Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Monopolistic screening under learning by doing


Gärtner, D (2010). Monopolistic screening under learning by doing. RAND Journal of Economics, 41(3):574-597.

Abstract

This article investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework where agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' learning rates are private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or underexploited crucially depends on whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). We further show that an overexploitation of learning effects can occur also if the full-commitment assumption is relaxed.

Abstract

This article investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework where agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' learning rates are private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or underexploited crucially depends on whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). We further show that an overexploitation of learning effects can occur also if the full-commitment assumption is relaxed.

Statistics

Citations

4 citations in Web of Science®
4 citations in Scopus®
Google Scholar™

Altmetrics

Downloads

28 downloads since deposited on 21 Jan 2011
4 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2010
Deposited On:21 Jan 2011 16:13
Last Modified:09 Mar 2017 08:20
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:0741-6261
Additional Information:'The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com'. The attached file is a preprint (accepted version) of an article published in RAND Journal of Economics.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00112.x

Download

Preview Icon on Download
Preview
Content: Accepted Version
Filetype: PDF
Size: 1MB
View at publisher

TrendTerms

TrendTerms displays relevant terms of the abstract of this publication and related documents on a map. The terms and their relations were extracted from ZORA using word statistics. Their timelines are taken from ZORA as well. The bubble size of a term is proportional to the number of documents where the term occurs. Red, orange, yellow and green colors are used for terms that occur in the current document; red indicates high interlinkedness of a term with other terms, orange, yellow and green decreasing interlinkedness. Blue is used for terms that have a relation with the terms in this document, but occur in other documents.
You can navigate and zoom the map. Mouse-hovering a term displays its timeline, clicking it yields the associated documents.

Author Collaborations