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On the convergence of logit-response to (strict) Nash equilibria


Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Netzer, Nick (2017). On the convergence of logit-response to (strict) Nash equilibria. Economic Theory Bulletin, 5(1):1-8.

Abstract

We show that the logit-response dynamics converges to a subset of (strict) Nash equilibria for any weakly acyclic, N-player normal form game. The result holds independently of whether revision opportunities arise as in asynchronous learning or in other ways, as long as the dynamics is regular. Our analysis generalizes and organizes recent convergence results in the literature. Further, it provides a simple selection criterion, because convergence to strict Nash equilibria obtains even in the presence of non-strict, pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Abstract

We show that the logit-response dynamics converges to a subset of (strict) Nash equilibria for any weakly acyclic, N-player normal form game. The result holds independently of whether revision opportunities arise as in asynchronous learning or in other ways, as long as the dynamics is regular. Our analysis generalizes and organizes recent convergence results in the literature. Further, it provides a simple selection criterion, because convergence to strict Nash equilibria obtains even in the presence of non-strict, pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Logit-response dynamics, weakly acyclic games, stochastic stability
Language:English
Date:2017
Deposited On:08 Dec 2016 15:13
Last Modified:28 Mar 2017 01:01
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:2196-1085
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-016-0104-1
Related URLs:http://link.springer.com/journal/40505 (Publisher)

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