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Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players


Ewerhart, Christian (2017). Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players. Economics Letters, 157:167-170.

Abstract

It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher image.

Abstract

It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher image.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Tullock contest; nash equilibrium; heterogeneous valuations; discrimination
Language:English
Date:2017
Deposited On:23 May 2017 13:46
Last Modified:28 Jun 2017 01:03
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0165-1765
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012
Related URLs:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176517301908
http://www.zora.uzh.ch/135994/

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Embargo till: 2019-05-19