



---

Year: 2017

---

## Party System Responsiveness and Left-Wing Populist Success in Latin America

Bornschieer, Simon

**Abstract:** This paper sets out to explain the highly uneven breakthrough of the “populist” or “contestatory” left during the “left turn” in Latin America since the late 1990s. Extant attempts to explain why moderate left parties that resemble the traditional social democratic mass parties have emerged in some countries, and populist left parties in others have been inconclusive. I argue that populist anti-establishment mobilization falls on fruitful ground where party systems do not adequately represent citizen preferences. This is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for populist success. Combining data on party positions with mass-level surveys for two cases where new anti-establishment parties that have been successful and two cases of failure, I analyze how well parties represent voters along the two most salient dimensions of political competition in Latin America: the economic antagonism between state and market, and the regime dimension that pits democrats (or those in favor of deepening democracy) against those holding positive evaluations of past military dictatorships. At the party level, I use data from the Salamanca Parliamentary Elites Surveys (PELA) and from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys. At the voter level, I rely on the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Latinobarómetro surveys. I first locate parties and voters on the dimensions mentioned above and then use an innovative measure to assess party system responsiveness. The paper shows that party systems in Venezuela and Bolivia lacked responsiveness prior to Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales’ successful bids for the presidency. In Chile, and to a lesser degree in Brazil, on the other hand, the close correspondence between voter preferences and party positions along the economic and political regime divides explains why new anti-establishment actors have not been successful. Looking at the evolution of party system responsiveness during the “left turn” questions the simple dichotomization of left parties into moderate and populist camps, however. While responsiveness improved substantially after the emergence of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, it remains poor in Venezuela after Chávez came to power. Likewise, there are persistent differences in terms of representation in Chile and Brazil, both of which belong to the moderate left group. Beyond the initial expectations, the results thus show two pathways of the left to power in Latin America in the new millennium: A programmatic or “segmented” and a “majoritarian” path. Populist actors clearly pursue majoritarian strategies, but some non-populist actors do as well, as the Brazilian case shows.

Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich  
ZORA URL: <https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-147861>  
Conference or Workshop Item

Originally published at:

Bornschieer, Simon (2017). Party System Responsiveness and Left-Wing Populist Success in Latin America. In: ECPR General Conference 2017, Oslo, 6 September 2017 - 9 September 2017, ECPR.

# Party System Responsiveness and Left-Wing Populist Success in Latin America

Simon Bornschieer  
University of Zurich  
[siborn@ipz.uzh.ch](mailto:siborn@ipz.uzh.ch)

Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR General Conference in Oslo,

September 6-9, 2017.

## Abstract

This paper sets out to explain the highly uneven breakthrough of the “populist” or “contestatory” left during the “left turn” in Latin America since the late 1990s. Extant attempts to explain why moderate left parties that resemble the traditional social democratic mass parties have emerged in some countries, and populist left parties in others have been inconclusive. I argue that populist anti-establishment mobilization falls on fruitful ground where party systems do not adequately represent citizen preferences. This is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for populist success. Combining data on party positions with mass-level surveys for two cases where new anti-establishment parties that have been successful and two cases of failure, I analyze how well parties represent voters along the two most salient dimensions of political competition in Latin America: the economic antagonism between state and market, and the regime dimension that pits democrats (or those in favor of deepening democracy) against those holding positive evaluations of past military dictatorships. At the party level, I use data from the Salamanca Parliamentary Elites Surveys (PELA) and from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys. At the voter level, I rely on the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Latinobarómetro surveys. I first locate parties and voters on the dimensions mentioned above and then use an innovative measure to assess party system responsiveness.

The paper shows that party systems in Venezuela and Bolivia lacked responsiveness prior to Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales’ successful bids for the presidency. In Chile, and to a lesser degree in Brazil, on the other hand, the close correspondence between voter preferences and party positions along the economic and political regime divides explains why new anti-establishment actors have not been successful. Looking at the evolution of party system responsiveness during the “left turn” questions the simple dichotomization of left parties into moderate and populist camps, however. While responsiveness improved substantially after the emergence of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, it remains poor in Venezuela after Chávez came to power. Likewise, there are persistent differences in terms of representation in Chile and Brazil, both of which belong to the moderate left group.

Beyond the initial expectations, the results thus show two pathways of the left to power in Latin America in the new millennium: A programmatic or “segmented” and a “majoritarian” path. Populist actors clearly pursue majoritarian strategies, but some non-populist actors do as well, as the Brazilian case shows.

## Introduction

The idea that failures of democratic representation create opportunities for political outsiders is central both to cleavage-based accounts of party system change, as well as to the ideational approach to populism. In the former framework, populists are seen as agents who re-establish congruence between party systems and specific segments of the electorate. The diagnosis of the ideational approach is one of a more generalized crisis of democratic representation that makes citizens susceptible to being mobilized by a (thin) ideology that pits “the people” against a corrupt and self-serving elite (c.f. Mudde, 2004; Hawkins, 2010; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). In this paper, I show that the two approaches can fruitfully be combined when it comes to explaining the breakthrough of populist or radical challenger parties on the one hand, and the prevalence of moderate left parties on the other hand during Latin America’s “left turn” of the 1990s and 2000s.

What the cleavage approach and the ideational populist approach share is the idea that representation failure is a necessary condition for the breakthrough of new political parties. This is the first hypothesis that is tested in this paper. The second proposition questions the stark differentiation between the radical/populist/ contestatory left in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and a pragmatic/moderate left in Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil that is prevalent in the early literature on the “left turn” or the “pink tide” (e.g., Castañeda, 2006; Weyland, 2009; 2010, among others). I suggest instead that there is a programmatic and a populist path to power. The former can be studied using a cleavage approach based on the work on the older democracies of Western Europe, which focuses on the processes of dealignment and realignment between specific social groups and political parties. Along the populist path, on the other hand, new anti-establishment political actors have a majoritarian appeal because vast majorities of the voting population have become disillusioned with the existing parties.

Hence, although representation failure is a necessary condition for populist success, the size of the groups that are not adequately represented in a party system may differ in terms of numbers.

Importantly, the distinction between a programmatic and a populist path to power cuts across the distinction between moderate and radical-populist left parties in Latin America. Thus, although the Movement towards Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia and the Bolivarian movement in Venezuela are commonly seen as exponents of the radical populist left – with a qualification made by Levitsky and Roberts (2011a) that is important, as we will see – the former followed the programmatic path, whereas the latter pursued what might be called a “pure” populist strategy. As a result, the MAS has restored responsiveness in the party system, whereas the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) in Venezuela has failed to do so. From the perspective adopted in this paper, MAS’ path to power has been similar to that pursued by the Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT), an exponent of the “moderate” left. However, the Brazilian case differs from the Bolivian one in that the electorate of the PT, by coming to encompass ever-larger segments of the population over time, has lost its unique ideological characteristics, thereby damaging the quality of representation.

These hypotheses are tested based on an in-depth analysis of four Latin American cases: Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile. The Chilean case serves as an illustration of a country with moderate left-wing parties that were responsive to voter preferences throughout the period studied. In the other three cases, new political parties reached power during the “left turn”, yet these left parties differed profoundly in their appeals and in their impact on the party system. To assess party system responsiveness, I use an innovative approach that combines data on party positions with mass-level surveys along the state-market and democratic regime dimensions to measure the quality of representation. The analysis focuses on the mid-1990s, prior to the resurgence of the left that set off with Hugo Chávez’ successful

bid for the presidency in 1998. I then assess the quality of representation in the mid-2000s, after the left reached majorities throughout the countries studied.

This paper is structured as follows. I begin by discussing the widespread distinction between the moderate and the populist left in Latin America, and then go on to present a theory of how established conflicts and alignments limit the space for new political actors in general, and populists in particular. I then develop the idea of a programmatic and a populist path to power, before justifying the choice of cases to be included in the analysis. The ensuing section explains in detail the data and methods I use to measure representational congruence. The empirical section then starts out by presenting aggregated evidence for the two hypotheses tested in this paper, but also takes a closer look at the positions of parties and their voters that drive these patterns.

### Populism and the “left turn” in Latin America

In Latin America, the most recent wave of populism is associated with the “left turn” of the late 1990s and 2000s, following an era of structural economic adjustment policies and austerity (Panizza, 2009). While some of the left-wing parties that came to govern in the post-neoliberal era resemble classical mass parties and have taken decades to institutionalize, others represent new political movements that appeal to voters by mobilizing against the political establishment. Weyland (2010) uses the term “contestatory” left to distinguish the latter group – encompassing Venezuela’s Bolivarian movement and Bolivia’s Movement for Socialism – from the more moderate leftist parties that governed Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil. While the latter respect economic constraints and political opposition, the contestatory left presents a more profound challenge to the status quo both in terms of rhetoric and action. As a working hypothesis, I label the contestatory variant of the left as “populist”, following the

recent comparative literature (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Roberts, 2015; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015). I discuss more fine-grained distinctions between new political actors on the left later on. As the empirical results presented in this paper show, these distinctions are highly relevant to the kind of electorate new left parties rally and to the impact they have on the representation of voter preferences.

To distinguish between populist and non-populist forms of mobilization, I draw on the “ideational” approach to populism that conceives of the latter as a “thin ideology”, whose central element is the juxtaposition between “the people” and an elite that has betrayed the people and is no longer responsive to the preferences of the citizenry (e.g., Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Hawkins *et al.*, forthcoming). In this conception, populism is compatible with a range of distinct “host ideologies”, but in all its manifestations, it exhibits an anti-pluralist ideological core that consists in the idea that politics should be the expression of the “volonté générale” or the general will of the people (Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2004, p. 543). While populism can also be viewed as merely being a discourse or a strategy used by political outsiders (e.g., Weyland, 2001), the definition offered by the ideational approach has the advantage of conceptual clarity (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 499). Thus, it allows for a clear distinction between populist and non-populist forms of mobilization in theoretical terms, as well as for drawing the boundaries between populist worldviews and other manifestations of democratic malaise such as political alienation, lack of political trust, etc. (Hawkins *et al.*, forthcoming; Hawkins, 2010).

Thus far, there are rather few attempts to explain why moderate left-wing mass parties have emerged in some countries and populist left parties in others (e.g., Weyland, 2009). Remmer's (2012) analysis suggests that ideological demand-side factors are not particularly relevant in explaining the choice of moderate or populist/contestatory left-wing ideologies by parties in various countries. I counter this contention by tying voter preferences to differences

in the options that party systems offer to voters. Thus, my central hypothesis is that the lack of responsiveness of the party systems in the populist left countries explains why an anti-political establishment mobilization was successful. A persistent lack of parties to respond to the preferences of voters erodes partisan loyalties and the legitimacy of the political system, making voters open for appeals by new political actors. This is why Hawkins (2010) and Doyle (2011) have identified political distrust as a crucial factor driving support for populists such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. The moderate left in Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil emerged in a much more incremental process typical of classical mass parties. The ability of these parties to successfully compete and build a following tempered discontent and voters remained committed to a strategy of political change within existing institutions. Consequently, due to the relatively high degree of citizen support in these countries, the moderate left relied and continues to rely on economic policy appeals and the salient regime issue to rally support, and does not adopt the anti-establishment rhetoric typical of the populist left. Thus, the distinction between the moderate and the populist left echoes that made by Levitsky and Roberts (2011b: 407–410) between the “institutional” and the “crisis-outsider” path to power.

### Representation failure and the populist challenge

Much of the literature has focused on proximate causes of the breakdown of parties or party systems, which often pave the way for the rise of populist challengers (e.g., Lupu, 2014). Embedding these accounts in a more encompassing framework that includes proximate and more remote factors shows that short-term factors are often strongly shaped by long-term party system evolutions, and cannot be understood in isolation from them (c.f., Bornschier,

2016).<sup>1</sup> Adopting such a perspective allows us to take advantage of a vast literature that has studied the conditions shaping the fortunes of challenger parties that are not populist (a similar point is made by Roberts 2015). My contention is that party systems under some certain conditions provide space for challengers – whether of a populist type or not – while the mobilization space for any kind of new actor is restricted under other conditions.

From a historical cleavage perspective, the capacity of new political actors to rally voters is limited by voters' existing partisan attachments (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1999; Kriesi and Duyvendak, 1995; Bartolini, 2000; Bornschier, 2010). To the degree that existing divisions remain salient and that new divides do not reinforce, but rather cut across them, the party system tends to “organize” new issues “out of politics”, in Schattschneider's (1975 [1960]: chap. 4) famous words.<sup>2</sup> As long as an individual's group attachments and political identities tied to the existing structure of conflict are stronger than his or her identification with a cause that draws a new group boundary – such as belonging to the amorphous group of “the pure people” that is betrayed by the corrupt elite – the individuals' political alignment will remain stable. Any change in political preference thus requires a prior transformation in an individuals' salience hierarchy of identities (Stryker, 1980, 2000). More specifically, older political identities must fade and new ones must become stronger to make a political realignment become a realistic possibility. I discuss these two components of the theoretical model – the fading of older political identities and the rise of new ones – in turn.

(1) The strength of older divisions and the political identifications they entail at the individual level depends first of all on how strongly parties reinforce these identifications by

---

1 Another partial exception to the tendency to focus on short-term factors to explain the reconfiguration of Latin American party systems after the third wave of democratization is Kenneth Roberts' (2014) work, given that his analysis stretches back to what he calls the “neo-liberal critical juncture” of 1980s. However, as I argue elsewhere (Bornschier 2016), the contrasting party systems evolutions during the neoliberal phase are themselves strongly shaped by earlier patterns of political representation.

2 It is irrelevant in this respect whether extant alignments are strongly structured by social group membership – such as in the case of the traditional class and religious cleavages – or whether they are more strongly politically defined, as in the case of contemporary Western Europe's over-arching economic and cultural ideological alignments (Bornschier 2010: 57-60).

offering distinctive positions along the older divides (Bornschieer 2010: chap. 3). Conflict reinforces the group attachments that underlie political divides, and thus perpetuates alignments (Coser, 1956; Sartori, 1968). Political conflict nurtures the ideological schemas, in Conover and Feldman's (1984) terms, that voters have in their minds and that help them understand politics and form preferences concerning the political issues of the day. When different social groups each have strong partisan loyalties, the pattern of competition can be called “segmented” (Mair, 1997, pp. 162–171): The electoral market is tightly restrained and leaves little room for the emergence of new lines of opposition or new political parties. Indeed, there is now an impressive literature on party systems in the advanced democracies that underscores that conflict constitutes the reproductive mechanism underlying the traditional cleavages (van der Brug, 2010; Adams, de Vries and Leiter, 2011; Evans and Tilley, 2011; Evans and de Graaf, 2013; Rennwald and Evans, 2014). But there is also evidence from Latin America that polarization creates, while de-polarization dilutes the links between social groups and parties that stabilize party systems (e.g., Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Bornschieer, 2016; Levitsky *et al.*, 2016).

If parties converge in their spacial policy positions, this results in dealignment, or, in Roberts' (2014) terms, can set off a “dealigning critical juncture”. If voters’ ideological schemas are no longer nurtured by political conflict, voters become open for the appeals of new parties, movements, or charismatic leaders. Paradoxically, pacted transitions to democracy that are engineered to avoid extreme political conflict may have this long-term effect, as new generations of voters are socialized into politics that have no memory of the conflicts that made elite pacts necessary (Bornschieer 2016). Examples in point are the pacted transition back to democracy in Colombia in 1958 after the civil war known as La Violencia, and the Punto Fijo pact agreed upon in Venezuela in 1958. In the first decades after the elite pacts that ended polarization, these party systems may have appeared “segmented” in the term discussed above, due to the memory of intense conflict. But these political identifications

became hollowed out as they were no longer nurtured by political conflict, but came to depend almost exclusively on the flow of clientelistic resources (e.g., Coppedge, 1994).<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, when the established parties have converged in their policy positions, they are tempted to in some way or another inhibit the entry of competitors. Because they are no longer responsive to voters' substantive policy preferences, they are left with two principal options: The first is to form an outright cartel by outlawing fringe parties or by introducing strong hurdles to the entry of new parties. The other option is to substitute programmatic partisan linkages with clientelistic efforts to maintain loyalties to the cartel.<sup>4</sup> Clientelism, in turn, requires financial resources that foster corrupt practices. The dependence on a constant flow of particularistic resources also makes clientelistic party systems vulnerable to populist challenges as soon as these resources dry up. In fact, this short-term factor plays an important role in explaining the timing of the breakdown of party systems if parties do not complement particularistic linkages with programmatic ones. Evidence is provided here by the Venezuelan case (Roberts, 2003; Morgan, 2011), as well as the PRI's loss of power in Mexico (Fox, 1994; Magaloni, 2006). In the medium term, cartelization thus fosters dealignment. In the longer run, it erodes the legitimacy of the political system, thereby opening a window of opportunity for populists, who are known to thrive on crises of legitimacy (Hawkins 2010, Doyle 2011).

(2) On the other hand, change can also come from below, as a result of the evolving preferences of voters. These can result from structural change, as it has occurred in the advanced democracies, triggering the transformation of historical cleavages (Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kriesi *et al.*, 2008). Likewise, the growth of the informal sector in Latin America has made the core constituencies along the state-market divide shrink. This creates new political potentials that parties can respond to in two different ways. First, an

---

3 Likewise, Karreth, Polk, and Allen (2012) show that European Social Democrats' catch-all strategies may be electorally rewarding in the short run, but in the medium term, parties that abandon their traditional program often lose significant vote shares.

4 This is actually the ideal-typical case of Katz and Mair's (1995) cartelization thesis, a phenomenon that in this pure form is a more adequate description of Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Colombia, rather than in the Western European context, for which the theory was originally developed.

established or a new party can address the substantive concerns that underlie the political potentials, for example by adopting social policy initiatives that provide universalistic social rights for those in need (e.g., Pribble, 2013). Alternatively, parties may adapt their linkage portfolio by distributing clientelistic resources to dealigned constituencies (Levitsky, 2003; Luna, 2014). Clientelism may for some time compensate for a lack of party system responsiveness and therefore obscure the fact that voters are dealigned. However, if parties replace programmatic linkages by clientelistic ones, this may render them more vulnerable to attacks by anti-establishment actors in times of crisis (Morgan, 2011). Even then, the response need not be populist: A crisis of representation may be resolved by non-populist forces or former fringe parties that mobilize the electoral potentials neglected by established parties, but only if they stay true to their campaign promises. By performing policy shifts (Stokes, 2001) or setting off dealigning critical junctures (Roberts 2014), new political parties may worsen the crisis of legitimacy that the political system faces.

#### Programmatic and populist paths to power

To summarize, an erosion of a party system's roots in society – and the concomitant large number of floating voters that results from the process of dealignment – represents a necessary condition for populist success. So far, the cleavage approach and the ideational approach to populism concur. They differ, however, in the diagnosis of how deep the crisis of representation runs. From a cleavage perspective, populism is a phenomenon that accompanies gradual processes of realignment in mature party systems, triggered by slowly evolving voter preferences. In other words, it tends to assume that populism is driven by change from below, rather than cartelization or dealigning critical junctures set off by parties themselves, building on the distinction made in the preceding section. Change from below in

a system where parties are responsive to voter preferences translates into a programmatic path to power, where the left adopts clear-cut policy positions and mobilizes voters who closely mirror these ideological convictions. As a result, by representing political preferences that were hitherto neglected, the left establishes responsiveness in the party system.

According to the earlier literature that adopted a dichotomous distinction between two types of left-wing parties during the “left turn” (e.g., Castañeda 2006, Weyland 2009, 2010), the moderate left followed this pathway, but as we will see, the Bolivian MAS did so as well. If left-wing challengers adopt a populist rhetoric, it remains a “thin ideology” that is subordinate to a powerful host ideology. This predominance of populism’s host ideology translates into what may be called “segmented populism” (Bornschier forthcoming): Despite claiming to represent “the people”, populists rally groups of voters whose substantive policy preferences are relatively homogeneous and closely mirrored by the populist challengers themselves. As a consequence, like non-populist parties that follow the programmatic path to power, segmented populists can be expected to improve the representation of voters’ substantive policy preferences. Thus, the segmented populist path may share important similarities with Levitsky and Roberts’ (2011b: 407–410) “institutional path to power”.

The situation is different where the party system has been unresponsive to voter preferences for longer periods of time: More in line with the ideational approach to populism than with cleavage theory, the ideological convergence of the main parties has resulted in a more deep-rooted democratic malaise. If parties fail to respond to voter preferences, large parts of the electorate first lose trust in the existing parties, and then in the political system more generally (e.g., Hawkins 2010, Doyle 2011). If political support erodes, populist messages are more likely to rally electoral majorities. In the populist pathway to power, a left-wing political outsider mobilizes adopts a Manichean discourse drawing an antagonism between the established political class or “political caste” on the one hand, and “the people”

on the other. By promising to represent the interests of the people, rather than more narrow interests (or individual self-interest), populists succeed in mobilizing broad swaths of the electorate.

Because of this “majoritarian” character of populism that thrives on diverse groups of dealigned voters, this path to power is unlikely to improve representation. In other words, I expect similarly low levels of party system responsiveness to voter preferences before and after populists have gained majorities in these contexts. As we will see, although Hugo Chávez and his party exhibited quite clear-cut economic policy positions, this did not translate into them mobilizing voters with similarly clear preferences (see also Hawkins 2010 for similar results in an analysis of the election that brought Hugo Chávez to power in 1998).

#### Case selection

The analysis that follows focuses on four countries that are generally considered to stand for the “left turn” in Latin American politics since the late 1990s. I start out by selecting two countries where a near-consensus exists that their most important left-wing parties belong to the moderate left group, namely, the Socialist Party (PSCh) and Party for Democracy (PPD) in Chile and the Workers’ Party (PT) in Brazil. Whereas the Chilean left has roots going back to the 1920s, the PT was only founded in 1980, during Brazil’s transition to democracy (Keck, 1992). Bolivia and Venezuela, on the other hand, have left-wing parties that many observers classify as belonging to the radical, contestatory, or populist left (e.g., Weyland, 2009, 2010). However, Levitsky and Roberts (2011a) draw an important distinction between the populist left and the “movement left” (based on differences in the concentration or dispersion of authority within parties). Along this dimension, the Venezuelan MVR exhibits concentrated authority, while the Bolivian MAS is considered a case of dispersed authority

due to its roots in social movements. Likewise, along Panizza's (2009: 193) differentiation between party, social, and personalist forms of representation, Bolivia scores high on both social and personalist representation, indicating a difference to Venezuela, where the personalist element prevails. Thus, while the literature unanimously classifies Hugo Chávez as populist according to the definition used in this paper (e.g., Hawkins, 2010; Levitsky and Loxton, 2013), the verdict is more open on Evo Morales. For Madrid (2008), Morales is an "ethnopolitist", whereas others more adequately and use the term "movement left" for the MAS (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011a) and the label "movement populist" for Morales (Levitsky and Loxton, 2013).

Adopting Levitsky and Roberts' (2011a) typology, but adapting their classification of the Brazilian PT to account for the difference in age between the Brazilian and the Chilean left – even the PPD, as a spin-off from the PSCh, has a longer history than the PT –, the cases can be grouped as depicted in Figure 1. The distinction between concentrated and dispersed authority tends to go together with that between programmatic and non-programmatic modes of mobilization (c.f. Kitschelt, 2000). Hence, the Peronists in Argentina would be situated in the established party organization/concentrated authority cell, but are left out in the present analysis. It is generally assumed that the concentrated authority typical of populist movements or parties forges a "charismatic bond" between parties and their followers (Madsen and Snow, 1991; Hawkins, 2010) that is less strongly based in the representation of voters' substantive policy preferences than in the case of mass-organic or electoral-professional left parties (c.f. Levitsky and Roberts, 2011a: 11-16).

Figure 1: Typology of left parties and location of cases studied (adapted from Levitsky and Roberts 2011a: 13)

	Established party organization	New political movement
Dispersed authority/ programmatic	PSCh (Chile)	PT (Brazil)  MAS (Bolivia)
Concentrated authority/ clientelistic and/or charismatic		MVR (Venezuela)

Within each of the four countries, I analyze at least one time point before the challenge by the left. In most countries, this coincides with the first round of data available from the University of Salamanca Surveys of Latin American Legislators (PELA) in the mid-1990s. Offering the first comprehensive measurement of party positions across Latin America, this is the first point in time that allows for an analysis of party system responsiveness. Table 1 lists the crucial phase prior to the left becoming a serious contender in elections, as well as the type of left-wing challenge (moderate left, populist left, or movement left) of the parties involved. In Chile, the left was of course already entrenched in the 1990s. In Brazil, Lula came close to winning the presidency in 1989 against Collor, but he was far less successful in 1994 and 1998, and it is only after a profound transformation of the party that it became a contender for power again in 2002 (Hunter, 2010). Ideally, the analysis for Brazil would therefore go back beyond the 1994 elections, where my data starts, but as we will see, the evolution between 1997 and 2002 is already highly instructive.

Table 1: Cases, party system divides, and types of left-wing challengers

Country	Crucial period prior to left challenge	Time points used in analysis	Proximate election	Type of left-wing challenge	Parties
Chile	–	1994 (PELA) - 1995 (WVS) 2006 (PELA) - 2005 (WVS)	1993 2005	Moderate left	PSCh, PPD
Brazil	1980s/1990s	1997 (BLS) - 1995 (LB) 2005 (PELA) - 2002 (ESEB)	1994 2002	Moderate left	PT
Venezuela	Before 1998	1995 (PELA) - 1996 (WVS) 2000 (PELA) - 2000 (WVS)	1993 1998	Populist left	PSUV/MVR
Bolivia	Before 2002	1998 (PELA) - 1998 (LB) 2003 (PELA) - 2004 (LB) 2006 (PELA) - 2005 (LB)	1997 2002 2006	Movement left	MAS

Key to data sources: PELA: Surveys of Latin American Legislators (<http://americo.usal.es/oir/elites/index.htm>); BLS: Brazilian Legislative Survey (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/14970>); WVS: World Values Survey ([www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)); LB: Latinobarómetro ([www.latinobarometro.org](http://www.latinobarometro.org)); ESEB: Estudio Eleitoral Brasileiro, CESOP/FGV/ BRASIL02.DEZ-01838 (available at: [www.cesop.unicamp.br](http://www.cesop.unicamp.br)).

The left challenge is more recent in Bolivia and Venezuela, on the one hand. In Venezuela, candidates from the established parties still dominated the 1993 elections. Hugo Chávez immediately won when he ran for president in 1998, having founded the Movement for the Fifth Republic party (MVR) a year before. In Bolivia, Evo Morales finished second in the 2002 elections, only slightly behind the victorious Sánchez de Lozada, and the MAS can be considered a serious challenger from then on. The analysis of the Bolivian case therefore starts in 1998.<sup>5</sup> I then select one point in time after the left won the presidency to assess whether the breakthrough of the left has improved representation or not. In Venezuela, it would have been interesting to track party system responsiveness beyond 2000, but unfortunately, this is impossible due to the lack of adequate data.

Generally, the face-to-face interviews with legislators that the PELA data is based on were conducted at the beginning of each legislative period (Alcántara Sáez, 2008). Thus, they allow for an assessment of the relationship between party positions and voter preferences shortly after elections in which parties received a mandate from voters. Because the earliest PELA

<sup>5</sup> There are more time points available for Bolivia because PELA surveys were conducted after early elections as well.

survey available for Brazil is from 2005, I use the Brazilian Legislative Survey (Power and Zucco, 2011) to measure party positions in 1997. I have then matched the elite data with survey data from proximate time points.<sup>6</sup> Wherever possible, I have relied on data from the World Values Survey (WVS), since it offers the most representative samples, as well as a wide range of items to operationalize the economic and regime dimensions. For Bolivia and Brazil, which are not included in the WVS, I rely on the Latinobarómetro surveys, as well as the Brazilian Election Survey for 2002. The Latinobarómetro data has the clear disadvantage of offering representative samples only for the urban population before 2000/2001, and this will have to be kept in mind for the interpretation of the results for Bolivia and Brazil.

I measure party system responsiveness along those dimensions of conflict that have been identified as the most salient ones in the literature. Analyses by Moreno (1999) Rosas (2010), and Bornschier (2013) converge in identifying the economic state-market divide as the single most important ideological division. In several countries, these authors also find the regime dimension centering on evaluations of past military dictatorships and democratic regime preferences to cleave parties. Due to the occurrence of military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s in Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia, regime dimensions are potentially relevant in these countries. In Venezuela, on the other hand, I explore whether a regime divide is present after Hugo Chávez launched the Bolivarian Republic. The next section spells out how these dimensions are operationalized and how responsiveness is measured.

#### Measuring party system responsiveness: conceptual issues

The responsiveness of governments to the preferences of citizens is a defining attribute of polyarchy, according to Dahl (1971, 1989), or of the liberal concept of representation (Pitkin,

---

<sup>6</sup> The match is not perfect, but given the concept of representation that I use, this is not a problem, as I lay out in the next section.

1967). One of the central junctures in the “chain of responsiveness” (Powell, 2004) that runs from public preferences to public policies, is the congruence between voter preferences and party positions. According to the “responsible party model”, first theorized by the APSA Committee on Political Parties (APSA, 1950), and synthesized by Thomassen (1994, pp. 251–2), congruence is achieved if, first, parties offer diverging programmatic offerings, and second, voters chose parties according to these offerings. Consequently, the quality of representation has frequently been assessed by looking at the correspondence between the political preferences of voters and their representatives (Dalton, 1985; Powell, 2000; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005, 2010; see also Diamond and Morlino, 2005 for a theoretical account). This is the strategy I use here, with the qualifier that the data at hand does not allow for a measure of the absolute congruence between the positions of legislators and voters, but only for their *relative* correspondence. I come back to this issue below.

As explained in the preceding section, the elite data was collected relatively shortly after elections, warranting the assumption that legislators expressed positions in tune with their campaign promises. Voter preferences were measured at temporally close time points, i.e. either in the same year or, if no suitable data is available, in the year before or after.<sup>7</sup> If legislators have clear ideological profiles and voters’ preferences are relatively stable, the match is thus satisfactory. Where party systems are fluid and voter preferences are fickle, on the other hand, it is heroic from the start to assume strong representation.

I operationalize the state-market and regime dimensions at the party and voter levels by drawing on all available issue-specific items available in the elite and mass surveys. [The items used will be listed in an Appendix in a future version of this paper.] The choice of the adequate strategy to aggregate these issues into overarching dimensions is not straightforward

---

<sup>7</sup> In Brazil, the correspondence is not ideal. For the 1994-1998 legislature I have opted for the 1995 Latinobarómetro dataset (the earliest available) because of its temporal proximity to the elections in 1994, given that party preferences are relatively unstable in Brazil (e.g., Mainwaring 1999). For the 2002 election, I use the Brazilian Election Survey conducted shortly after that election, while PELA only interviewed MPs in 2005.

in most Latin American countries, however. In political contexts where politicians and voters have coherent ideological schemas that guide them through politics, for example in Western Europe, or in Latin American countries with sophisticated voters such as those in Chile and Uruguay, latent ideological dimensions can easily be formed using factor analysis (Kriesi *et al.*, 2008; Bornschieer, 2013). In countries such as Venezuela, however, responses to various items that on theoretical grounds we would assume to measure the same underlying dimension, often turn out to be not at all correlated in practice. This may be due to the fact that only some of the issues that surveys tap are politicized and therefore relevant in a given country. Absent the ideological schemas prevalent in the advanced democracies, respondents do not give consistent answers to these questions. Including issues that respondents are less sure about blurs the positions of parties and voters. As a consequence, we might underestimate the level of party system responsiveness with respect to salient issues.

I avoid this problem by using discriminant analysis to operationalize latent dimensions, both at the level of legislators, as well as at the voter level. This technique uncovers dimensions that are politically meaningful because they help to distinguish respondents according to their party membership or preference. In other words, the analysis makes the operationalization of policy dimensions center on those political issues that set politicians and voters from different parties apart. This is thus an approach that is benevolent in terms of judging the responsiveness of a party system, similar to Luna and Zechmeister's (2005) "best score" practice, where only those items for each category are taken into account that exhibit the highest match between parties and voters. The conceptual downside of this approach is that the measurement of latent dimensions becomes confounded from the start with party politics. Thus, it tends to overestimate the quality of representation, but it has the advantage of providing a tough test for the hypothesis that it is representation failure that provides space for populists.

The following issues are used from the elite and mass surveys to construct the economic state-market and regime issues:

#### Economic issues

- *Welfare*: Expansion of or defense of a generous welfare state, support for public education, redistribution, and equality.
- *Economic liberalism*: Opposition to market regulation, and protectionism, support for deregulation, for more competition, and privatization.

#### Regime dimension

- *Regime*: Assessment of past military regime (if there was a military dictatorship), support for democracy, opposition against authoritarianism.
- *Army*: Support for a strong national defense, against reducing the military's budget (to some extent, this can be interpreted as a regime dimension).

In empirical terms, in countries with a history of military intervention, the regime dimension often meshes assessments of the army with orientations towards democracy, as earlier analyses of the dimensionality of political space reveal (Bornschieer, 2013). The current analysis confirms this (these detailed results will be made available in an Appendix in the next version of this paper). The reason it makes sense to include items tapping evaluations of the role of the armed forces is that respondents in many countries are reluctant to express skepticism towards democracy, but are willing to say that they favor a strong role of the military or assess past military interventions positively. In order to allow for these country differences in the make-up of the regime dimension, I include both of the above categories in the same discriminant analysis.

To deal with missing values, I first run a discriminant analysis with all items that can be classified as belonging to the above categories. I then impute missing values based on linear imputation using all items in a category that were associated with the dimension in question in

the theoretically expected direction. I then re-run the discriminant analysis using only these variables, with imputed values. This procedure assures a clear interpretation of the resulting dimension and avoids imputing missing values based on variables where we do not know what they actually measure.

The most important step in the analysis is to assess the correspondence between the positions of parties and those of their voters. Because the positions of parties and voters are not measured on the same scales, this correspondence can be judged only in *relative* terms. Because I cannot measure the absolute correspondence between party positions and voter preferences that is implied in the term congruence, I follow Wlezien (2016), in labeling my measure as one that assesses the *responsiveness* of the party system to voter preferences (even if no over-time adaptation of policy in response to public opinion is implied). I assess how responsive parties are to voter preferences by regressing the position of the party the respondent voted for on his/her individual preference along a given dimension.<sup>8</sup> Put differently, I use the ability of voter preferences to explain the ideological position of their preferred party as a measure of congruence. The most important information provided by this analysis is not the coefficient (which again is not independent of the differing scales on which parties and voters are placed), but whether individual preferences are a significant predictor of party choice. Consequently, I use the z-statistic of the ordered logit regression as a measure for the congruence of representation. Because the z-value is determined also by sample size, and the latter varies by country and year, I weight the z-value by the number of respondents on which the logistic regression is based. This results in a measure that can be compared across countries and time.

---

<sup>8</sup> Technically, I attribute to each individual the policy position of his/her party, and then assess how well individual preferences explain the position of the party they voted for. Since the variance of the dependent variable is limited by the low number of parties competing, I use ordered logit instead of OLS regression. The approach is set out in more detail in Bornschieer (2013).

## Results: Potentials for left-wing (populist) mobilization in Latin America

In presenting the results of the analysis of responsiveness, I complement these with a measure of the degree of polarization a divide entails at the party system level. Polarization is a key dimension to characterize the nature of competition between parties (Dalton, 2008), in part because it is an indication of the salience of competitive dimensions and because it impinges on how strongly partisan camps differ in terms of ideological outlook or whether parties target similar groups of voters (Bornschieer, 2010: Chap. 3). To measure polarization, I calculate the standard deviation of parties' mean positions, weighted by party size.<sup>9</sup> I then illustrate these aggregated results with a few selected figures showing the positions of parties and voters on which the aggregated results are based.

### *Responsiveness in the mid-1990s: The populist breeding ground*

Figure 2 characterizes representation along the economic dimension in the four countries studied by situating elections along the dimensions of responsiveness and polarization. The vertical line in the plot roughly indicates the cut-off point between statistically significant and non-significant measures of responsiveness.<sup>10</sup> It is more difficult to define in absolute terms when polarization is high and when it is low, and I have drawn a line that approximately halves the distribution. The results are particularly interesting because they conform to theoretical expectations, yet nuance them in various ways. I begin by discussing differences between my cases in the mid-1990s, and then go on to study divergent country trajectories over time.

---

<sup>9</sup> Party strength is derived in seat shares from the PELA elite surveys.

<sup>10</sup> This differentiation is based on the original z-values, not those transformed to account for differences in sample size that make up the horizontal dimension in the figure.




Figure 2: Party system responsiveness and polarization along the state-market dimension over time

In both cases that saw the breakthrough of new political actors, responsiveness was low in the 1990s: The Venezuelan and Bolivian elections of 1995 and 1998, respectively, show a party system that is totally unrepresentative of voter preferences.<sup>11</sup> Party positions are less polarized than for example in Chile in 1995. The responsiveness measure is zero, indicating that party positions along the state-market dimension are not related to voter preferences.<sup>12</sup>

11 Recall that the sample is not nationally representative in Bolivia, implying that urban voters are over-represented. Given that this electoral segment is more likely to be politically informed and cast a programmatic vote, the result that the party system is unresponsive in 1998 is all the more significant.

12 In fact, the raw z-values are negative, indicating not only that there is no relationship between voter preferences and party positions, but that the relationship is negative. In other words, more left-wing voters actually voted for more right-wing parties and vice-versa. I have defined the minimum of the responsiveness measure at zero because it is questionable whether representation quality can be negative. This does not change the substantive interpretation of the results, however.

Clearly, partisan alignments must be due to something else than voters' differing economic policy preferences. Figure 3 shows the positions of parties and voters on which this assessment is based for Venezuela. While the positions of parties more or less conform to expectations, Acción Democrática (AD) occupying a centrist position and the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI) issuing more market-liberal stances, Causa R and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) take strongly left-wing positions. Convergencia National (CONV), a spin-off from the long-established COPEI, is situated in between the traditional parties. These party positions are not a mirror of their voters' policy preferences, however. Most electorates are hardly distinguishable, and occupy rather centrist positions, with extensive ideological overlap – the bars below the mean positions show the standard deviation and thus the homogeneity or heterogeneity of party electorates.<sup>13</sup> In fact, parties even misrepresent their voters' preferences: This is most clearly the case for COPEI supporters, as well as for those expressing a preference for MAS, which likewise misrepresents its voters (they actually appear most right-wing). Overall, the unresponsive party system clearly provided a favorable breeding ground for Hugo Chávez' populist appeal.




Figure 3: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Venezuela, mid-1990s

Legend: CAUSA R, La Causa Radical; MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; CONV, Convergencia Nacional; AD, Acción Democrática; COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente.

13 When looking at these figures, keep in mind that individual respondents' positions are standardized: Consequently, the zero point in the center of the graphs is not a neutral position, but simply halves the distribution of legislators' and voters' positions.

Turning to the cases with superior levels of representation in Figure 2, the Brazilian party system stands out for being relatively representative of voter preferences in 1997. It must be underlined, however, that this result is based on a survey that is representative only of 33% of the population, and is thus a more adequate depiction of the urban population than the population at large.<sup>14</sup> In contrast to Brazil, Chile does not exhibit particularly strong responsiveness in terms of the economic state-market dimension in 1995, as put in evidence in Figure 2. At first sight, this is somewhat surprising, at least if we recall that Chile was among the two countries with the highest levels of congruence in Luna and Zechmeister's (2005) analysis and also scored high both in terms of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995), and in the clarity of the programmatic alternatives offered by the party system (Kitschelt *et al.*, 2010). As we can see in Figure 4, parties and electorates do line up in the same order, but the relationship between positions at the two levels is significant only at the 10%-level. In fact, although the party system is highly polarized along the economic dimension, electorates are situated rather close to each other. Moreover, Partido por la Democracia (PPD) voters do not more strongly favor state intervention in the economy than those supportive of the conservative Renovación Nacional (RN). PPD as a party, however, is hardly distinguishable from the left-leaning Socialists (PS) and the Christian Democrats (PDC).




Figure 4: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Chile, mid-1990s

Legend: PPD, Partido Por la Democracia; PS, Socialist Party; DC, Christian Democrat Party; RN, Renovación Nacional; UDI, Unión Demócrata Independiente.

<sup>14</sup> See documentation at <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>.

This does not imply that Chile provided fertile ground for populists, however: Looking at the upper-left panel in Figure 5 reveals that the state-market divide is overshadowed by an overpowering regime divide. In terms of the regime divide, the Chilean party system is the most polarized of all included in this analysis at any point in time, and it reaches by far




Figure 5: Party system responsiveness and polarization along the state-market and the regime dimensions, over time

highest level of responsiveness of any competitive dimension in the mid-1990s. It is thus important to take into account the two-dimensional structure of political competition: As Figure 5 shows, the regime divide was far more salient in terms of structuring partisan alignments than the economic dimension at this point in time. These results are in line with those presented by Torcal and Mainwaring (2003).

Overall, the hypothesis that representation failure represents a prerequisite both for the breakthrough of new political actors in general, as well as populist challengers in particular, is clearly confirmed by the comparison of the four cases. I now turn to the question what happens after the left becomes a serious contender for power, allowing for a distinction between the populist and the programmatic path to power during the “left turn”.

#### *Diverging patterns of representation between Venezuela and Bolivia in the “left turn”*

Figure 2 shows a stark divergence in the evolution of responsiveness over time along the economic dimension in the four countries. The contrast between the Venezuelan and the Bolivian case is particularly interesting. The quality of representation surges in Bolivia with the appearance of MAS shortly before the 2002 elections, indicating that the new party served as a rallying point for left-leaning voters who lacked a credible political alternative before. The appearance of the populist left in Venezuela, in contrast, does nothing to improve responsiveness. The emergence of these two exponents of the “contestatory left” has thus had a profoundly different impact on representation. We can understand why by comparing the positions of parties and voters in these two countries. As we see in Figure 6 for Venezuela in 2000, the MVR constitutes a clear left-wing pole in the party system: The MVR forms a coherent state interventionist force in parliament, uniting parliamentarians with decidedly state interventionist positions, which stand in stark contrast to the more market liberal convictions of AD and COPEI. The supporters of the Bolivarian movement on average do not

exhibit a similarly left-wing profile, however. Rather, they are situated in the center of the distribution of voter preferences, underlining both the heterogeneity of the populist electorate, as well as the non-programmatic nature of its mobilization. Consequently, the emergence of the populist left, while clearly expanding the range of policy options that voters can chose from, did little to improve substantive policy representation. The other parties in the Venezuelan party system even misrepresent their voters: AD and COPEI voters are those that profess most strongly state interventionist views, while these parties themselves have converged on a market liberal profile. Those supporting Proyecto Venezuelano (PV) and Primero Justicia (PJ) are most market liberal, on the other hand.




Figure 6: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Venezuela, 2000

Legend: MVR, Movimiento V República (Bolivarian Movement); MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; AD, Acción Democrática; COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente; PV: Proyecto Venezuelano (Henrique Sallas Romer); PJ: Primero Justicia (Henrique Capriles).

By contrast, MAS in Bolivia rallies an electorate that stands out much more clearly for its state-interventionist political ideology (Figure 7). Most of the other parties also represent their voters relatively well, with some exceptions such as Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (UCS), which became a negligible political force, however, after betraying its voters by joining the “Megacoalition” that supported the presidency of former military dictator Hugo Banzer from 1997 to 2001. Apart from Banzer’s own Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN) party, this coalition also included the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). This implied what might be considered a second “de-aligning critical juncture”, after the long established and once truly

Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) had campaigned on a left-wing platform in the mid-1980s, only to then implemented neoliberal reforms (c.f., Roberts, 2014: chap. 6). While all of this resulted in the party system being unresponsive to voter preferences in 1998 (as we saw in Figure 2), Figure 7 shows that responsiveness was restored as a consequence of the MAS emerging and becoming a rallying point for leftist voters. The results for the 2006 elections are similar, and not shown here.




Figure 7: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Bolivia, 2003-4

Legend: MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; UCS, Unidad Cívica Solidaridad; NFR, Nueva Fuerza Republicana; MIR, Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria; MNR, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; ADN, Acción Democrática Nacionalista.

While there is a strong contrast in terms of responsiveness along the economic state-market dimension in Bolivia and Venezuela, returning to Figure 5 testifies to the existence of one programmatic linkage in Venezuela: That centering on the democratic regime issue. Divergent assessments of the role of the armed forces and of the stability of democracy in the country polarize both parliamentarians and voters far more than economic policy options. On the one side, there are those professing trust in the armed forces and supporting the Bolivarian project, and on the other parties and their voters alike are concerned over the role of the armed forces and of the state of democracy (detailed information on how these dimensions were operationalized will be provided in a future version of the paper). Put together, the results regarding the economic and regime dimensions in Venezuela in 2000 indicate that the parties

opposing the Bolivarian movement rally their voters primarily based on their defense of democracy, rather than their opposition against the regime's economic policies.

*The moderate left and party system responsiveness: A paradox*

The second striking finding in terms of the effect of the “left turn” on representation is that programmatic responsiveness has decreased considerably in Brazil between 1997 and 2002, as the evolution in Figure 2 shows. More specifically, the ideological distinctiveness of the PT's support coalition in terms of economic policy preferences has become strongly diluted in the process of the PT becoming a majoritarian political force. Figures 8 and 9 show the positions of parties and voters in 1997 and 2002, respectively. At the party level, not very much changes between these two elections: The PT occupies a staunchly state interventionist position, while the Liberal Front (PFL, now Democrats) adopts the most market liberal stance, with PMDB and PSDB situated in between (the latter two switching their respective locations). In 1997, these positions mirror the relative preferences of party electorates: Although electorates are situated relatively close to each other, they line up in the order mirroring the positions of the parties. More so than the parties themselves, their voters exhibit considerable overlap, but at least directional policy voting is pretty apparent in Figure 8: Voters seem to know what parties stand for and support parties that mirror their preferences in more radical terms.

By 2002, however, the PT's support coalition has become more similar in terms of heterogeneity to that of the MVR in Venezuela than that mobilized by the movement left in Bolivia, or the moderate left in Chile (see below). The average PT voter is not ideologically distinct along the state-market dimension, but rather situated in the center of the preference distribution. Surprisingly, both PFL and PMDB voters are more state interventionist than PT voters, at least in terms of their preferences regarding market regulation on which the

measurement is based (note that there are no items in the election survey that tap support for social programs such as “Bolsa Familia”, a point I return to later on). In parallel, the regime divide that was pretty strong in Brazil in 1997 fades as well, as Figure 5 shows. However, differing conceptions of democracy and attitudes regarding clientelism and corruption still cleave the electorate, and PT voters remain more critical of clientelism and corruption than other voters (results not shown).<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, some of this distinctiveness has withered as well in the course of the PT winning the presidency.




Figure 8: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Brazil, mid-1990s

Legend: PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores; PSDB, Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira; PMDB, Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro; PFL, Partido da Frente Liberal (now Democratas); PPB, Partido Progressista Brasileira.




Figure 9: Parties (above) and voters (below) on the state-market divide in Brazil, early-mid 2000s

Legend: PL, Partido Liberal; PP, Partido Progressista (formerly PPB). For all other parties, see Figure 8.

15 I have used these items to measure the regime divide at the voter level because they are available in the Brazilian election study that I use, in contrast to the data sources used in the other countries. This operationalization seems particularly pertinent in the Brazilian case because the PT sought to change Brazilian politics by proposing a different way of doing politics and governing (Keck, 1992; Hunter, 2010; Gómez Bruera, 2013).

There is one important caveat with respect to the Brazilian case, however: Concomitant to the evolution of the PT from an opposition party to a majoritarian political actor, the representativeness of the voter sample used to measure congruence increases. The Latinobarómetro 1995 was representative only of 33% of the population, which typically means that the non-urban and poorer population living in Favelas is not adequately represented. In 2002, the sample is nationally representative. In other words, the superior quality of representation in 1997 might be due not only to the more homogeneous electorate that the PT had in its earlier years, but also to the fact that the measurement is based predominantly on those voters who are more likely to cast their vote on programmatic grounds. To gauge whether stronger programmatic linkages persist in 2002 for the more educated and politically knowledgeable parts of the electorate, I have restricted the sample by excluding voters with low levels of education and who are unable to give correct answers to questions tapping political information, but the results in terms of responsiveness remain unaltered (these results are available upon request). Whatever the effect of the biased sample in 1997, we can safely say that responsiveness in 2002 is very low or even inexistent in terms of the state-market divide, and modest with regard to the regime or clientelism and corruption issues.

Finally, while the regime divide was more salient than the economic cleavage in the mid-1990s in Chile, the situation has reversed by 2006. Figure 5 shows that the regime divide has become less polarized over time, but it continues to foster high levels of responsiveness. Representation along the state-market dimension improves strongly, on the other hand. This suggests that processes of realignment have taken place because voters came to base their vote choice more strongly on economic policy than the memory of the military dictatorship. In comparative terms, the Chilean party system was more responsive than any other one except that of Bolivia in the 2000s (Figure 2). At no point in time, then, did the party system thus offer favorable opportunities for populists. Surely, political discontent has been

widespread in certain sectors of society recently, and Chile also stands out for having many survey respondents who profess no party preference (see also Carlin, 2006). But this discontent has so far found a grass-roots bottom-up expression rather than a top-down populist one (Donoso, 2013; Roberts, 2017a, 2017b). Furthermore, there is evidence that the current left-wing government is responding to the demands from below to dismantle some of the economic legacies of the Pinochet regime (e.g., Roberts, 2017b). Future analyses should expand the analysis into the more recent past to gauge the further evolution of responsiveness, given that certain authors are rather critical of representation in Chile (e.g., Bargsted and Somma, 2016).

## Conclusion

This paper has brought to the fore at least three important findings that shed light on commonalities and differences between left-wing parties during Latin America's "left turn". First of all, the emergence of new political actors occurs only where party systems are unresponsive to voter preferences. Where strong programmatic linkages between parties and their supporters exist, such as in Chile, evolving voter preferences are more likely to result in adaptations of the established parties to social change than in the emergence of new parties. Likewise, the "left turn" brought a party to power in Brazil that had been founded two decades earlier, and had been a serious contender for power in presidential elections since 1989.

Second, where representation deficits existed prior to the "left turn", they resulted in two distinct paths of the left to power. In Venezuela, Chávez and the MVR followed a "majoritarian" populist path, where populism's "thin" ideology prevailed over the substantive ideology. Indeed, the analysis has shown that for all the left-wing rhetoric employed by

Chávez, the electorate rallied by the MVR is ideologically diverse. Consequently, the rise of the left did not improve substantive policy representation. In Bolivia, on the other hand, where Evo Morales' rhetoric has likewise been described as populist, the left rallies an ideologically coherent electorate with state interventionist credentials (besides mobilizing an ethno-populist cleavage that I have not measured in this paper, see Madrid, 2008). This is, at heart, a programmatic path to power, which I have proposed to label as “segmented populism”: It appeals to “the people” at large, but only specific segments of the electorate follow. Consequently, this type of mobilization has the capacity to improve party system responsiveness.

The difference between “segmented” and “majoritarian” populism thus has important implications for the idea that populism is both a threat, as well as a corrective to democracy (c.f., Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012): While some forms of populism indeed represent a corrective to failures of representation, others do not. The key difference between MAS in Bolivia and MVR in Venezuela is that the former has strong roots in society, making it represent specific social groups. The above result thus testifies to the importance of Levitsky and Roberts' (2011a: 12-16) emphasis on dispersed vs. concentrated authority, which leads them to distinguish between a “populist” and a “movement left” within the group of new political movements that emerged in the “left turn” (a similar distinction is made by Panizza 2009). Clearly, then, the “contestatory” (Weyland, 2010) or “wrong left” (Castañeda, 2006) is a heterogeneous category.

The third important finding – and a largely unanticipated one – is that a similar fissure exists between left-wing parties in Chile and Brazil, which most observers consider exponents of the moderate or “institutionalized partisan” left (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011a: 13). Whereas strong programmatic representation is evident in Chile, the PT's path to majority party status in Presidential elections has resulted in a decline of party system responsiveness.

This is presumably a consequence of an enlargement of the PT's electoral coalition as the PT evolved from an exceptionally disciplined and programmatically-driven party to a more "normal" Brazilian party (Hunter, 2010). Yet this finding contrasts with the increasingly programmatic behavior of parties in parliament (Hagopian, Gervasoni and Moraes, 2009). The results presented in this paper then point to unexpected similarities in the support coalition of the left in Brazil Venezuela, suggesting that non-populist parties can also dilute responsiveness if they adopt catch-all strategies.

What, then, drives partisan alignments in Brazil, if not parties' responsiveness to voters' policy preferences? On the one hand, my results show that a divide over different "ways of doing politics" persists in Brazil, with those critical of clientelism and corruption leaning towards the PT, and those who are less critical of these phenomena supporting the traditional parties. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge that the standard of programmatic responsiveness I adopt in this paper is high: Voters who support the PT because they "reward Lula" for the social policy benefits they received by the PT government (Hunter and Power, 2007), but who do not share the PT legislators' conviction that markets should be regulated by the state, do not contribute to party system responsiveness (in part because the data did not allow me to measure voter support for social policy expansion). This approach to assessing representation seems justified to me, however: Rather than programmatic responsiveness, rewarding the PT for having received social benefits is more a form of economic or pocketbook voting, as Zucco (2008) concurs.

One might still argue that measuring the state-market dimension in terms of preferences over market regulation is unrealistic in a country where many voters lack clear understandings of economic policy (my results showed that many PT voters are rather critical of state intervention to regulate markets). Traditional cleavage politics, on the other hand, assumes that social location shapes collective political identities, which in turn translate into similar

substantial ideological worldviews. One of the most interesting findings of this paper is that not only the Chilean party system meets these high standards in terms of programmatic responsiveness, as we would have anticipated. But Bolivia's parties do as well, albeit being situated in one of the least developed countries in South America. This suggests that political agency, and more specifically the mobilization strategies adopted by political parties, is more important than contextual characteristics in shaping party system responsiveness.

## References

- Adams, J., de Vries, C. E. and Leiter, D. (2011) 'Subconstituency Reactions to Elite Depolarization in the Netherlands: An Analysis of the Dutch Public's Policy Beliefs and Partisan Loyalties, 1986-98', *British Journal of Political Science*, 42, pp. 81–105.
- Alcántara Sáez, M. (ed.) (2008) *Politicians and Politics in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- APSA, C. on P. P. (1950) 'Towards a more responsible two-party system', *American Political Science Review*, September 1950(supplement).
- Bargsted, M. A. and Somma, N. M. (2016) 'Social cleavages and political dealignment in contemporary Chile, 1995–2009', *Party Politics*, 22(1), pp. 105–124.
- Bartolini, S. (2000) *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980. The Class Cleavage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bornschier, S. (2010) *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right. The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Bornschier, S. (2013) 'Trayectorias históricas y responsiveness del sistema de partidos en siete países de América Latina', *América Latina Hoy*, 65(diciembre), pp. 45–77.
- Bornschier, S. (2016) 'Historical Polarization and Representation in South American Party Systems, 1900–1990', *British Journal of Political Science*, pp. 1–27. doi: 10.1017/S0007123416000387.
- Bornschier, S. (forthcoming) "Ideational and Party-System-Centered Explanations of Populist Success: Latin America and Western Europe Compared." In *Populism and the Study of Ideas*, edited by Kirk A. Hawkins, Ryan E. Carlin, Levente Littvay, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Abingdon: Routledge.
- van der Brug, W. (2010) 'Structural and Ideological Voting in Age Cohorts', *West European Politics*, 33(3), pp. 586–607.
- Canovan, M. (2002) 'Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy', in Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds) *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 25–44.
- Carlin, R. E. (2006) 'The decline of citizen participation in electoral politics in post-authoritarian Chile', *Democratization*, 13(4), pp. 632–651.
- Castañeda, J. G. (2006) 'Latin America's Left Turn', *Foreign Affairs*, 85(3), pp. 28–43.
- Conover, P. J. and Feldman, S. (1984) 'How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model', *American Journal of Political Science*, 28(1), pp. 95–126.
- Coppedge, M. (1994) *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks. Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Coser, L. A. (1956) *The Functions of Social Conflict. An examination of the concept of social conflict and its use in empirical sociological research*. New York: The Free Press.
- Dahl, R. A. (1971) *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R. A. (1989) *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dalton, R. J. (1985) 'Political Parties and Political Representation. Party Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations', *Comparative Political Studies*, 18(3), pp. 267–299.

- Dalton, R. J. (2008) 'The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party System Polarization, Its Measurement, and Its Consequences', *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(7), pp. 899–920.
- Diamond, L. and Morlino, L. (2005) 'Introduction', in Diamond, L. and Morlino, L. (eds) *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. ix–xliii.
- Donoso, S. (2013) 'Dynamics of Change in Chile: Explaining the Emergence of the 2006 Pingüino Movement', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 45, pp. 1–29.
- Doyle, D. (2011) 'The Legitimacy of Political Institutions Explaining Contemporary Populism in Latin America', *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(11), pp. 1447–1473.
- Evans, G. and de Graaf, N. D. (eds) (2013) 'Explaining Cleavage Strength: The Role of Party Positions', in *Political Choice Matters. Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–26.
- Evans, G. and Tilley, J. (2011) 'How Parties Shape Class Politics: Explaining the Decline of the Class Basis of Party Support', *British Journal of Political Science*, 42, pp. 137–161.
- Fox, J. (1994) 'The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship. Lessons from Mexico', *World Politics*, 46, pp. 151–84.
- Gómez Bruera, H. F. (2013) *Lula, the Workers' Party and the Governability Dilemma in Brazil*. New York and Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hagopian, F., Gervasoni, C. and Moraes, J. A. (2009) 'From Patronage to Program. The Emergence of Party-Oriented Legislators in Brazil', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(3), pp. 360–391.
- Hawkins, K. A., Carlin, R. E., Littvay, L., and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (eds) (forthcoming) *Populism and the Study of Ideas*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hawkins, K. A. (2010) *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hunter, W. (2010) *The Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil, 1989–2009*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hunter, W. and Power, T. J. (2007) 'Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy, and the Brazilian Elections of 2006', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 49(1), pp. 1–30. doi: 10.2307/4490505.
- Karreth, J., Polk, Jonathan T. and Allen, Christopher S. (2012) 'Catchall or Catch and Release? The Electoral Consequences of Social Democratic Parties' March to the Middle in Western Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(7), pp. 791–822.
- Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (1995) 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party', *Party Politics*, 1(1), pp. 5–28.
- Keck, M. E. (1992) *The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (1994) *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (2000) 'Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities', *Comparative Political Studies*, 33(6/7), pp. 845–879.
- Kitschelt, H. et al. (2010) *Latin American Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Kitschelt, H. and McGann, A. J. (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kriesi, H. et al. (2008) *Western European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, H. and Duyvendak, J. W. (1995) 'National Cleavage Structures', in Kriesi, H. et al. (eds) *New Social Movements in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 3–25.
- Levitsky, S. (2003) *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America. Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, S. et al. (2016) *Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, S. and Loxton, J. (2013) 'Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes', *Democratization*, 20(1), pp. 107–136.
- Levitsky, S. and Roberts, K. M. (2011a) 'Latin America's "Left Turn": A Framework for Analysis', in Levitsky, S. and Roberts, K. M. (eds) *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1–28.
- Levitsky, S. and Roberts, K. M. (2011b) 'Conclusion: Democracy, Development, and the Left', in Levitsky, S. and Roberts, K. M. (eds) *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 399–427.
- Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (1967) 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (eds) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York-London: The Free Press-Collier-Macmillan, pp. 1–64.
- Luna, J. P. (2014) *Segmented Representation: Political Party Strategies in Unequal Democracies*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Luna, J. P. and Zechmeister, E. J. (2005) 'Political Representation in Latin America. A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries', *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(4), pp. 388–416.
- Luna, J. P. and Zechmeister, E. J. (2010) 'Political Representation in Latin America', in Kitschelt, H. et al. (eds) *Latin American Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 119–144.
- Lupu, N. (2014) 'Brand Dilution and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America', *World Politics*, 66(4), pp. 561–602.
- Madrid, R. L. (2008) 'The Rise of Ethnopolitism in Latin America', *World Politics*, 60(3), pp. 475–508.
- Madsen, D. and Snow, P. G. (1991) *The Charismatic Bond. Political Behaviour in Time of Crisis*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Magaloni, B. (2006) *Voting for Autocracy. Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. R. (eds) (1995) *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Mair, P. (1997) *Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Moreno, A. (1999) *Political Cleavages. Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Morgan, J. (2011) *Bancrupt Representation and Party System Collapse*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Mudde, C. (2004) 'The Populist Zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), pp. 541–563.
- Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2012) 'Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America', *Government and Opposition*, 48(2), pp. 147–174.
- Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2013) 'Populism', in Freedden, M., Sargent, L. T., and Stears, M. (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 493–512.
- Panizza, F. (2009) *Contemporary Latin America. Development and Democracy Beyond the Washington Consensus*. London: Zed.
- Pitkin, H. (1967) *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Powell, G. B., Jr. (2000) *Elections as Instruments of Democracy. Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
- Powell, G. B., Jr. (2004) 'The Chain of Responsiveness', *Journal of Democracy*, 15(4), pp. 91–104.
- Power, T. J. and Zucco, C. (2011) 'Brazilian Legislative Surveys (1990-2013)'. Available at: [hdl:1902.1/14970](https://dataverse.harvard.edu/handle/1902.1/14970), Harvard Dataverse, V5, UNF:5:VWkkenGqJz8okIV/iX0+yQ==.
- Pribble, J. (2013) *Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Remmer, K. L. (2012) 'The Rise of Leftist-Populist Governance in Latin America: The Roots of Electoral Change', *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(8), pp. 947–972.
- Rennwald, L. and Evans, G. (2014) 'When Supply Creates Demand: Social Democratic Party Strategies and the Evolution of Class Voting', *West European Politics*, 37(5), pp. 1108–1135.
- Roberts, K. M. (2003) 'Social Correlates of Party System Demise and Populist Resurgence in Venezuela', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 45(3), pp. 35–57.
- Roberts, K. M. (2015) 'Populism, Political Mobilizations, and Crises of Political Representation', in de la Torre, C. (ed.) *The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives*. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, pp. 140–158.
- Roberts, K. M. (2017a) '(Re)Politicizing Inequalities: Movements, Parties, and Social Citizenship in Chile', *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 8(3), pp. 125–154.
- Roberts, K. M. (2017b) 'Chilean Social Movements and Party Politics in Comparative Perspective: Conceptualizing Latin America's "Third Generation" if Anti-Neoliberal Protest', in Donoso, S. and von Bülow, M. (eds) *Social Movements in Chile: Organization, Trajectories, and Political Consequences*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 221–247.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. (2014) *Changing Course in Latin America. Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rokkan, S. (1999) *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan, Based on His Collected Works, edited by Peter Flora with Stein Kuhnle and Derek Urwin*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rosas, G. (2010) 'Issues, Ideologies, and Partisan Divides. Imprints of Programmatic Structure on Latin American Legislatures', in Kitschelt, H. et al. (eds) *Latin American Party Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 70–95.

- Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2012) 'The ambivalence of populism: threat and corrective for democracy', *Democratization*, 19(2), pp. 184–208.
- Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2015) 'Explaining the Emergence of Populism in Europe and the Americas', in de la Torre, C. (ed.) *The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives*. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, pp. 189–227.
- Sartori, G. (1968) 'The Sociology of Parties. A Critical Review', in Stammer, O. (ed.) *Party Systems, Party Organizations, and the Politics of New Masses, Beiträge zur 3. Internationalen Konferenz über Vergleichende Politische Soziologie, Berlin, 15.- 20. Januar 1968*. Berlin: Institut für politische Wissenschaft an der Freien Universität Berlin, pp. 1–25.
- Schattschneider, E. E. (1975) *The Semisovereign People. A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. London: Wadsworth.
- Stokes, S. C. (2001) *Mandates and Democracy. Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stryker, S. (1980) *Symbolic Interactionism. A Social Structural Version*. Menlo Park, Readings: Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Country.
- Stryker, S. (2000) 'Identity Competition: Key to Differential Social Movement Participation?', in Stryker, S., Owens, T. J., and White, R. W. (eds) *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 21–39.
- Thomassen, J. (1994) 'Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models', in Jennings, M. K. and Mann, T. E. (eds) *Elections at Home and Abroad. Essays in Honor of Warren Miller*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 237–264.
- Torcal, M. and Mainwaring, S. (2003) 'The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 1973-95', *British Journal of Political Science*, 33, pp. 55–84.
- Weyland, K. (2001) 'Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics', *Comparative Politics*, 34(1), pp. 1–22.
- Weyland, K. (2009) 'The Rise of Latin America's Two Lefts. Insights from Rentier State Theory', *Comparative Politics*, 41(2), pp. 145–164.
- Weyland, K. (2010) 'The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America. Conceptual and Theoretical Issues', in Weyland, K., Madrid, R. L., and Hunter, W. (eds) *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–27.
- Wlezien, C. (2016) 'Public Opinion and Policy Representation: On Conceptualization, Measurement, and Interpretation', *Policy Studies Journal*, published online ahead of print. doi: 10.1111/psj.12190.
- Zucco, C. (2008) 'The President's "New" Constituency: Lula and the Pragmatic Vote in Brazil's 2006 Presidential Elections', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 40(1), pp. 29–49.