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Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes


Polk, Andreas; Schmutzler, Armin (2005). Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes. European Journal of Political Economy, 21(4):915-931.

Abstract

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries and loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries and beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying.

Abstract

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries and loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries and beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:20 June 2005
Deposited On:11 Feb 2008 12:21
Last Modified:21 Nov 2017 13:23
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0176-2680
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.04.003

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