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Has the Later Wittgenstein Accounted for Necessity?


Kalhat, Javier (2008). Has the Later Wittgenstein Accounted for Necessity? Philosophical Investigations, 31(1):1-23.

Abstract

In this paper, I argue against the later Wittgenstein's conventionalist account of necessity. I first show that necessary propositions and grammatical rules differ in ways that make an explanation of the former in terms of the latter inadequate. I then argue that even if Wittgenstein's account were adequate, the explanation of necessity it offers would still fail to be genuinely reductive of the modal notion.

Abstract

In this paper, I argue against the later Wittgenstein's conventionalist account of necessity. I first show that necessary propositions and grammatical rules differ in ways that make an explanation of the former in terms of the latter inadequate. I then argue that even if Wittgenstein's account were adequate, the explanation of necessity it offers would still fail to be genuinely reductive of the modal notion.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Language:English
Date:January 2008
Deposited On:04 Mar 2009 11:04
Last Modified:06 Dec 2017 19:07
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:0190-0536
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.00331.x

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