Logic and Theology in Clement of Alexandria: The Purpose of the 8th Book of the Stromata

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Abstract: In Stromata VIII finden sich drei Kapitel, in denen Clemens Beweis und dialektischen Syllogismus gegen

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Logic and Theology in Clement of Alexandria.  
The Purpose of the 8th Book of the Stromata

by Silke-Petra Bergjan

Logic on the one hand and theology on the other, science and faith, method and dogma seem to imply an opposition or at least a certain tension. By the 4th century this opposition was well established. Athanasius has several educated Greeks visit Antonius. They look there for their syllogisms and dialectical arguments, they are caught up in sophistical λογομαχία\(^1\), they labor at needless proofs, but they are confronted by the effective and powerful faith of Antonius. Faith and dialectics are understood as alternatives that exclude one another. “Is it through demonstration by arguments or the working of faith? And which is more important?”\(^2\) Antonius, who needs an interpreter even to speak to these philosophers, calls faith superior and more powerful, syllogisms ultimately superfluous. The opposition between the Christian and the philosophers is reduced to the opposition between belief and dialectics. In the background is the ideal of the simple, plain Christian, who does without education and sophistical subtleties. In Gregory of Nyssa, the same pattern interrupts his conversation with Makrina: “Now to confirm our doctrine according to dialectical method by syllogistic and analytic techniques is a species of discourse from which we ask to be excused, for it is an unsound and questionable way of establishing truth”\(^3\). Her words ring true, according to Gregory and for him it stems from her use of plain language. A third and last example is found in Eusebius of Caesarea. He outlines the heresy of Paul of Samosata and refers in this context even more specifically to dialectics. Among various accusations, he condemns Paul of Samosata with the following words: “They have set aside the rule of ancient faith [...]”; and if any one brings before them a

\(^{1}\) Ath., v. Anton. 78,2 (SC 400, 334,9 Bartelink).


passage of Divine Scripture, they see whether a conjunctive or disjunctive form of syllogism can be made from it. They forsake the holy writings of God to devote themselves to geometry [...]. Euclid is laboriously measured by some of them; and Aristotle and Theophrastus are admired; and Galen, perhaps, by some is even worshipped⁴. Thus Eusebius introduces as a further element the notion of heresy. From Apelles to Apollinaris, the knowledge and use of logic was a sign of their heresy. The use of dialectic methods and formal argumentation was part of the intensive debate of the ideas of Aetius and Eunomius⁵. I leave this debate aside as well as the question of to what extent the ideal of simple and plain faith that illustrates itself through its opposition to dialectic subtleties was a commonplace that had already changed its significance by the 4th century.

The opposition between the plain faith of simple Christians and the needless distinctions of dialectics was known in the times of Clement, as can be seen in Athenagoras⁶. Here, we encounter the uneducated craftsmen and old women, who are not in a position to explain their faith with words, but whose lives give ample evidence of it. Distinguished men such as Athanasius, Gregory, Eusebius and Athenagoras identified themselves with that form of Christianity. Not Clement. He mentions that there is no need to polish his writing according to elevated standards of refined language⁷, but he does not identify with those Christians who regard deep education in philosophy, art and science as needless and prefer simplicity instead.

Moreover, dissatisfaction with the presentation of Christian thought at the time, especially the lack of reflection on method, in particular basic knowledge of the elements of proof or of science, could explain why he wrote and published the *Stromata*. Similar reasons probably led Galen to write his work on proofs⁸. Galen mentions methodlessness and fear of method among his medical colleagues⁹. They mentioned methodlessness and fear of method among his medical colleagues⁹. They were not trained in apodeictic

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⁴ Eus., h.e. V 28,13f. (GCS Eusebius 2/1, 504,11-21 Schwartz): πίστεως δὲ ἀρχαίας κανόνα ἡθετήκασι [...] κἂν αὐτοίς προτέινῃ τις ἤπιον γραφῆς θείκης, ἐξετάζουσιν πότερον συνημένων ἢ διεξεγευμένων δύναται ποιῆσαι σχῆμα συλλογισμοῦ: καταληπτόντες δὲ τάς ἄγιας τοῦ θεοῦ γραφὰς, γεωμετρικῶν ἐπιτιθέουσιν [...] . Εὐκλείδης γοῦν παρὰ τισιν αὐτῶν φιλοτόπως γεωμετρεῖται, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Θεόφραστος δασμᾶζονται: Γαληνός γὰρ ἵσυς ὑπὸ τινῶν καὶ προσκυκνεῖται.

⁵ Cf. Socr., h.e. II 35,6-14 (GCS NF. 1, 150,18-151,17 Hansen), Soz., h.e. III 15,7; IV 12,1; VI 26,3 (GCS 50, 126,24-27; 154,16-18; 272,25-273,2 Bidez/Hansen). On “Aristotle’s association with heretical thought” cf. D.T. Runia, Festugière Revisited. Aristotle in the Greek Patres, VigChr 43, 1989, 23-26. Cf. p. 3 on Festugière’s shortcomings: “The range of Aristotelian doctrine in which Festugière declares the Fathers to be interested in is too restricted. The three themes he concentrates on are certainly the most common, but there are many others notably also in the area of logic and dialectics”.

⁶ Athenag., leg. 11,2 (PTS 31, 42,10-43,19 Marcovich).


⁹ Gal., libr. ord. 1,9 (Medicorum Graecorum opera quae exstant 19, 52 Kühn = CUFr, Galien 1, 90,7-13 Boudon), cf. von Müller, Über Galens Werk (see note 9), 415.419.
methods and either avoided them or believed themselves to have innate powers to make diagnoses\textsuperscript{10}.

Clement probably had similar complaints against untutored teachers of Christianity, but he was reluctant to identify either himself or his opponents with the logicians. Clement found himself confronted with two kinds of opponents. He characterizes them as those who insist on the simple and plain nature of Christian faith, and those who like to create strife and doubt by splitting hairs. Clement’s \textit{Stromata} can be seen as directed against both groups. Even though one can speak of a decline of logic, logic was still taught. Galen lists the schools of philosophy that he visited, and even though he was largely disappointed in the quality of instruction in logic, his remarks still attest to an ongoing debate on dialectical problems\textsuperscript{11}. It is therefore likely that traces of this debate were adapted to confront opponents in various other contexts. Clement was not the only Christian writer to do so. Similarities in approach can be seen in the \textit{de resurrectione}-genre of literature, for example in the writing attributed to Athenagoras\textsuperscript{12}. However, that author used a distinctly less technical language, and his knowledge as reflected in his description of \textit{politōdeixiēs} is limited. The knowledge of logic and epistemology, the scope and precision of the 8\textsuperscript{th} Book of the \textit{Stromata} seems to have been an exception in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century. This text deserves our attention.

\textbf{I. The 8\textsuperscript{th} Book of the Stromata}

The 8\textsuperscript{th} book differs significantly from the previous \textit{Stromata} in content and length. Harnack\textsuperscript{13} gave a summary of the main points that have to be taken into consideration. Ancient sources\textsuperscript{14} testify that eight books of the \textit{Stromata} existed, but also that manuscripts with seven books were in circulation. As handed down to us, the text of the 8\textsuperscript{th} book is not complete. It is a matter of debate whether the 8\textsuperscript{th} book goes back to Clement in its present form, or whether a compiler assembled excerpts of a more comprehensive version\textsuperscript{15}. Both explanations leave questions open. The text

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Cf. von Müller, \textit{Über Galens Werk} (see note 8), 418.
\item Athenag., \textit{res.} 1,14 (SVigChr 53, 38,16-26 Marcovich).
\item Phot., bibl. 111 (Photius, Bibliothèque, texte établi et traduit par R. Henry, CBy, vol. 2, Paris 1960, 81f.).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
of the extant 8th book is coherent with the preceding seven Stromata. The links between them are obvious and have long been observed\textsuperscript{16}. If the 8th book consists of excerpts, then it is difficult to explain why the definitions that Clement gives in the 8th book were already used in the preceding ones. If, on the other hand, the 8th book consists of notes that Clement made from handbooks or lectures, then his sources must have been compatible to a remarkable degree with the material in the preceding books. If one compares the 8th book with the extant logical handbooks of Galen or Apuleius on logic, or with corresponding chapters in the handbook of Alcinous, the differences are striking.

What roughly corresponds to the 8th book are the subdivisions of logic listed by Alcinous or Sextus Empiricus, namely division, definition, analysis, induction, and syllogism.

Clement’s aim is to find scientific knowledge or ἐπιστημονική θεωρία\textsuperscript{17}, where ἐπιστημή is understood as being organized into a system of proofs or demonstrations. That calls for the study of method, and this leads Clement first of all to questions of semantics, to the distinction between sound and meaningful language\textsuperscript{18}, between words, meaning, and things signified. His purpose here is to clarify the terms used in setting forth a matter of dispute. Proof or demonstration aims for scientific, clear and certain knowledge, based on pre-existing knowledge. Demonstration being understood as discourse, the example is presented by an interlocutor, a protagonist of doubt, and this naturally leads into a chapter on the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement. Questions of tense logic and future contingent statement are touched upon. A second part is dedicated to questions of definitions and classification. These lead again to semantic questions, and in this context Clement paraphrases sections of the Categoriae of Aristotle. Clement uses an example that appears in the Categoriae, and others that are found in the later commentaries by Porphyrius, Ammonius or Simplicius\textsuperscript{19}. Even though in a list of main figures of the arts and sciences, Clement ascribes logic to Chrysipp and the natural sciences to Aristotle, Aristotle seems to be his principal source for logic\textsuperscript{20}. Finally we have a chapter on causes.

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\textsuperscript{16} Cf. W. Ernst, De Clementis Alexandrini Stromatum libro VIII. qui fertur, Göttingen 1910, passim.

\textsuperscript{17} Clem., str. VIII 1,3 (80,13 F.).

\textsuperscript{18} Clem., str. VIII 12,7 (87,19-22 F.): τὸ κυσάμενον σατό δὴ τοῦτο τοῦνα παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι μῆτε γρῶν ἢτο μήτε φυτόν. ἀλλ’ ὄνομα τε καὶ φωνή καὶ σῶμα καὶ ὅν καὶ τί καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ γρός. (“It is plain to everybody that the name ‘foetus’ is neither an animal not a plant, but a name, and a sound, and a body, and a being, and anything and everything rather than an animal.”)


When one compares the 8th book with handbooks of logic such as Galen’s \textit{Institutio Logica} and Apuleius’ \textit{Peri \epsilonριηε\iotaς}, the most striking difference is that in Clement the exposition of syllogisms is missing. One could conjecture that Clement presented syllogisms in one of the missing sections, but it is likely that in Clement there was never a chapter on the syllogistic figures. Only the first sentences of the \textit{Institutio Logica} have parallels in Clement. Galen writes: “The finding of things known through demonstration comes from things already known […] from knowledge of things that are proper to what is sought to be demonstrated”\textsuperscript{21}. This conception of knowledge-building leads Galen to an exhaustive study of the technicalities of syllogisms. The little that Clement says on syllogisms will be our subject now.

\section*{II. Demonstrative versus Dialectical Syllogisms}

At the start of the 3rd chapter of the \textit{Stromata} Clement gives the following definition of demonstration (\textit{\deltaπ\deltaε\iotaς}): “Demonstration is an argument that in controversial questions provides certainty that rests upon points of agreement”\textsuperscript{22}. Agreement on first principles that are not themselves in question carries over to the certainty of the conclusion. Clement is interested in the relationship between \textit{\deltaπ\deltaε\iotaς} and these fundamental principles, between scientific knowledge and its specific certainty and reliability. He develops this in the 2nd and 3rd chapter of the 8th book which will be commented on in the following in three sections.

\subsection*{II.1. Demonstration as Method of Discovery or of Instruction}

Clement looks for knowledge that can be won by a process of rational and illuminating discovery, he speaks of \textit{\gammaν\δω\iotaς}, of an investigation that leads to certain knowledge, he speaks of \textit{\™pιστ»»h} and scientific demonstration. Through scientific demonstration he wants to gain knowledge. He understands \textit{\™pιστ»»h} as being organized into a system of proofs or
demonstrations. A demonstration needs a clear method. The starting point Clement refers to in the context of instruction, has to be the most basic one to be generally agreed upon.

Right from the beginning two lines of thought are visible. Clement’s language of search, investigation, and examination suggests that ἀπόδειξις is a research-technique and that Clement is describing a process that results in knowledge of something previously not known. “It is impossible to find without seeking, to seek without examining, to examine without unfolding and opening the question by inquiry, to produce clarity”23. Here, Clement seems to indicate that the process of ἀπόδειξις reveals something new, as is indicated by the term “illumination” to describe the kind of search he has in mind. So far, I have emphasized points that can also be read in Sextus Empiricus where he deals with demonstration. Sextus also assigns ἀπόδειξις to the genus of λόγος24, and characterizes demonstration as an argument which is revelatory and establishes a non-evident conclusion25. Demonstration describes a process that brings something hidden to light, a process of discovery. Clement describes the discoverer as only thinking that he does not know something. The knowledge has only to be revealed, and this happens through the force of a premiss that compels the conclusion. However, there is a second interpretation of demonstration.

Here, the knowledge exists already and demonstration is a form of presentation in a pedagogical context. This puts in mind us of the first sentence of the Analytica posterior: “All teaching and all intellectual learning comes about from already known knowledge”26. Not only does Clement use the same phrase for pre-existing knowledge, but he, too, identifies the principle of demonstration with the principle of instruction. He speaks about “Ἀπόδειξις or more precisely scientific certainty (ἐπιστημονικὴν πίστιν) in the souls of those who learn”27. Ἀπόδειξις becomes the task of the teacher, as “we come to know things by taking not just any random terms, but such as are prior and more familiar, as is done in demonstrations – for so it is with

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24 Cf. S.E., M. VIII (BSGRT, Sexti Empirici Opera 2, 104-212 Mutschmann); cp. J. Brunschwig, Proof Defined, in: Schofield/Myles/Barnes (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism (see note 11), 126.


27 Clem., str. VIII 5,3 (82,16f. F.): ἀπόδειξις λέγεται ἢ τὴν ἑπιστημονικὴν πίστιν ἐντιθέσα ταῖς τῶν μαθησάμενων ψυχαῖς.
all teaching and learning”, to quote Aristotle. The commentaries show that there was a debate on whether to emphasize the context of teaching or not. We see this in a quote from Simplicius that also serves to set the stage for our next point: Simplicius states: “all discursive teaching and learning comes about from first principles [...] everything known is either self-evident and a first principle of knowledge through being agreed as is in the case with definitions and the premisses that are called immediate, or it is through some prior knowledge of definitions and immediate premisses, as is the case with everything known through syllogism and demonstration.” What are these first principles according to Clement?

II.2. Admissible Starting Points for Demonstrations

There are three attempts in Clement to describe what can be admitted as a premiss. First and most important seems his insistence on starting with something agreed upon. Clement uses the term òmologoúmenon. But what sorts of things are agreed upon? Clement refers to definitions and more generally to statements that are certain and evident. By certain and evident, Clement means dialectical propositions that have achieved a high degree of credibility through being commonly held. Similarly, in the quotation just given, Simplicius associates certainty with agreement.

A matter of dispute must be resolved in light of agreed upon, clear and distinct propositions. “Agreed-upon” implies that the starting point has to be set and decided on. Clement’s purpose is to avoid the infinite regress. He rejects a search for first principles in which every point of dispute requires the resolution of the next even more fundamental one, and so on. This infinite process would prevent a proof from being started. Sextus uses exactly this argument repeatedly in favour of Scepticism; and concludes that since the need for proof never ends, but continues ad infinitum there is nothing that can ever be proven. Instead, according to Clement, the basis of a demonstration has to be agreed upon, that is, òmologoúmenon says that the first principles have to be posited and confirmed.

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28 Arist., Top. 141a28-30 (SCBO, 120 Ross): γνωρίζομεν δ’ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων καὶ γνωριμιστέρων, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν (οὕτω γάρ πάσα διδασκαλία καὶ μάθησις ἔχει).
29 Alex. Aphr., in Top. I 1 (CAG 2/2, 9,22 Wallies).
30 Simp., in Ph. I 1 (CAG 8, 15,1f; 15,5-8 Diels): εἰ γάρ πάσα διδασκαλία καὶ πάσας μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἢ ἀρχῆς γίνεται [...] ἐπειδή πᾶν τὸ γνωσκόμενον ἢ αὐτότητι ἔστι καὶ ἀρχῇ γνώσεως διὰ τὸ ὀμολογεῖσθαι, ὡς ἐξώσειν αἱ ὀρθοὶ καὶ αἱ ἄμεσαι καλοῦμεθα προτάσεις, ἢ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης τινός γνωσκόμενος γνώσεως τῆς τῶν ὀρθῶν καὶ τῶν ὀμέσων προτάσεως, ὡς ἔχει πάντα τὰ διὰ συλλογισμὸν καὶ ἀποδείξεως γνωσκόμενα.
31 Clem., str. VIII 4,1 (81,30 F.).
34 S.E., P. III 44; II 182 (145; 110 M.).
35 Clem., str. VIII 5,1 (82,12-14 F.).
The concept of “agreed-upon assumptions” occurs in the definition given by Sextus: “A proof, they say, is an argument which, by way of agreed-upon assumptions and in virtue of yielding a conclusion, reveals a non-obvious consequence”\(^\text{36}\). Sextus draws upon the definition due to his opponents, identified as Stoics. Aristotle and his commentators, on the other hand, rarely cite agreement as a criterion, but there are exceptions like: “He begins with what is more obvious and agreed upon”\(^\text{37}\) or “as in demonstration, will he make it clear from what is agreed upon”\(^\text{38}\). The examples come from Ammonius and Aristotle, and we can find this phrase used by the commentators beginning with Alexander of Aphrodisias. Even in Galen an example of this pattern can be found.

Second: while Clement initially identifies agreement as a safe starting point, he continues and in the very next paragraph he sets in opposition the true and the agreed upon. Here the starting point for a demonstration is not merely an agreed-upon assumption, but instead a true proposition or, in modern terms, the valid versus the sound argument. In this context the agreed-upon assumption slips over to the side of the merely valid argument\(^\text{39}\).

Finally, in a third attempt to define the starting point, the reference to the agreed-upon assumptions is missing all together. Here the starting points of demonstrations are seen as self-evident, without need of proof. Clement refers to the philosophers, who call them indemonstrable, ἀναπόδεικτον\(^\text{40}\). Scientific knowledge must be built upon indemonstrable first principles, which are therefore primary immediate propositions. The alternative, that everything needs a proof, would make demonstration impossible and would again lead to an infinite regress. At this point, Clement has used the same argument twice with somewhat different conclusions. Clement admits not only self-evident premisses, but also those that are evident to perception and intellect. These are considered simple and irrefutable or simple, rational and primary, respectively. Whether self-evident or evident to perception or intellect, they are previously known. All these principles are suitable as premisses only if they are appropriately relevant to the conclusion. If one


\(^{38}\) Arist., APo. 92a35f. (164 R.): οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἀποδεικνύσεις ἢ ὁμολογουμένους εἶναι δήλου ποιηθείς.

\(^{39}\) Clem., str. VIII 6,2 (83,1-6 F.).

\(^{40}\) Clem., str. VIII 7,1f. (83,20-24 F.): αὐτίκα οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀναπόδεικτους ὁμολογοῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀλίγων ἀρχὰς, ἡστ’ ἐπερ ἑτιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα πρότερον εἶναι τι πιστόν ἢ ἑαυτοῦ, δ ἡ πρότου καὶ ἀναπόδεικτον λέγεται. ἐπὶ τὴν ἀναπόδεικτον ὁρα πείστιν ἢ πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις ἀνάγχεται.
adds up all the aspects mentioned by Clement, one arrives at the following list: premisses should be true, evident, agreed upon, relevant, previously known. Admirable as it is, this list shows a certain lack of coherence. The criterion of being agreed upon versus the criterion of being evident suggests that different conceptions have been mixed together.

Most important are thirdly the various distinctions Clement draws to explain the difference between syllogism and ἀπώδειξις.

II.3. The Distinction between Demonstration and Syllogism

Clement does not use the terms συλλογισμός/συλλογίζομαι right from the beginning but introduces them later to refer to the distinction between a valid and a sound conclusion where ἀπώδειξις refers to a sound conclusion. In a first line of argument Clement explains that in contrast to a conclusion from just one premiss (ἐνδειξίς) a syllogism consists of several parts including at least two premisses. The example he gives to illustrate the structure of a syllogism does not meet our expectations at all. He gives an historical example, the legend of Python of Byzantium, whose act of betrayal was established by more than one piece of evidence, without any elucidation of the logical structure of the argument. The example serves merely to illustrate an argument that rests on several supports, in contrast to the demonstration understood as indication (ἐνδείξις) and thereby as a one-to-one principle. What are the antecedents for Clement’s notion of ἐνδείξις? One could refer to the debate on the Stoic admission of syllogisms with only one premiss. This debate seems to be of some importance to Clement as he later refers in Stoic terms to the distinction between syllogisms and arguments that are valid but not syllogistically concludent (περαιτικός λόγος). Considerably closer to Clement at this point however is the Aristotelian concept of a proof based on irrefutable signs, which was accepted as a kind of demonstration, though an inferior one. Clement’s example of ἐνδείξις (pregnant women) corresponds exactly to this concept, which was discussed in the context of induction. Later Clement returns to the structure of syllogism and summarizes: “Nobody would call a syllogism simple or primary, even if the conclusion is true, as

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41 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,27 F).
42 On definitions of proof (ἀπώδειξις) cf. Brunschwig, Proof Defined (see note 24), 125-160; Barnes, Proof Destroyed (see note 11), 161-181.
43 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,30 F.). Cf. Plu., Dem. 9,849f. (BSGRT, 10,7 Ziegler).
44 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,29-83,1 F.).
45 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,27-29 F.).
46 Alexander of Aphrodisias for example rejected this form of argument: Alex. Aphr., in APr. I 1 (CAG 2/2, 21,28-22,1 Wiels).
47 Clem., str. VIII 8,2 (84,19f. F.).
48 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,28f. F.).
a syllogism consists of three parts, two premisses and the conclusion”⁴⁹. In deed, the notion of “primary” leads us into Clement’s second and more successful attempt to define the terms demonstration and syllogism. Assertions are called primary if they are unmediated and indemonstrable, and it is exactly these syllogisms drawn from primary premisses that are called demonstrations in the Peripatetic tradition. Clement builds upon different well known criteria to distinguish various forms of syllogisms. According to Clement, demonstration is defined as drawing a conclusion from a self-evident, indemonstrable, but above all true premiss, while syllogizing is defined as drawing a conclusion from agreed-upon assumptions, that is, from premisses that are not necessarily known to be true. If you draw an appropriate (οἰκεῖον) conclusion from premisses that are not known to be true, but entail the conclusion, you still produce a syllogism; however, Clement explains, you don’t produce a demonstration, while if you don’t draw an appropriate conclusion, you don’t produce a syllogism at all⁵⁰. This grading of ἀπόδειξις, syllogism and non-syllogism, we would call a sound conclusion, a valid one and an invalid one. In the terminology of Clement, syllogism refers to a valid or invalid inference, while ἀπόδειξις, refers exclusively to a sound proof.

His distinction between sound, valid and invalid depends partly on the characteristics of the premisses, partly on the appropriateness of the relationship between premisses and conclusion. Beyond this, formal criteria for establishing validity are not visible. As can be seen from his application of logic in his theological works, the relationship between premiss and conclusion is in Clement not independent of content and not topic neutral.

Clement’s explanation of the distinction between demonstration and syllogism is closely related to that given by Aristotle. In the introduction to the Topic Aristotle states “now a syllogism is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a demonstration, when the premisses from which the deduction starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses that are primary and true; and a dialectical syllogism, if it reasons from reputable opinions. Things are true and primary that are convincing on the strength not of anything else but of themselves”⁵¹. Clement’s distinction at this

⁴⁹ Clem., str. VIII 6,6 (83,12-15 F.): οὐδεὶς δὲ ἀπόδειξις καὶ πρῶτος λόγος ὅνομάζεται συλλογισμός, κἂν ἀληθής ἤ ἀλλ’ ἵστη τοιολογίστων ἢ τριῶν τοιούτων σύνθετον, διεύθυν μὲν ὡς λημμάτων, ἐνδὴ δὲ ὡς συμπεράσματος.
⁵⁰ Clem., str. VIII 6,3f. (83,6-10 F.).
⁵¹ Arist., Top. 100a25-100b19 (1 B.): ἦστι δὲ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ἐν ὡς τεθέντων τινῶν ἐτερὸν τι τῶν κειμένων ἢ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων. ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἦστιν, ὅταν ἐς ἀληθῶν καὶ πρῶτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἤ, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἢ διὰ τινῶν πρῶτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴληφεν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐς ἐνδοξῶν συλλογιζόμενος. ἦστι δὲ ἀληθὴς μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ μὴ δ’ ἐτέρων ἄλλα δ’ αὐτῶν ἔχουτα τὴν πίστιν.
point is essentially identical to Aristotle’s. The opposition between true
and primary premisses and premisses based on opinion is spelled out in
the commentaries. Alexander of Aphrodisias writes: “For demonstrating
something is not the same thing as giving a syllogism, for the latter is
based on what someone thought or assented to. For many false things are
assented to, on the basis of which a syllogism, but not a demonstration,
can be produced”52. He seems to refer to the same fundamental difference
between syllogism and demonstration.

Clement identifies the Aristotelian definition of dialectical syllogism
with syllogisms in general, and uses the Aristotelian criteria to distinguish
between syllogisms and demonstration. What is misleading in Clement
at this point is that he has not yet mentioned that this distinction is in
Aristotelian terms a distinction between two subclasses of syllogisms.
Both, demonstrations and dialectical syllogisms, are syllogisms, but not
every syllogism is a demonstration, as the later requires true hypotheses.
In the Peripatetic tradition, though there is a clear distinction between
syllogism and demonstration, a demonstration is still called a syllogism.
This is obvious in Aristotle53 and most clearly spelled out by Alexander
of Aphrodisias stating: “For if there is a demonstration, there must be a
syllogism, since a demonstration is a sort of syllogism, but if there is a
syllogism, there need not to be a demonstration because there are also
dialectical and sophistical syllogisms”54. An argument in the form of a
demonstration was basically understood as a syllogism.

The distinction Clement describes was convincing and well known,
but his attempt to separate demonstration and syllogism as far as possible
provokes the objection that both demonstration and dialectical syllogism
are syllogisms. In response to this Clement turns to a Stoic line of thought
where he finds the needed distinction between two valid conclusions one
a syllogism and the other not syllogistically conclusive55.

In this third attempt to define a proper argumentation Clement intro-
duces the distinction between analysis and demonstration, analysis being
the reduction of a given proposition to a indemonstrable first principle
(εἰς τὰ ἐξ οὐκετῶν πιστά) and demonstration being the presentation of the

52 Alex. Aphr., in APr. (292,32-34 W.): οὗ γάρ ταῦτα ἀποδείξαι τε καὶ συλλογίσασθαι τι,
διότι έδοξε τινὶ ἢ συνεχόμενησε συγχωρέσαι γάρ πολλὰ καὶ ψευδὴ, δεί άν συλλογισμός μὲν
ἄν γένοιτο, ἀποδείξει δὲ οὖ. Translated by: I. Mueller, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On

53 Arist., APo. 72a25f. (116 R.): ἐπεὶ δὲ δεὶ πιστεύειν τε καὶ εἰδέναι τὸ πράγμα τοῦ τοιούτου
ἐξεῖν συλλογισμῶν ὃν καλοῦμεν ἀποδείξειν.

54 Alex. Aphr., in APr. prooemium (7,5-9 W.): ἀποδείξεος μὲν γάρ οὔσης πάντως ἐστὶ καὶ
συλλογισμὸς ἢ γάρ ἀποδείξες συλλογισμὸς τις συλλογισμοῦ δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ πάντως ἐστὶν
ἀποδείξεις διὰ τὸ συλλογισμὸν εἶναι καὶ διαλεκτικῶν τινα καὶ σοφιστικῶν. Translated by: J.
Barnes/S. Bobzien/K. Flannery/K. Ierodiakonou, Alexander of Aphrodias: On Aris-

completed argumentation including all intermediate steps. He urges the reader first to look for true propositions as a foundation, regardless of whether they are called premiss, assumption or axiom. Defining a demonstration as an argument that establishes one thing from another, he next asks his reader to make sure to draw the appropriate conclusion without caring very much whether an argument is called concludent (but not syllogistically concludent) or is syllogistically concludent. The terminology taken up shows that in this section, without leaving his line of thought Clement hints at the Stoic perspective on logic.

What we find in Clement is completely standard and refers to basic ideas of logic. Clement uses logical distinctions and vocabulary, and even his preference for ἐπίδειξις over syllogism in general was shared by philosophers. According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotle “tells us that the account of demonstration must be considered the primary product of syllogistic method as a whole. For the study of the other forms of syllogism is a matter for philosophers only to the extent that dealing with them is useful for demonstration and for the discovery of what is true.”

Clement’s search for truth seems compatible with the primacy of ἐπίδειξις in Alexander. In contrast to Alexander or Galen, Clement’s preference for ἐπίδειξις is not imbedded into a broader interest in formal thinking. However, Clement’s three approaches to describing the relation between sound demonstration and syllogism show a detailed knowledge of logic which he asserts is useful in the context of theological argumentation.

III. The purpose of demonstration

In the end, does Clement expect the methods of logic to define a standard in theology? He favours the use of syllogisms insofar as the truth value of the premisses qualifies them as demonstrations, but a certain reluctance concerning syllogistic inference is visible in his qualification of forms of argumentation by the means of the opposition between truth and opinion. Clement is interested in applying logic to theological argumentation and at the same time he knows the limits of doing so. Clement distinguishes

56 Clem., str. VIII 8,1 (84,9-15 F).
57 This has probably to be understood as “concludent in the specific sense”, cf. D.L., vit. VII 78,3 (401,11f. Marcovich): περατικοὶ δὲ εἰσὶν εἰδικῶς οἱ συνάγωντες μὴ συλλογιστικῶς.
59 Alex. Aphr., APr. I prooemium (8,19-24 W.): διδάσκαι, ὅτι προηγούμενον ἔργον τῆς συλλογιστικῆς πάσης μεθόδου χρή τῶν περί ἐπίδειξις ἡγεῖσαι λόγων καὶ γάρ ἢ περὶ τά ἄλλα ἐδή τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ πραγματεία τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γίνεται, καθ’ ὅσον καὶ τὸ περὶ ἰκείων διειληφθέναι χρήσιμον πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ δήθεν σώζειν, translation: Barnes et al., Alexander of Aphrodias (see note 54), 51.
philosophy and dialectics, which define that culture of education that he wants the Christian Gnostic to relate to and to distinguish himself from. As Clement does not reject the culture of education in general, his treatment of dialectics has to be subtle. Namely, he uses the distinctions made in logic to clarify his own approach to dialectics.

Besides the treatment in book 8 of the *Stromata*, he does this in the closely related chapters in book 2 of the *Stromata*\(^{60}\). Here he gives exactly the same definition of ἀπόδειξις as in book 8, introducing it as follows: “Justified however is only that knowledge that represents the scientific demonstration of the tradition according to the true philosophy”\(^{61}\). Demonstration is again an intellectual procedure that produces certainty or faith. More clearly than in the 8th book, demonstration is applied in the context of Christian thinking. Christian faith and epistemological certainty, both readings of πίστις, explain each other. “For the discourse which consists of demonstrations, implants certain faith in the soul of him who follows it”\(^{62}\). Christian faith is supported by demonstration. Clement speaks of the “highest” form of demonstration and urges the gnostic to be a true dialectician. This application to Christian thinking implies that Clement takes up cause for demonstrative syllogisms. In the 2nd book, they are again contrasted to dialectical syllogisms. “The demonstration which rests on opinion is human, and is the result of rhetorical arguments or dialectical syllogisms. For the highest demonstration, which we alluded to as scientific, produces certainty (πίστις) by the opening up of Scriptures to the souls of those who desire to learn; the result of which is knowledge”\(^{63}\). Clement applies the steps of demonstration to the reading of Scripture, starting with a true proposition, a verse of Scripture, and resulting in a true conclusion.

The first chapters of the 8th book can be read as a commentary on Matt 7,7f.: “Ask, and it shall be given you, seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you”\(^{64}\). To explain this highly controversial verse Clement invokes and defends the notion of scientific investigation. Clement points out that there is no finding without searching, and no apprehension without effort. Driven by his desire to find, the Christian, according to Clement, will nevertheless be peaceful in his inquiry, not showing self-love

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\(^{63}\) Clem., str. II 49,2-4 (139,3-8 F.): ἡ δὲ δοξαστικὴ ἀπόδειξις ἀνθρωπικὴ τέ ἐστι καὶ πρὸς τῶν ῥητορικῶν γινομένη ἐπιχειρήμαστον ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικῶν συλλογισμῶν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνοσάτω ἀπόδειξις, ὃν ἤγειζε ἡ ἑπιστημονικὴ, πίστιν ἐντίθησε διὰ τῆς τῶν γραφῶν παραθέσεως τε καὶ διαβιβάζων τοὺς μανθάνους ῥηγομένων ψυχαῖς, ἢτις ἃν εἰς γνῶσις.

but loving truth. Receiving understanding by scientific proof, he will be prudent, considerate, not fond of strife, and free from ambition\textsuperscript{65}.

The various Christian groups invoked Matt 7,7 in order to identify themselves with the seekers, or with those who have found\textsuperscript{66}. In the Nag Hammadi texts and other Coptic Gnostic writings there are numerous references to and quotations of Matt 7,7\textsuperscript{67}. In the\textit{Pistis Sophia} text Mary Magdalene appears in the role of the questioner. She inquires with assurance and certainty (\textit{ἀσφαλεία})\textsuperscript{68}, and this phrase occurs several times in the text\textsuperscript{69}. According to Irenaeus and Tertullian this style of questioning was very persuasive to many people. Tertullian writes: “I come now to the verse that our people use as pretext for pursuing their curiosity, and the heretics exploit to cultivate misgivings”\textsuperscript{70}. “They bedazzle many unwise people, as if one could learn more than the truth from them”\textsuperscript{71}, so Irenaeus. Reacting against a group who raise endless questions, Tertullian declares that the time of searching lies in the past. “You must seek until you find and believe when you have found; and then there is nothing more to do than to hold to what you believe”, in the conviction that “no inquiry is allowed once you have found and believed what has been taught by him who charges us to search for nothing beyond his teaching”\textsuperscript{72}.

It appears, indeed, that the concerns of Tertullian are not altogether foreign to Clement. Christians distinguish themselves in that they have arrived and have found a dogma. In the introduction to book 8, the em-
phasis in Matt 7,7 is on finding rather than seeking the dogma. Exactly this distinguishes the “barbaric” Christians from their contemporaries among the philosophers, whose ruminations amount to nothing but empty contentless debates, according to Clement\textsuperscript{73}. This reminds us of Justin, who, disappointed by his itinerary through the schools of philosophy, encountered the old man who showed him a philosophy whose truth was grounded in the old tradition and could be built upon\textsuperscript{74}.

Seeking leads the Christian to the goal, according to Clement, but this does not release him from further efforts. “The Word does not want him who has come to believe to be passive and entirely idle with respect to the truth. Indeed it says ‘Seek, and ye shall find’, but it brings seeking to its end in finding, excluding only empty trifling yet admitting the philosophical reflection”\textsuperscript{75}. If the Gnosis stands for restless searching and the Church for ignorance and a false complacency, then Clement belongs on the side of Gnosis. At least, he shares their opinion of Christians that lack gnostic ambition. He speaks of people who insists that they have found the truth and that Christian faith brooks no proof. They avoid any examination through fear of being proven wrong. They are in thrall to self-deception and achieve a peace of mind that is grounded in illusion. According to Clement they are not few\textsuperscript{76}. We meet again the protagonists of a plain, unsophisticated form of Christianity. The \textit{Authentikos Logos}, one of the few Gnostic writings that refers to their opponents\textsuperscript{77} states: “However, those who are ignorant don’t seek God”\textsuperscript{78}, and Clement would add: much less find him. “If they have faith (and I do not want to speak of knowledge) of a kind that can be dissolved by any plausible argument, then let it be dissolved”\textsuperscript{79}.

Clement does not subject the endless questions and nitpickings of the Gnostics to the Sceptical critique (as Tertullian might), but rather directs the arguments of the Sceptics\textsuperscript{80} against Tertullian and against the refusal of his followers to reflect upon and thereby strengthen their faith. Ac-

\textsuperscript{73} Clem., str. I 23,3; I 9,43; I 10,47.
\textsuperscript{74} Just., dial. 7,1-3 (PTS 47, 82-84 Marcovich).
\textsuperscript{75} Clem., str. I 51,4 (33,23-26 F.): ἀκίνητον μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἄργον οὐ βούλεται εἶναι τὸν πιστεύοντα ὁ λόγος: «ζητέτε» γὰρ «καὶ εὑρήσετε» λέγει, ἄλλα τὴν ζήτησιν εἰς εὑρέσιν περαιτέρω, τὴν κενὴν ἐξελάσσον γλυκαρίαν, ἐγκρίνων δὲ τὴν ἀχυροῦσαν τὴν πιστὶν ἡμῶν θεόρατα. Cf. str. VIII 1,2 (80,8 F.).
\textsuperscript{76} Clem., str. VII 92,5 (65,25-27 F.).
\textsuperscript{77} Cf. K. Koschorke, Die Polemik der Gnostiker gegen das kirchliche Christentum, NHS 12, Leiden 1978.
\textsuperscript{78} AuthLog (NHC VI,3) 30,4f. (BCNH 2, 31 Ménard), vgl. TractTrip (NHC I,5) 109 (NHS 22, 288-290 Attridge/Pagels); Iren., haer. II 26,3 (262,68 R./D.).
\textsuperscript{80} Cf. the explanation on Scepticism in Clem., str. VIII 15,2-16,3 (89,1-90,6 F.), cf. in detail G. Striker, Sceptical Strategies, in: Schofield/Myles/Barnes (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism (see note 11), 54-83.
According to Clement, they themselves end by producing strife because they 
abdicate judgment and are not capable of distinguishing true statements 
from false. Taking an anti-sceptical position, Clement insists that we 
should not suspend judgment, just because the false and contradictory 
is difficult to distinguish from the true and consistent. Rather, we are 
asked to seek reliable knowledge. We must examine possibilities, and in 
particular, distinguish between appearance and truth. Clement gives the 
following example: if two pieces of fruit are before us, and one of them 
is an imitation made of wax that only looks like a fruit, then we need not 
simply do without fruit, but rather should carefully examine the fruit and 
decide. Clement thus shows great confidence that the search for truth 
will result in reliable knowledge.

Clement speaks of a kind of know-nothing tendency on the part of 
his opponents, arguing against the disrespect of skills and knowledge 
from agriculture and medicine to geometry. His main argument consists 
of pointing out the necessity of making distinctions. In this connection 
he mentions heresies, for which there is a particular need to sort out 
the alternatives. Faith that avoids questions or is disturbed by them is 
shaky and insecure. Dialectics, according to Clement, defends faith against 
heresies as a “bulwark, so that truth cannot be trampled under foot by 
the sophists.”

But is dialectics in a position to carry out this task? In the 7th book of 
the *Stromata* Clement speaks of false teachers, their exegeses, their de-
bates. These are not the simple Christians who avoid critical discussion, 
but rather those that Clement accuses of attempting to transcend ordinary 
belief. Characterizations against which he has had to defend himself now 
serve to shewer his opponents. He describes them thus: “They do not lay 
down necessary principles as a foundation for the matter, but rather are 
driven by human opinions, then draw from them the necessarily following 
conclusions, and to avoid being refuted they end up sparing with those in 
possession of the true philosophie.” Drawing conclusions from merely 
agreed-upon assumptions that are not known to be true is the hallmark 
of dialectical syllogism, which according to Clement, is connected to 
strifemongering and is speculative in a way that can be called eristic. By

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81 Clem., str. VII 4 (64,30-34 F.).
82 Clem., str. I 43,1-4 (28,18-29,13 F.); VI 93,1(478,14-19 F.).
85 Clem., str. VI 81,4 (472,17f. F.):
86 Clem., str. VI 98,2 (69,14-17 F.):
87 Clem., str. VII 98,2 (69,14-17 F.):
using the term ἐριστικὸς\textsuperscript{88}, Clement signals that the distinction between demonstration and dialectical syllogism that he developed in the 8\textsuperscript{th} book separates him from this group of opponents.

This indicates a different point of view than the one known from the Aristotelian Topics. After distinguishing demonstration and dialectical syllogism, Aristotle goes further and sets off both from eristic syllogism, which are favoured by those who are eager for strife. According to Aristotle: “they only appear to establish a conclusion from premisses that seem to be reputable but are not really so”\textsuperscript{89} Eristic is described as giving the impression of a deduction which isn’t one. So strictly speaking, there are no eristic syllogisms but only eristic deceptions\textsuperscript{90}. In this light, the technical term ‘eristic’ seems unsuited to describe Clement’s opponents. Clement appears to conflate two Aristotelian concepts in order to discredit his opponents. Clement seems to be aware of this problem\textsuperscript{91} and doesn’t use the term ‘eristic’ often\textsuperscript{92}.

To defend his line of thought, Clement insists upon strictly separating persuasive dialectical arguments from demonstration\textsuperscript{93}. The method of demonstration, which results in certainty of faith, serves to defend him against unsophisticated as well as over-sophisticated Christians\textsuperscript{94}. Thus in Clement, as in Tertullian and others, the allegation of overusing dialectics can be employed to impugn the opponent.

In the Stromata we find both criticism and praise for dialectics. Clement’s treatment, however, is self-consistent. In his critique, he delineates the potential of logic to be an empty, sophistical endeavour dealing with mere probabilities\textsuperscript{95}, but this does not undercut his conviction that a

\textsuperscript{88} Clem., str. I 41,2 (27,10f. F.).

\textsuperscript{89} Arist., SE 165b9-11 (SCBO, 192 Ross).

\textsuperscript{90} Clement gives the following example of a sophistical syllogism: “What you say passes through your mouth. Which is true. You name a house. Therefore a house passes through you mouth. Which is false”. Clem., str. VIII 26,5 (97,4-7 F.).

\textsuperscript{91} Cf. Clem., str. I 39,3 (26,7f. F.)

\textsuperscript{92} Cf. Clem., str. I 39,1-4 (25,32-26,14 F.); I 41,2 (27,10f. F.); I 47,2 (31,5-8 F.); V 8,1 (330,22f. F.); VI 162,2 (515,22-24 F.); VII 4 (71,7 F.); VIII 1,2 (80,8 F.), cf. also str. I 22,2 (14,23f. F.); V 7,1 (329,25 F.); VIII 11,3 (86,27 F.).

\textsuperscript{93} Against the interpretation of this verse by J. Helderman, Die Anapausis im Evangelium Veritatis. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung des valentinianisch-gnostischen Heilsgutes der Ruhe im Evangelium Veritatis und in anderen Schriften der Nag Hammadi-Bibliothek, Leiden 1984, 100f.: „Auch Clemens Alexandrinus – der „christliche Gnostiker“ hat das häretische Verfahren bzw. die Berufung auf das Jesuswort zurückgewiesen”.

\textsuperscript{94} Clement has therefore been characterized as occupying an intermediate position by Koschorke, Die Polemik (see note 77), 201: “Eine bemerkenswerte Zwitterstellung nimmt dabei der ‚kirchliche Gnostiker‘ Clem.Al. ein: für häretisches Forschen wehrt er in str. I,54,4 das Recht der Berufung auf Mt 7:7 ab, nimmt es aber für sein eigenes, über den ‚einfachen Glauben‘ der Menge hinausgehendes Forschen in Anspruch –, wobei ihm jedoch seitens der kirchlichen simpliciores vergleichbares Mißtrauen begegnet wie den häretischen Gnostikern”.

\textsuperscript{95} For example Clem., str. I 39,1-5 (25,30-26,14 F.); I 41,2 (27,10f. F.).
Christian Gnostic should have training in logic as demonstration is an essential tool for providing certainty in faith and thinking. Clement does not see his own use of dialectics as being subject to the flaws depicted in his critical remarks. Throughout the books of the *Stromata*, his pursuit of these distinctions within dialectics defines his stand in the controversies of his time.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In *Stromata* VIII finden sich drei Kapitel, in denen Clemens Beweis und dialektischen Syllogismus gegenüberstellt. Seine Ausführungen haben Parallelen in der aristotelischen Dialektik. Beweiskräftige Schlüsse übertragen die Zuverlässigkeit und Wahrheit der Prämisse auf die Schlussfolgerung, sie führen zu zuverlässiger Erkenntnis. Das Bemühen um zuverlässige Erkenntnis ist nach Clemens Aufgabe des Theologen. Entsprechend häufig begegnet die dialektische Terminologie, insbesondere in *Stromata* II und VII.

*Stromata* VIII wird eingeführt als Kommentar zu dem kontrovers interpretierten Vers Mt 7,7. Im Unterschied zur nicht-christlichen Philosophie führt nach Clemens die christliche Philosophie zum „Finden“, was sie aber nicht des „Suchens“ enthebt. Christen, die nach zuverlässiger Erkenntnis streben, sind nach Clemens also gerade nicht wie in Tertullians Häretikerbeschreibung diejenigen, die endlos suchen und deren Suche zu nichts führt. Vielmehr hält Clemens umgekehrt seinen Gegnern vor, dass sie unter den skeptischen Vorbehalt fallen, wenn sie sich in ihrem einfachen Glauben eines Urteils bewusst enthalten.

Clemens verteidigt eine Ausbildung in Dialektik, gleichzeitig finden sich bei Clemens logik-kritische Aussagen, in denen Clemens jedoch nicht seine eigene Haltung gegenüber der Dialektik zurücknimmt. Er hat hier mit einer zweiten Gruppe von Gegnern zu tun, denen Clemens das Argumentieren mit dialektischen Schlüssen zuschreibt, d.h. mit zwar gültigen, aber im Gegensatz zu seinen eigenen Beweisen nicht notwendig wahren Schlüssen. Diese Schlüsse zieht er in den Bereich eristischer Scheinsyllogismen, womit deutlich ist, dass er in der Dialektik entwickelte Unterscheidungen benutzt, um seine Position in den Auseinandersetzungen zu bestimmen.

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