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Agency and the pace of adoption of new techniques


Anderson, Ronald W; Nyborg, Kjell G (2002). Agency and the pace of adoption of new techniques. Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 68(1):203-220.

Abstract

We study the relation of financial development and the pace of technological advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A firm which is financed by outside shareholders but run by managers has the prospect of a process innovation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation requires firing old management and hiring new with skills appropriate for the new technique. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in this game can be of two types. In entrenchment equilibrium once the new techniques has been announced old style management raises their dividend payout sufficiently to pre-empt the innovation. In maximum rent extraction equilibrium managers are unable or unwilling to match the impending productivity improvement and instead respond by increasing their perquisites for the remaining time of their tenure. We show that both equilibria involve several types of inefficiencies and can result in underinvestment in positive NPV projects. We discuss the role of financial innovation in reducing the inefficiencies identified.

Abstract

We study the relation of financial development and the pace of technological advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A firm which is financed by outside shareholders but run by managers has the prospect of a process innovation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation requires firing old management and hiring new with skills appropriate for the new technique. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in this game can be of two types. In entrenchment equilibrium once the new techniques has been announced old style management raises their dividend payout sufficiently to pre-empt the innovation. In maximum rent extraction equilibrium managers are unable or unwilling to match the impending productivity improvement and instead respond by increasing their perquisites for the remaining time of their tenure. We show that both equilibria involve several types of inefficiencies and can result in underinvestment in positive NPV projects. We discuss the role of financial innovation in reducing the inefficiencies identified.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2002
Deposited On:22 May 2015 12:48
Last Modified:08 Dec 2017 12:59
Publisher:De Boeck Universite
ISSN:1782-1495
Additional Information:ISBN: 9782804139049
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.3917/rel.681.0203
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:11973

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