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Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information


Ewerhart, Christian (2002). Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 107(2):474-482.

Abstract

We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n−1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies— regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game.

Abstract

We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n−1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies— regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2002
Deposited On:06 Apr 2010 11:02
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 14:04
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0022-0531
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2958

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