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Strategic incentives in unconventional electoral systems: Introduction to the special issue


Bochsler, Daniel; Bernauer, Julian (2014). Strategic incentives in unconventional electoral systems: Introduction to the special issue. Representation, 50(1):1-12.

Abstract

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Abstract

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Political Science
Dewey Decimal Classification:320 Political science
Language:English
Date:2014
Deposited On:07 Jan 2015 12:52
Last Modified:08 Dec 2017 09:32
Publisher:Taylor & Francis Inc.
ISSN:0034-4893
Additional Information:Special issue: Strategic incentives in unconventional electoral systems
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2014.902214

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