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Loyalty and competence in public agencies


Wagner, Alexander F (2011). Loyalty and competence in public agencies. Public Choice, 146(1/2):145-162.

Abstract

Competent public agencies are associated with better economic outcomes. Beyond competence, political leaders need to secure the loyalty of their agencies. Unfortunately, several theories predict a tradeoff between these two valued features. This paper finds that recruitment into agencies is meritocratic where (1) agency officials have poor outside options, (2) careers in agencies are long-lasting, and (3) agency loyalty is important. Moreover, agency competence is lower when (4) loyalty is important but the time horizon is short, and (5) outside opportunities improve but the time horizon is long. This evidence fits best with a theory of loyalty as non-contractible behavior.

Abstract

Competent public agencies are associated with better economic outcomes. Beyond competence, political leaders need to secure the loyalty of their agencies. Unfortunately, several theories predict a tradeoff between these two valued features. This paper finds that recruitment into agencies is meritocratic where (1) agency officials have poor outside options, (2) careers in agencies are long-lasting, and (3) agency loyalty is important. Moreover, agency competence is lower when (4) loyalty is important but the time horizon is short, and (5) outside opportunities improve but the time horizon is long. This evidence fits best with a theory of loyalty as non-contractible behavior.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2011
Deposited On:09 Mar 2011 12:47
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 14:49
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0048-5829
Additional Information:The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9587-8
Related URLs:http://www.bf.uzh.ch/cms/employees/alexander-f..wagner_165_624.html?type=publications&emp_id=11 (Author)

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