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Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining


Wichardt, P C; Schunk, D; Schmitz, P W (2009). Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining. Economics Letters, 103(1):33-35.

Abstract

This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which
responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff
that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation
based on cognitive dissonance is offered.

Abstract

This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which
responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff
that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation
based on cognitive dissonance is offered.

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46 downloads since deposited on 22 Jul 2009
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:April 2009
Deposited On:22 Jul 2009 04:51
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 13:17
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0165-1765
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.01.011

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