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The logit-response dynamics


Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Netzer, Nick (2010). The logit-response dynamics. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2):413-427.

Abstract

We develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit-response learning dynamics in games, with arbitrary specification of revision opportunities. The result allows us to show convergence to the set of Nash equilibria in the class of best-response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games. We also study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specification of revision opportunities. Our techniques can be extended and applied to a wide class of learning dynamics in games.

Abstract

We develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit-response learning dynamics in games, with arbitrary specification of revision opportunities. The result allows us to show convergence to the set of Nash equilibria in the class of best-response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games. We also study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specification of revision opportunities. Our techniques can be extended and applied to a wide class of learning dynamics in games.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2010
Deposited On:16 Feb 2010 15:31
Last Modified:07 Dec 2017 00:02
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0899-8256
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.004

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