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Financing and growth under repeated moral hazard


Anderson, Ronald W; Nyborg, Kjell G (2011). Financing and growth under repeated moral hazard. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20(1):1-24.

Abstract

We develop an incomplete contracts model to study the extent to which control rights of different financings affect corporate growth. The model admits a standard hold-up problem under equity financing; insiders may be disincentivized to do R&D because outside investors can use their control rights to expropriate large parts of the returns by hiring more efficient managers in the future. Debt financing may give rise to a double moral hazard problem; both managers and shareholders may divert corporate resources to themselves before debt is serviced. However, in many cases, these phenomena do not occur in equilibrium and control rights are irrelevant. Cross-sectional predictions are derived from those cases where control rights matter. Consistent with the empirical evidence, leverage is inversely related to growth and to profitability.

Abstract

We develop an incomplete contracts model to study the extent to which control rights of different financings affect corporate growth. The model admits a standard hold-up problem under equity financing; insiders may be disincentivized to do R&D because outside investors can use their control rights to expropriate large parts of the returns by hiring more efficient managers in the future. Debt financing may give rise to a double moral hazard problem; both managers and shareholders may divert corporate resources to themselves before debt is serviced. However, in many cases, these phenomena do not occur in equilibrium and control rights are irrelevant. Cross-sectional predictions are derived from those cases where control rights matter. Consistent with the empirical evidence, leverage is inversely related to growth and to profitability.

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1 citation in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2011
Deposited On:11 Feb 2010 02:48
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 13:53
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:1042-9573
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2009.12.001
Related URLs:http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/2920.html
Other Identification Number:YJFIN_551

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