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How Political Parties Frame the European Integration Process

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Abstract: This article proposes to study how national political parties frame the European integration process, in order to better understand how Europe actually figures into national political discourses. We argue that framing strategies depend strongly on parties' positions and standing. To verify our hypotheses, we will account for the fact that political parties' arguments might be influenced by country-specific characteristics and the specific issues being debated. Drawing on Habermas' typology of pragmatic-, identity- and value-related arguments, we provide sophisticated frame categorizations to capture the complex structure of argumentation, going beyond a simple dichotomization of economic and cultural frames. Relying on a large and original media dataset for the period from 2004 to 2006 in six Western European countries, we will be in the position to test a series of hypotheses that have so far only been tested in individual countries.

Keywords: European integration process, Euroscepticism, framing, political parties

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Introduction

Mair (2007: 162) has recently insisted that “in addition to the imputed location of a party’s core identity, and in addition to the evidence provided by the formal policies which it adopts or is obliged to adopt, we need to know more about how Europe actually plays in national political discourse, as well as about the way in which it is conceived [...].” So far, studies investigating the integration process have mainly been concerned with whether the EU is actually an important issue in the public debate (Trenz 2003; de Vreese 2005), who participates in the debate (Koopmans 2007), how and why political actors and citizens position themselves towards the EU (Marks & Steenbergen 2004) or how the electorate behaves in European elections (Marsh 1998; Hix & Marsh 2007).

This article discusses an aspect of integration that has heretofore been neglected to a certain extent in the literature on the European integration process. Following from Mair’s assertion, we believe that, in addition to simply analyzing the positions of political actors, we must also consider *why* certain actors are against the European integration process, and why others are in favor of it. In addition, we should not simply look at which characteristics of political actors correlate with the respective positions, but also scrutinize which concrete arguments are mobilized to justify positions. The main aim of this paper is thus to investigate how the European integration process is framed by political parties at the national level. And more specifically, we are interested in differences between party-families and supporting and non-supporting parties. We argue that framing strategies depend strongly on parties’ positions and standing, and agree with Diez Medrano (2003: 5), who holds that the attitudes of political actors towards objects or problems depend on how parties conceive or represent them. In other words, analyzing framing processes will give us a deeper insight in how the European integration process is perceived, and will help us better understand positions towards it.

A second, more descriptive aim of this article is to disaggregate the debate on the European integration process, and to show how extensive the argumentation is. In keeping with this aim, we shall pursue a nuanced and sophisticated means of frame categorization, in order to capture the various arguments that exist and to go beyond the simple differentiation between economic and cultural arguments. On the basis of Habermas' (1993) typology of pragmatic-, identity- and value-related arguments, we will propose different useful categorizations. Disaggregating the framing process also means that we look at how political parties argue in different situations. In order to test our arguments, which assert that differences in framing strategies can be explained largely by the standing of a party and its position towards the European integration process, we must verify whether their argumentations are influenced by factors that are specific to the respective national debates. In particular, we must consider the general political climate towards the integration process within a country, and the issues at stake that might have an impact on how political actors argue. On the one hand, we will control for the presence of right-wing populist parties that are particularly hostile towards the integration process, and the fact that some countries are generally more Eurosceptic than others. On the other hand, we will account for the fact that different issues that concern different aspects of the integration process are debated in various countries during the same period.

To find answers to our questions we collected data on the basis of newspaper articles for the period 2004 to 2006 in six Western European countries: Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. With such a large database at hand, we are in the position to test arguments that have already been formulated by other scholars, but only verified in individual countries. Moreover, by relying on media data instead of party programs or expert interviews, we can investigate the supply of politically relevant actors for the electorate more precisely.

Framing positions towards the European integration process

So far, most of the studies concerning people's perceptions of the European integration process have focused on how frames are used in the media. An important contribution has been made by de Vreese (2005: ch.4; see also de Vreese, Peter & Semetko 2001) who analyzed whether the media emphasize disagreements and conflicts between different entities when they cover the European integration process, or whether they frame events and issues in terms of their economic implications. Trenz (2005: 262-268) adopts similar frame categories to ours (see below), considering whether the arguments used in the media are interest-, value- or identity-related. Diez Medrano (2003: ch.4) is interested in how journalists present the EU in op-ed articles and how their opinions correspond with the attitudes of the populations.

While these studies help us understand how the EU is presented in different countries, they do not reveal much about the arguments of particular political actors. In this article we are not so much interested in the role and strategies of the media as we are in understanding how political parties justify their attitudes towards the European integration process. Very few studies have focused on this question so far. One of those studies has been executed by Statham and Grey (2005) in the United Kingdom. They identify three conceptual lenses through which political actors formulate the relationship to Europe: political, economic and cultural-historical (Statham & Grey 2005: 74). And through their analysis, they show that Eurosceptic conservatives rely heavily on political arguments, while pro-Europeans from both major British parties emphasize economic arguments. By showing that only a modest number of political actors uses cultural and historical arguments, they further confirm their expectation that Euroscepticism is only populist to a limited extent, and is cultural in nature (see also Statham 2008: 38).

Van Os (2005) explores the framing of Europe by French political parties on the basis of the contents of their respective websites. He also distinguishes interest/instrumental, identity, and value frames—revealing that both defenders and opponents of the European integration process refer to strategic actions and specific interests when discussing this issue. Regarding the two other groups of frames, it is interesting to see that the major forces opposing the EU—the *Front National* and the *Mouvement pour la France*—adopt arguments that are different from all other parties. While all established parties demonstrate something resembling a European identity, and mention democratic values when referring to this supranational entity, the Right-wing populists defend a national identity and do not use universal value frames at all.

It is useful, here, to differentiate between supporting and non-supporting political parties. By looking at positions and justifications together, we learn to differentiate between arguments that are mobilized to support the integration process, and those that are used to criticize it. Diez Medrano (2003) shows that integration's supporters emphasize economic advantages conferred by the unification of the market, as well as the EU's expected contribution to peace and a better understanding between peoples. Non-supporters, on the other hand, emphasize potential threats to national identity and sovereignty that could be brought on by integration. In addition to these patterns, we hypothesize that integration's supporters lead a much more pragmatic discourse, focusing on concrete problems, since they have accepted the EU as a historical fact, contrary to Eurosceptics who mobilize fundamental and ideological arguments.

Koopmans (2007) has revealed that patterns of support for and opposition to the European integration process are strongly related to the standings of political actors. While prominent actors are mostly in favor of integration, less influential actors tend to be more critical of European institutions. Other studies focusing on political parties came to similar conclusions. A recurrent theme in the literature is the inverted 'U' pattern of party alignments on Europe (Hix

& Lord 1997; Marks & Wilson 2000; Hooghe et al. 2004). According to this thesis, opposition to Europe comes from the far left and the far right while centre parties generally hold a pro-integrationist stance. We expect majority and minority parties to differ not only in terms of their positions, but also in terms of their arguments. Following the hypotheses we have formulated above, we argue that established parties would also lead a much more economic and political discourse than their less established counterparts, with particularly far-right parties emphasizing cultural arguments most.

It is up for debate, however, whether the ‘permissive consensus’ among mainstream political parties still exists on European integration, or whether critical voices have also gained influence within major political parties. Statham (2008) has observed that in the last years, Euroscepticism has become more important among mainstream parties. Kriesi (2007: 88) argues that established conservative parties are likely to take an accommodating stance towards the Euroscepticism of minor right-wing populist parties, in order to close off their niche in the electoral market. Consequently, Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008) argue that the issue of European integration has become more salient and more controversial in countries where Right-wing populists have gained power in the last decade. The influence of Right-wing populists is mainly due to the fact that, by adopting a general pro-integrationist stance, the established parties have long ignored the part of the electorate that is opposed to a further integration process (Hix & Lord 1997). Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008) further emphasize that, partly because of the mobilization by Right-wing populists, identity and cultural aspects bear a lot of Eurosceptic potential. Similarly, Hooghe and Marks (2009, forthcoming) argue that the mobilization of exclusive national identity among mass publics, by parties who emphasize traditionalism, authority and nationalism (their famous tan-dimension), has had an important impact on the debate in recent years. Because of this, it will be interesting to see whether the presence of

right-wing populist parties has an influence on the way political parties argue at the national level.

This will also give us the opportunity to control for country-specific characteristics. In order to test our arguments concerning the framing strategies of political parties, we must verify whether or not their argumentations are influenced by factors that are specific to their respective national debates. Following from our idea to differentiate between supporting and non-supporting parties, we endeavor to differentiate between countries that are strongly in favor of integration, and those where a majority opposes further European integration. It might be that the general positive or negative climate in a country has an impact on the discourse of individual political parties. For the six countries under investigation in this paper, Kriesi (2007) has already shown that Euroscepticism is particularly widespread in the UK and the non-member state of Switzerland.

Furthermore, we must consider whether we fall short of understanding how the European integration process is perceived, especially if we do not differentiate between different sub-issues. It may very well be that political parties do not simply support or refuse the integration process. Indeed, it seems wise to expect variations across policy fields. Since European integration consists of economic, political and cultural projects, parties might take diverging positions (see Marks 2004: 241-343; Marks, Hooghe & Wilson 2004). For example, parties of the center-left are often said to be in favor of more integration if particular projects focus on 'market-regulation'. Social democrats are in favor of diminishing cultural boundaries, but simultaneously are afraid of losing social achievements at the national level. On the other side of the political spectrum, those on the right increase their opposition to integration when the process concerns more than a simple economic and monetary union. Liberal conservative parties often support further integration as long as it mainly concerns market liberalization,

and oppose further integration when political or cultural aspects are concerned (Kriesi 2007: 86-87). It will be interesting to see whether such differences can also be observed through the frames that are used in the context of the various sub-issues of the European integration process. To this end, we will investigate whether the framing strategies found in the general debates on the European integration process are the same across subfields. Before we test these arguments, however, we will more precisely specify what we understand by ‘framing,’ and which particular frame categories we shall use for our analyses.

Clarifying and distinguishing our framing approach

According to a highly influential definition by Robert Entman, framing means to “*select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation*” (1993: 52, italics in original). Unlike agenda-setting, which is primarily concerned with salience, framing not only tells people *what* to think about, but more importantly, *how* to think about a particular issue. The underlying assumption of the approach is that the way an issue is presented in the media can influence how it is understood and evaluated by the audience (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007: 11). The evaluation of abortion policies, to mention a classic example, sharply differs if one thinks of abortion as a question of life or death, or if it is framed as a matter of women’s rights and civil liberties (see Ferree et al. 2002). Empirical studies show that framing has a clear effect on individual attitudes, even in a conflictive environment where competing frames are at work (e.g. Zaller 1992: ch.9; Brewer & Gross 2005; Chong & Druckmann 2007; skeptical Sniderman & Theriault 2004).

While the term frame denotes the “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974: 21)—systems that guide our perception of reality—framing refers to the more or less consciously managed process, by which these schemata are manufactured, selected, distributed and adopted. For

public political contestations, this process can be divided into four distinct stages (Matthes 2007: ch.2). In the first stage, frames are promoted by competing political actors. Drawing on established cultural resources, they adopt a framing strategy that aims to create a maximum of public support. Because of this, this stage is called *strategic framing*. However, it must be noted that political actors' statements typically do not get direct public attention. Before being published and becoming part of the public debate, they pass through a second stage where they are selected and arranged by journalists. This procedure provides the latter with the opportunity to (re-)frame particular statements or whole articles, according to the norms and routines of the media system (*journalistic framing*). These processes result in frames that dictate how these issues appear in *mass media* products, e.g. newspapers (third stage). The fourth and final stage witnesses the impact of these frames on individuals' attitudes, and their own framing of issues (the *framing effects*).

The frames that we investigate in our study can be conceptualized as the outcome of the "framing contest" (Gamson 2004: 245) between political actors of the first stage, partly modified by journalists' mediation efforts during the second stage. Furthermore, the practical relevance of these media frames during the third stage stems from the fact that they decisively shape how the debated issue is perceived by the audience, thereby influencing individuals' attitudes in the fourth stage of the framing process. In contrast to the majority of media framing studies, which typically focus on the whole article (e.g. de Vreese 2005; Trenz 2003), we analyze media frames on a propositional level. This means that we coded frames for every statement in an article, and that these frames had to be clearly attributable to a particular political actor (see below). This idea of "frame ownership" enables us to keep the aspect of strategic framing central to our analysis, as we not only pursue the question of *how* the debate is framed, but also, and just as importantly, by *whom*.

As stated above, we are interested in the framing of issue positions by political actors in the mass media, and therefore propose to define frames as *patterns of justification*. We would like to know which justifications are put forward by a political actor to support his or her position regarding a particular issue. We have to keep in mind, however, that in reality, political actors do not argue as consistently and explicitly as we, as political scientists, would wish them to do so. Quite often they evoke a particular argumentative context by dropping a few keywords, or rely on metaphors and symbols. Consequentially, the term “pattern of justification” is understood here in a fairly broad sense, and also includes rather latent and implicit arguments.

It is worth noting that our definition of frames bears resemblance to Entman’s “problem-definition” aspect in his above-mentioned, broadly encompassing definition of what framing is. One could go even further—thinking of the attributed issue in a statement as a “treatment recommendation”, and thinking of an actor’s stance (position) as an element of the “evaluative component” of a frame (see also Matthes 2007: 127-130). However, for our analysis it is most useful to keep justifications, actors, issues and positions separated. We will use our more narrow definition, and restrict the meaning of the term “frame” to patterns of justifications.

Categorizing frames

In order to systematically structure the various frames, which are attributed to policy positions in the mass media debate, we draw on a distinction made by Habermas (1993), which has proven useful for the study of multilayered issues like the European integration (Sjursen 2002; Trenz 2005; Lerch & Schweltnus 2006). Habermas’s (1993) typology distinguishes three types of possible frames: pragmatic, identity-based and moral-universal frames. The first type, pragmatic, consists of arguments referring to the expected utility of a policy. A pragmatic frame justifies a position by its ability to reach a specific goal, or by its potential to meet particular interests (Lerch & Schweltnus 2006: 306). The second type consists of posi-

tions that can be justified by identity-based arguments. These frames legitimize policies by pointing to ideas and values inherent to a particular community. The third type, moral-universal arguments, is exploited by actors referring to “universal standards of justice“ (Sjursen 2002: 494f.), which can be accepted by everyone, regardless of his or her particular interests or cultural identity.

In order to expand upon existing studies that use these three frame categories, and in order to meet our research goals, we propose some additional categorizations (see Table 1). Early on, our research objectives lead us to look more closely at the content of the three frame categories. Within the pragmatic category, we delineated between political, economic, and other pragmatic reasons. *Political reasons* concern the efficiency of the political system or are directly connected either to a strategy of a specific actor, or to a procedural process. *Economic reasons* comprise welfare, budgetary and private sector frames. *Other pragmatic reasons* is a residual category, consisting of less salient frames like ecology, security and infrastructural reasons.

-- Table 1 about here --

The identity-based frames can be separated into *national-exclusive* and *national-institutional* frames. The first subcategory summarizes nationalistic and xenophobic frames, as well as those emphasizing the preservation of traditional values. *National-institutional* frames include arguments related to political self-determination and national independence. These frame types are both used by political actors who prefer closed cultural boundaries and a culturally homogeneous society. By contrast, *multicultural-inclusive* reasons contain opposing arguments such as cultural plurality and tolerance. The last of the three main categories, moral-universal frames, is not further differentiated. It is composed of general moral principles like

peace or equality of opportunities, and their legalistic counterparts—basic civic and political rights.

A second additional categorization aims at aggregating the three main categories. In order to test how important cultural frames are in the debate on European integration, we seek to create a category that includes all frames that are cultural in nature. While pragmatic types of frames can be perceived as arguments following an instrumental rationality (Sjursen 2002), both identity-based and moral-universal types can be understood in a Weberian sense as cultural frames (Weber 1921[1980]: 12). These arguments emanate from the same source—that is to say, from a rationale based on moral, religious or ethnical *values, norms or habits* in opposition to the *utilitarianistic interest* characterizing the pragmatic frames. Thus, we have two distinct justification patterns for a policy position, the first being utilitarianistic (or pragmatic) in nature and containing the reasoning for the political or economic interest, and the second being cultural and containing values deduced from identity or moral principles.

Having three different kinds of categorizations at hand, we end up with a list of frames that can be generalized in a flexible way to fit our specific research questions. One aim of this study is to test whether political, economic or cultural frames are more often used when positions are taken towards the European integration process. To this end, we will compare the cultural frames at the highest level of aggregation with the economic and political reasons at the lowest level of aggregation. We expect that opposition parties (Right-wing populists and Radical left parties) will be shown to adopt a more fundamental ideological discourse, while mainstream parties who are part of the ‘permissive consensus’ use more pragmatic frames (political and economic reasons). To better understand how cultural frames are used, we will investigate whether supporters of the EU prefer to use multicultural-inclusive and moral-

universalist frames, and if non-supporters conversely tend to mobilize national-exclusive and national-institutional arguments.

Data collection and methods

In order to achieve a comprehensive picture of the debate over the European integration process, we have conducted a comparative study of six Western European countries (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). Since our data originated from a larger research project, the countries were selected for purposes different from the ones we pursue here. For the present analysis, it would certainly have been interesting to include South European countries and some new member states. Nonetheless, the six countries under investigation demonstrate significant variety, in terms of factors of interest, for our analyses. They have different party systems (especially with regard to the presence of right wing parties); different issues have been debated in the period under investigation; and they include two particularly Eurosceptical countries (GB, CH). More generally, our sample consists of small (A, CH, NL) and large countries (D, F, GB), of core member states (D, F, NL), states that joined the EU later (A, GB) and a non-member state (CH).

We collected data from newspaper articles published in the three-year period (2004, 2005 and 2006), which enables us to observe the most recent development of the debate. There is little doubt in the literature that the mass media constitute the most important arena for public debates on politically relevant issues (see Ferree et al. 2002; Bennett et al. 2004). An analysis of newspaper articles thus allows us to analyze the statements of political actors, as they are directly perceived by their opponents, policy makers and by a broader audience. Practical limitations prevented us from being able to include more than one newspaper per country in the analysis. The newspaper sample contains *Le Monde* in France, *The Times* in the United Kingdom, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in Germany, the *NRC Handelsblad* in the Netherlands, *Die*

Presse in Austria and the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in Switzerland. We decided to rely on the most widespread quality newspapers in each country, since they are most likely to exert a key influence on other media actors. These newspapers exhibit a high probability for being read by other domestic journalists, and a high probability for influencing the editorial decisions of other news organizations (Bennett et al. 2004: 445). Furthermore, Koopmans and Statham (1999: 207) have shown in their Political Claims Analysis approach—a method comparable to ours in terms of basic coding instructions—that there are no significant differences in the positioning of political actors between quality newspapers and tabloids.

Our content analysis is based on an innovative approach of selecting newspaper articles while simultaneously collecting data. We apply a three-step procedure to obtain a representative sample of relevant articles. The first step is the identification of events in each country that are relevant to the European integration process. The events are identified by means of various yearbooks such as *Keesing's World Record of Events* and *Facts on Files* (World News Digest Yearbook). This list of events constitutes the basis for the development of an extensive keyword list for each country, and greatly assisted us in finding all relevant articles.¹ Indeed, relying on event lists yielded a significant advantage in that it allowed us to know about the relevant discussions in each country before deploying a keyword search. This is especially important for a complex issue such as European integration, which is disputed in many different ways, in every country. By these means, we have been able to minimize the risk of neglecting important aspects in our selection procedure (false negatives).

Since we were still confronted with an immense number of articles per newspaper (approximately 30'000 per country), we engaged another selection step. Following our aim to grasp the core of the debate on European integration (i.e. to include only the most relevant articles

¹ All the newspaper titles in our sample are accessible electronically via the databases Factiva or LexisNexis.

into our content analysis) we grouped the events into sub-issues and ranked them according to their salience in the basic sample. Only the most salient sub-issues were implemented in the next selection step, which allowed us to reduce the samples to approximately 3'000 to 4'000 per country.

In the third and final step, we chronologically drew a random sample of 1'200 articles per country out of the sub-issue selection. A chronological selection helped us account for the dynamic of the debate. Time-invariant newspaper selection procedures—e.g. the selection of all articles published on a certain weekday—fail to capture the differences in the intensity of a debate and do not account for periods in which a greater volume of articles are published. By contrast, a chronological random sampling follows the occurrence distribution of relevant articles and, therefore, the peaks and troughs of the debate.

The articles selected are coded sentence-by-sentence, using the method of 'nuclear sentences'. This approach has its origins in early theoretical elaborations by Wittgenstein (1984 [1921]) and was first practically implemented in concrete coding instructions by Osgood (1956) and Axelrod (1976). Recently, it has been revived for the analysis of party systems (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kleinnijenhuis, de Ridder & Rietberg 1997). Additionally, Franzosi (2004: 60f.) has provided theoretical and empirical evidence that the method—which he calls 'story grammars'—is a useful device for the social sciences in general. 'Nuclear sentences' represent an inductive approach that aims to capture the full complexity of the political debate without imposing strong theoretical expectations (e.g. in terms of previously fixed category schemas) on the data.

The basic idea of this method comes in the notion that both the latent and manifest content of every written document can be described as a network of relationships between objects. For

the purpose of our project, we coded every relationship between 'political objects' (i.e. between a political actor and a political issue) that appears in the text. Each sentence is reduced to its most basic structure (the so-called 'nuclear sentence'), indicating only its subject (political actor) and its object (issue), as well as the direction of the relationship between the two. The direction is quantified using a scale ranging from '-1' to '+1' (with three intermediary positions). In substantive terms, such a nuclear sentence represents an actor's opinion on an issue. Each of these positions is complemented by up to five justifications, by which actors may explain and endorse their statement. This multiplicity of justifications results from the fact that actors often back their policy position by invoking multiple frames, either to discuss a complex issue persuasively, or to gain support from different audiences at the same time (Lerch & Schweltnus: 307). Table 2 gives a short, illustrative example of a nuclear sentence.

-- Table 2 about here --

As Kriesi et al. (2006) have shown, we can investigate the supply of politically relevant actors for the electorate more precisely with media data than is possible with more common data, like party manifesto data, expert surveys, or roll call data. Newspapers are a better tool for grasping new issues, and for understanding the direct confrontation between political actors. Furthermore, it is argued that a political party's image is much better represented in the media than in party manifestos, which hardly any ordinary citizen reads.

The European integration debate in six Western European countries

We shall now turn our attention to the empirical results of our study. Before we test our hypotheses concerning the framing of the European integration process, this first section shall provide the necessary context, by presenting an overview of how the public debate in the years 2004-2006 is thematically structured in the six countries under study. Table 3 reports

the salience of the various European-integration issues (i.e. their relative share of nuclear sentences in the media coverage). As could be expected for a debate that is highly driven by events and institutional actors on the European level, we observe a fairly similar pattern across countries: by far, the two most salient issues in all member states are the *enlargement* process—which includes the accession of Romania and Bulgaria (southeastern enlargement) and the question of Turkey’s membership, and the *constitutional treaty*. On average, these two key issues account for more than half of the media coverage, and heavily dominate the debate. The *enlargement* process is by far the most important issue in Austria and Germany with a salience of 51 and 40 per cent, respectively. In the UK, France, and the Netherlands, the *constitutional treaty* ranks number one with 34, 36 and 27 per cent, respectively. This issue’s comparatively high salience in the UK is somewhat surprising, as—unlike in France and the Netherlands—no referendum was held there during the time period under study.

An unsurprising exception to this general pattern is found in Switzerland, which shows a lesser, yet still considerable interest in the *enlargement process* (13 per cent) and the *constitutional treaty* (19 per cent), particularly for a non-EU member state. Here, it is clear that the focus of the debate rested on the then-ongoing second round of bilateral negotiations with the European Union. The two most controversial issues of these *bilateral treaties* were the extension of the agreement on the *free movement of persons* to the new CEE EU-member states, and the *Schengen/Dublin accord*², both finally approved by the Swiss citizens in a referendum. Taken together, these three issues account for 50 per cent of all statements in Switzerland.

-- Table 3 about here --

² As the Schengen agreement and the Dublin convention are part of the “Area of freedom, security and justice”, we subsume them under the label *security*.

There are a few other country-specific characteristics worth mentioning. Infringements of the stability pact drew considerable public attention to the *monetary union* in four of the five member countries (more than 9 percent salience in Austria, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands). Unlike the other countries, the UK demonstrated heightened interest in the *budgetary framework for 2007-13* (14 per cent), fiercely defending the “British rebate” against concerted attacks from other member states. Another country specific characteristic is found in the high salience of questions of *market liberalization* and *(re-)regulation* in France. These two economic issues, two sides of the same coin, account together for 20 per cent of all statements in the French debate.

In addition to salience, polarization is another indicator of political relevance, and is of strong interest to us. To this end, Table 3 also reports the mean value of all positions on a given issue for each country. A value of ‘+1’ or ‘-1’ would represent perfect positive or negative unanimity among political actors, whereas a value close to ‘0’ would indicate that they are deeply divided on a certain issue. In all member countries, we observe a high overall level of polarization (values close to 0), which supports the claim that the days of the (permissive) consensus in European integration politics are over (Hooghe and Marks 2007) on a very general level. Only the UK debate is considerably less polarized, adopting a generally Eurosceptical attitude (-0.30)— a finding that is substantiated by the almost identical negative value for the issue *EU-integration in general*. This skeptical attitude towards the EU has also been observed in British parties by Statham (2008: 19) in a less recent period of time, and is explained by Diez Medrano (2003) vis-à-vis the distinct historical legacy of the Empire. Switzerland proves to be an outlier once again, strongly in favor of European integration (0.29). However, this finding should be interpreted with some reservations, considering the non-member status of Switzerland and the fact that the highly controversial question of EU-

membership was largely absent from the debate during the period under study. Moreover, the bilateral treaties were also supported by Eurosceptics, who conceived them as a viable alternative to accession.

Let us now turn our attention to the core question of how the European integration process is framed. In pursuing our first step we are interested simply in the larger picture, aiming to show how the various issues we identified in the preceding part are framed (see Table 4). All the following tables are structured as follows: the first three rows list the different pragmatic frames; the fourth row lists the aggregated cultural arguments, which consist of Habermas's identity and value frames. In the lower part of each table we disaggregate the cultural frames according to the frame structure we presented in the section on frame categorization.

As Table 4 shows, five out of the ten main issues—namely *monetary union*, *market liberalization*, *regulation*, *free movement of persons* and the *bilateral treaties*—are framed in predominantly economic terms. Political actors place these issues in the context of welfare, unemployment, economic gains, or budgetary constraints. If the debate consisted largely of these issues, one might convincingly argue that European integration would be best described as an integral part of the classic economic dimension of political conflict, as the regulation model proposes (see Steenbergen & Marks 2004).

-- Table 4 about here --

However, there is a second, much more salient cluster of issues at play, which includes *EU-integration in general*, the *constitutional treaty*, *enlargement*, the *EU-budget* and *security*. These issues all demonstrate a comparatively low share of economic arguments, and are framed largely in terms of culture: Identity-based arguments in favor of national exclusion,

independence, and multiculturalism on the one hand, and moral-universalistic justifications like justice or solidarity on the other. Additionally, it is worth noting that the two most salient issues by far—the *constitutional treaty* and the *enlargement process*—feature a share of identity-based frames that is above average. This seems to confirm what we have already found, with regard to the demand side of the political market— namely, that questions of identity (and cultural motives in general) are the driving force of the growing Euroscepticism (Hooghe & Marks 2004; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2004).

From this, it becomes quite clear that European integration cannot be understood through a single economic or cultural dimension. It is also clear that utilitarian political motives account for a smaller, but still non-negligible share across these issues. The complex, multi-faceted nature of European integration issues seems to give leeway to political actors—allowing them flexibility when presenting these issues to their constituency. We will explore this further in the following section.

The framing of the debate by political actors

In analyzing Table 5, we shall first consider the overall pattern of frames used in arguments supporting or opposing European integration. Previously we had hypothesized that supporters of integration would frame arguments predominantly in economic, political and moral-universalist terms, while those opposed to integration would likewise employ case identity-related frames.³ However, if we consider the three main groups of frames (political, economic and cultural), it is clear that supporters and dissenters pursue a similar discourse on integration. Contrary to Medrano's argument, economic frames are even more prevalent among statements that espouse negative attitudes towards the EU. Moreover, it is clear that the Euro-

³ The two groups of supporters and nonsupporters include all actors that participate in the debate: political parties, governments, EU-actors, interest groups, experts, unions and actors from countries that do not belong to our six cases etc.

pean integration process is perceived on *both* sides as a cultural and political entity, as much as it is considered as an economic space. However, while the non-supporters of the European integration process mobilize national-exclusive and national-institutional frames more often than the supporters, the latter are much more inclined to use multicultural-inclusive and moral-universalist arguments. Surprisingly, the last group of frames is also used quite often by critics of the EU. If we look at the two groups of nationalistic frames, which differentiate between pro-sovereignty and civic nationalist frames on the one hand, and xenophobic/ethnic nationalist arguments on the other hand, we see that both are equally important—a finding that partially contradicts Statham and Grey’s (2005) findings. It is true, however, that nationalistic frames are of minor importance overall, even among the opponents. This finding supports Statham’s (2008: 38) general argument, that a large majority of Eurosceptic positions are reasoned arguments.

-- Table 5 about here--

In the next step, we seek to gain a more nuanced picture by investigating how political parties justify their positions.⁴ In order to better understand the different types of argumentation, and to link these findings to our prior discussion on the arguments of supporters and non-supporters, we indicate each party-family’s position towards the European integration process at the very bottom of Table 5. It comes as no surprise that the extremist parties at the right and the left strongly oppose the current European integration process while the established Social democrats, Liberals, and Greens are clearly in favor of the European integration process. The

⁴ We regrouped all political parties into six party-families: Radical left, Greens, Social democrats, Liberals, Conservatives and Right-wing populists. The attribution of the individual parties is specified in the notes of Table 5. All political actors whose party affiliation could be identified were allotted to the respective party-groups. Thus, also actors that took positions, for example, in their function as head of states or ministers are included in the analysis.

conservative parties take a rather ambivalent position. Collectively, these parties can be seen as the ‘permissive consensus’ in the center of the political spectrum.

Overall, we see a clear difference of argumentation between major established parties that are in favor of the European integration process, and the minor left and right-wing parties that are much more critical. We also observe a kind of ‘U’ pattern, with regard to the use of frames. Again, the findings contradict the predictions of scholars who expect supporters to pursue a mainly economic discourse. With the exception of the Social Democrats, economic frames are used much more intensively by the Radical left and the Right-wing populists. The established parties, by contrast, justify their positive positions with political arguments, and thereby refer to the efficiency of the political system and to procedural questions. The very high number of economic frames used by the Radical left confirms the widely held argument that those forces oppose the current integration process, perceiving the EU as a neo-liberal construction, and seeking to protect the national workforces. Surprisingly, at least the last aspect also seems to be of importance for those at the other end of the political spectrum. Almost half of all arguments used by the Right-wing populists fall into the cultural group, however. At the disaggregated level, we see that they use national-exclusive and national-institutional frames much more often than the other parties, by far. This finding supports the theories of those authors who argue that opponents from the right argue mainly in cultural terms. It is interesting to observe that the Right-wing populists mobilize arguments based on political self-determination and national-independence more frequently than they do xenophobic frames. All the other parties use the moral-universalist justifications much more often. Especially in the cases of the Radical left and the Greens, which are often considered as post-materialist forces, moral-universalist discourses are quite important. The Greens also strongly emphasize pragmatic ecological frames, which are included in the category “other pragmatic”, more often than the other party groups.

Country-specific differences in the framing of political parties

Having observed different framing strategies among party-families, the next question we would like to address is whether these patterns vary between the supporting and Eurosceptic countries, and whether the presence of Right-wing populist forces has a noticeable impact on these patterns. Table 6 shows the framing of all party actors in a country, as well as the discourse of Right-wing populists in countries where they constitute a relevant political force. While they are traditionally weak in the United Kingdom and in Germany, it came as a surprise that we did not find enough observations for Right-wing populists in Austria—the Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)—to include them in our analyses. It might be that the FPÖ — the major right-wing populist force in this country—kept a low profile in criticizing the EU, as they were part of the coalition government during the first half of our investigative period. The subsequent 2005 split-up, into a more moderate and a more radical faction, did not have an observable impact on the low standing of these two right-wing populist parties.

-- Table 6 about here --

As we have already seen in Table 3, Euroscepticism is particularly widespread in the United Kingdom. Although we found highly positive values for Switzerland for reasons we have already discussed, Switzerland is also often considered to be particularly hostile towards the European integration process (Kriesi 2007). However, it is difficult to see a systematic difference of argumentation in these two countries. While the national-exclusive and national-institutional frames are slightly more prevalent on average in the UK than in the other countries, it is clear that, in Switzerland especially, national-exclusive arguments are quite rare even among the Right-wing populists.

The Swiss dynamic can be explained by the fact that, during the period of our investigation, a major referendum was held concerning the bilateral treaties with the European Union. One of the major issues at stake was the free movement of persons, which was mainly discussed in terms of the economic implications of the introduction of such a regime. An important argument in this context was that the opening of the borders would lead to higher unemployment and decreasing social security standards. While explicitly economic, this argumentation has at least some latent xenophobic connotations. Furthermore, if Switzerland had to decide on full EU-membership, we would certainly have seen a more culturally driven debate on Swiss identity, sovereignty, and the role of central political institutions (such as the direct democratic regime). However, the prevalence of economic frames in the context of the bilateral treaties referendum also must be seen in the light of the specific role and the position of the Swiss People's Party (SVP)—the major right-wing populist force in this country. Contrary to the Right-wing populists in other countries, the SVP is an established political force. Moreover, and contrary to its image among the electorate, the SVP is also very much concerned with economic issues, such as tax and budget reduction (Mudde 2007: 123; Kriesi et al. 2005).

Looking at Table 6, it is clear that Right-wing populists in the Netherlands and France rarely pursue an economic discourse, and that they employ national-institutional and (to an even greater degree) national-exclusive arguments much more than other parties.⁵ France and the Netherlands also represent the two cases where cultural frames are much more widespread than in other countries. However, the presence of right-wing populist forces does not seem to lead to a more nationalist discourse among other parties. On the contrary, we see that their cultural arguments consist mainly of multicultural and moral-universalist frames. It might be that, in these two countries, the discourse of the Right-wing populists was not adopted by oth-

⁵ It thus appears that despite country weights the high number of economic frames for right-wing populists that we observed in Table 5 is mainly due to the discourse of the Swiss People's Party (SVP).

er parties, but instead led to an important counter mobilization. It might also be that the referendum on the European Constitution that was held in these two countries during our period of investigation has given rise to an excessive use of cultural frames. Overall, we can conclude that the two country-specific characteristics, ‘presence of right-wing populist forces’ and ‘widespread Euroscepticism,’ have no impact on the argumentation of other parties.

Issues and framing

In this final empirical section, we would like to discuss whether the frame patterns we observed among political parties are the same across all the important issues of the European integration process, or whether the way the EU is perceived *also* depends on the different aspects of this process. We have already shown that two broad categories of issues can be distinguished in the debate on European integration, according to how they are framed (see Table 4). There is a clear cluster of economically framed issues, and another more heterogeneous framed cluster, comprising issues for which political, economic and cultural frames are more or less equally mobilized.

As the results in Table 7 reveal, there are substantial differences in the framing patterns of the various party families.⁶ In addition to the information provided in the preceding tables, we also list the salience of parties’ positions at the bottom of Table 7. Comparing the two dominant party groups, the Social democrats and the Conservatives, it is clear that they do not differ very much in their use of frames. However, their discrepancy in positions and salience is striking. The Social Democrats demonstrate clear, *opposed* positions for the two issue categories. So, while Table 5 suggested that the Social Democrats are in favor of the European inte-

⁶ In an additional analysis we regrouped the issues into economic and institutional issues not according to how they are framed (as we do in Table 7) but deductively on the basis of the content of the respective issues. We however got the same results as the ones we present in the next paragraphs.

gration process overall, Table 7 reveals that they clearly oppose further economic integration. With 48 per cent of their stances framed in economic terms, they are the party-family that is most active on economic issues. The Conservatives, on the other hand, focus heavily on heterogeneously framed issues (44 per cent) and demonstrate comparatively low interest in the economic issues. Furthermore, the low values for their positions (0.07 and 0.24) indicate ambivalent attitudes among and within the different conservative parties. At the center of the political spectrum, the Liberals are clearly in favor of the European integration process, and demonstrate similar framing characteristics to those of the two large party groups.

The three remaining party groups at the poles of the political scale, exhibit a significant deviation from the pattern established by the dominant parties. The Greens show a consistent cultural framing in both issue clusters. Remarkable is their constantly high share of moral-universalistic frames that implies that this part of the Greens' argumentation is due to their ideological heritage of New Social Movement beliefs and reasoning. The Radical left pursues a very consistent discourse, irrespective of the issues that are at the core of the debate—perceiving European integration as a whole as predominantly economic.

-- Table 7 about here --

As we already know, the seemingly inconsistent argumentation of the right-wing populist parties is due to one party, the Swiss People's Party (SVP). More detailed analysis reveals that almost all of the stances on economic issues stem from the Swiss People's Party (more than 90%) and that these positions are responsible for the Right-wing populists' high share of economic framing. Thus, it appears that the SVP strategically restrains their identity-based core argument, whereas the other Right-wing populists insist on the same identity-based argumentation towards all issues.

Conclusion

This article set out to disaggregate the debate on the European integration process, and to better understand how this process is perceived by political parties in six Western European countries. By doing so, we did not simply look at who is in favor of the European integration process, or which characteristics of the particular actors might explain their positions. Much more radically, we worked to figure out which arguments were mobilized to support actors' positions. To capture the extensive debate on the European integration process, we proposed an innovative and complex frame categorization that allowed us to verify different and detailed hypotheses. Relying on a new and extensive dataset, we were in the position to look simultaneously at six different countries, various party groups, and all of the relevant issues that were debated in the period from 2004 to 2006.

We came to the conclusion that the way political parties discuss the European integration process depends strongly on their standing and positions. Overall, it appeared that the European integration process is perceived as a cultural and political entity as much as it is considered as an economic space. This proves true for both supporting and opposing statements—a finding that contradicts the expectations of authors who argue that economic frames are more prevalent among those with integration-positive attitudes, and cultural frames are more prevalent among those with negative attitudes towards the EU. We obtained a more nuanced picture when we analyzed individual party-families. There was a kind of 'U' pattern with regard to the use of frames: while established parties and the Greens used political arguments more often than economic ones (with the exceptions of the Social Democrats), the parties at the far left and the far right behaved contrariwise. With regard to cultural frames, it appeared that Right-wing populists used national-exclusive and national-institutional frames much more often than the other parties. All the other parties mainly used moral-universalist justifications.

As far as country-specific characteristics are concerned, we can conclude that the presence of right-wing populist forces and general Euroscepticism have no impact on the argumentation of established parties. At the same time, however, it is clear that political parties' argumentation depends on the sub-issues that lie at the core of the debate at a specific moment. The mainstream parties appear to shift strategically, moving from an economic to a more cultural and political discourse depending on which sub-issue is at stake. Only the small parties of the Left—the Greens and Radical left—as well as the Right-wing populists (except the SVP) apply the same framing irrespective of the particular sub-issue debated. These parties consistently frame issues in line with their ideological beliefs—the Radical left in economic terms, and the Populist Right in cultural terms, relying squarely on nationalistic arguments.

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Table 1: Frame structure

<i>utilitarian</i>			<i>cultural</i>			
<i>pragmatic</i>			<i>identity-based</i>			<i>moral-universal</i>
political reasons	economic reasons	other pragmatic reasons	national-exclusive reasons	national-institutional reasons	multicultural-inclusive reasons	basic rights and general moral principles

Table 2: Example of the 'Nuclear Sentence' method

Le Monde, Jan. 14, 2005: “Chirac est favorable à l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'Union européenne.” (Chirac supports the EU accession of Turkey).		
<i>actor</i>	<i>direction</i>	<i>issue</i>
Jacques Chirac	+1	EU accession of Turkey

Table 3: Issue salience (percentages) and position by country

<i>Issues</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>
EU-integration in general	5 <i>0.02</i>	8 <i>-0.31</i>	6 <i>0.55</i>	6 <i>0.36</i>	6 <i>0.06</i>	7 <i>0.07</i>
Constitutional treaty	18 <i>0.01</i>	34 <i>-0.32</i>	36 <i>-0.01</i>	22 <i>0.02</i>	27 <i>0.04</i>	19 <i>-0.29</i>
Enlargement (incl. eastern e., Turkey)	51 <i>-0.07</i>	16 <i>0.59</i>	14 <i>-0.34</i>	40 <i>0.00</i>	21 <i>0.00</i>	13 <i>0.15</i>
Budgetary framework 07-13	3 -	14 <i>-0.53</i>	7 <i>0.40</i>	2 -	8 <i>-0.63</i>	3 -
Security (incl. Schengen)	3 <i>0.15</i>	2 <i>0.04</i>	5 <i>0.66</i>	1 -	3 <i>0.07</i>	14 <i>0.28</i>
Monetary union (incl. stability pact)	10 <i>0.32</i>	9 <i>-0.02</i>	6 <i>-0.06</i>	20 <i>0.08</i>	9 <i>0.43</i>	2 -
Market liberalization (incl. service directive)	2 -	2 <i>0.10</i>	10 <i>-0.68</i>	0 -	3 <i>-0.22</i>	3 <i>-0.50</i>
Regulated capitalism (incl. CAP)	2 -	10 <i>-0.78</i>	10 <i>0.59</i>	2 -	8 <i>0.07</i>	4 <i>0.17</i>
Free movement of persons	3 -	2 <i>-0.47</i>	0 -	2 -	3 <i>-0.04</i>	16 <i>0.35</i>
Bilateral treaties EU- Switzerland	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -	17 <i>0.35</i>
Other Issues	4 -	3 -	5 -	6 -	12 -	3 -
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Positions</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>-0.30</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.10</i>	<i>0.29</i>
N	2'076	1'602	4'006	1'722	2'539	2'493

Notes: Issues with salience greater than 10 per cent are highlighted. Positions are only reported if N>15. The indicator 'positions' varies between '-1' and '1'. In order to obtain a clear picture for every country, we have only included statements of *national* actors in this calculation.

Table 4: Framing by issues (percentages)

	<i>EU-integ. in general</i>	<i>Constit. Treaty</i>	<i>Enlarge- ment</i>	<i>Budget. framewrk</i>	<i>Security (Schengen)</i>	<i>Monetary union</i>	<i>Market liberaliz.</i>	<i>Regul. capitalism</i>	<i>Free mov. of persons</i>	<i>Bilat. Treaties</i>	<i>Total</i>
Political	29	37	34	37	25	28	15	21	12	36	31
Economic	20	19	14	19	16	64	72	52	76	38	29
Other pragmatic	9	4	10	0	24	0	0	6	4	5	7
Cultural	42	40	41	44	34	7	13	21	8	21	33
<i>National- exclusive</i>	5	7	9	1	4	0	3	1	5	0	5
<i>National- institutional</i>	16	8	1	1	10	2	2	3	1	4	5
<i>Multicultural- inclusive</i>	6	7	8	14	8	2	1	3	1	1	6
<i>Moral- universalist</i>	15	18	23	29	13	4	6	13	2	15	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	809	3'006	2'702	429	718	746	731	870	612	371	11'649

Notes: All categories have been weighted by country-weights.

Table 5: Framing by supporters/opponents and political parties (percentages)

	<i>Supporting positions</i>	<i>Opposing positions</i>	<i>Radical left</i>	<i>Greens</i>	<i>Social democrats</i>	<i>Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Right-wing populists</i>
Political	32	29	17	35	34	39	39	16
Economic	28	31	50	9	33	19	20	30
Other pragmatic	9	4	2	21	7	7	5	9
Cultural	30	36	31	35	27	35	35	47
<i>National-exclusive</i>	3	9	0	3	2	5	7	16
<i>National-institutional</i>	3	9	11	4	4	6	6	22
<i>Multicultural-inclusive</i>	7	4	0	4	5	9	8	2
<i>Moral-universalist</i>	17	16	20	25	16	15	15	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Positions</i>			<i>-0.51</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.15</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.12</i>	<i>-0.59</i>
N	6'916	4'383	160	289	1'902	669	2'391	521

Notes: All categories have been weighted by country-weights. The categories 'supporting and opposing positions' include all actors present in the debate (not only political parties) and summarize all positive and negative positions. The indicator 'positions' varies between '-1' and '1'.

The party-families consist of the following parties:

Radical left: PCF, LCR, LO (F); PDS, Die Linke (D); SP (NL); PdA (CH)

Greens: Die Grünen (A); Les verts (F); Die Grünen (D); Groen Links (NL); GPS (CH)

Social-democrats: SPÖ (A); Labour (GB); PSF, MDC/MRC, MRG/PRG (F); SPD (D); PvdA (NL); SPS (CH)

Liberals: Liberales Forum (A); LDP (GB); UDF (F); FDP (D); D66, VVD (NL); FDP, LPS (CH)

Conservatives: ÖVP (A); Conservative Party (GB); UMP, RPR, RPF (F); CDU/CSU (D); CDA (NL); CVP (CH)

Right-wing populists: BZÖ, FPÖ (A); FN, MNR, MPF (F); LPF, PVV (NL); SVP (CH)

Table 6: Framing by parties and countries (percentages)

	<i>Austria</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>France</i>		<i>Germany</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>		<i>Switzerland</i>	
	<i>T</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>RWP</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>RWP</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>RWP</i>
Political	30	31	19	15	38	36	16	21	13
Economic	31	30	39	14	29	17	11	46	51
Other pragmatic	9	7	2.0	8	9	7	16	11	12
Cultural	30	32	40	63	24	39	57	21	25
<i>National-exclusive</i>	7	5	7	38	6	5	24	3	6
<i>National-institutional</i>	7	10	4	16	0	8	14	7	13
<i>Multicultural-inclusive</i>	3	3	9	0	6	8	13	1	0
<i>Moral-universalist</i>	12	15	19	9	12	18	6	11	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	323	389	2'155	140	340	1'385	63	1'278	238

Notes: 'T' includes all frames used by political parties in the respective countries and 'RWP' those of Right-wing populists. In Austria, the United Kingdom and Germany the number of frames used by Right-wing populists was too small to make relevant statements. Only frames used by national political actors have been included.

Table 7: Framing by parties and issue-clusters (percentages)

	<i>Radical left</i>		<i>Greens</i>		<i>Social democrats</i>		<i>Liberals</i>		<i>Conservatives</i>		<i>Right-wing populists</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>
Political	20	8	38	17	39	20	37	43	41	28	13	14	38	23
Economic	51	57	3	47	20	59	12	35	14	57	13	61	16	56
Other pragm.	0	7	23	9	8	6	9	3	6	3	13	4	8	5
Cultural	28	28	35	27	33	16	42	19	39	13	61	21	39	17
<i>National-exclusive</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>National-institutional</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Multicultural-inclusive</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Moral-universalist</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>10</i>
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Positions</i>	<i>-0.64</i>	<i>-0.48</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.51</i>	<i>0.34</i>	<i>-0.27</i>	<i>0.26</i>	<i>0.67</i>	<i>0.07</i>	<i>0.24</i>	<i>-0.81</i>	<i>-0.25</i>		
N	108	45	225	57	1'263	571	443	160	1'795	444	344	169	4'217	1'451
Saliency (%)	2	2	7	3	33	48	8	9	44	26	7	12	100	100

Notes: The diversely framed issues (d) include the issues EU-integration in general, constitutional treaty, enlargement, budgetary framework and security. The economically framed issues (e) consist of the issues monetary union, market liberalization, regulated capitalism, free movement of persons and the bilateral treaties. The residual category has been excluded. All categories and saliency have been weighted by country-weights. The indicator 'positions' varies between '-1' and '1'. The absolute numbers of negative and positive positions does not equal the overall number of frames as there are some neutral positions that have been excluded from the analyses.