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Optimal privatisation using qualifying auctions


Boone, Jan; Goeree, Jacob K (2009). Optimal privatisation using qualifying auctions. Economic Journal, 119(534):277-297.

Abstract

This article explores use of auctions for privatising public assets. In our model, a single ‘insider’ bidder possesses information about the asset's common value. Bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the asset. Due to the insider's presence, uninformed bidders face a strong winner's curse in standard auctions. We show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder. It can be implemented via a two-stage ‘qualifying auction’. In the first stage, non-binding bids are submitted to determine who enters the second stage, which consists of a standard second-price auction augmented with a reserve price.

Abstract

This article explores use of auctions for privatising public assets. In our model, a single ‘insider’ bidder possesses information about the asset's common value. Bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the asset. Due to the insider's presence, uninformed bidders face a strong winner's curse in standard auctions. We show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder. It can be implemented via a two-stage ‘qualifying auction’. In the first stage, non-binding bids are submitted to determine who enters the second stage, which consists of a standard second-price auction augmented with a reserve price.

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3 citations in Web of Science®
6 citations in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2009
Deposited On:22 Feb 2010 08:45
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 13:34
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:0013-0133
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02213.x

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