have adopted differentiated rules for groups of countries, based on the recognition of the different circumstances of parties, such as special needs of certain parties (especially developing countries), or the different contribution of parties to the environmental problem at hand. The resulting differential treatment usually consists of differences in the stringency of obligations, different timing of their application, and/or international financial, capacitybuilding or technological assistance. The existence (and design) of preferential treatment for some groups of parties may be a precondition for their entering the agreement in the first place. But in the long term, some types of preferential treatment may lead to new incentives that make broader (and deeper) cooperation more difficult, as observed for the climate change regime by Castro et al. (2011).

In this article, I consider the relationship between the existence of differential treatment of parties to an IEA and the outcomes of the bargaining process that led to the adoption of the IEA as well as its effectiveness in terms of compliance and problem-solving. Following the literature on the rational design of international agreements, I regard country differentiation as akin to other flexibility provisions that are expected to facilitate deeper cooperation among parties. Using data from the International Regimes Database (IRD), I test whether country differentiation facilitates countries’ participation in an agreement, improves compliance of parties with the agreement’s provisions, and ultimately improves problem solving by the agreement.

Downloads

55 downloads since deposited on 20 Dec 2013
23 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper), not refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Political Science
Dewey Decimal Classification:320 Political science
Uncontrolled Keywords:International environmental agreements, regime design, negotiation, cooperation
Language:English
Event End Date:7 September 2013
Deposited On:20 Dec 2013 14:34
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 17:16
Related URLs:http://ecpr.eu/Events/EventDetails.aspx?EventID=5
Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-86837

Download

[img]
Preview
Filetype: PDF
Size: 456kB

TrendTerms

TrendTerms displays relevant terms of the abstract of this publication and related documents on a map. The terms and their relations were extracted from ZORA using word statistics. Their timelines are taken from ZORA as well. The bubble size of a term is proportional to the number of documents where the term occurs. Red, orange, yellow and green colors are used for terms that occur in the current document; red indicates high interlinkedness of a term with other terms, orange, yellow and green decreasing interlinkedness. Blue is used for terms that have a relation with the terms in this document, but occur in other documents.
You can navigate and zoom the map. Mouse-hovering a term displays its timeline, clicking it yields the associated documents.

Author Collaborations