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Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment


Pogrebna, Ganna; Blavatskyy, Pavlo R (2009). Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 403, University of Zurich.

Abstract

This paper studies coordination in a multi-stage elimination tournament with large monetarynincentives and a diversified subject pool drawn from the adult British population. In thentournament, members of an ad hoc team earn money by answering general knowledgenquestions and then eliminate one contestant by plurality voting without prior communication. We find that in the early rounds of the tournament, contestants use a focal principle and coordinate on one of the multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies by eliminating the weakest member of the team. However, in the later rounds, contestants switch to playing a mixednstrategy Nash equilibrium.

Abstract

This paper studies coordination in a multi-stage elimination tournament with large monetarynincentives and a diversified subject pool drawn from the adult British population. In thentournament, members of an ad hoc team earn money by answering general knowledgenquestions and then eliminate one contestant by plurality voting without prior communication. We find that in the early rounds of the tournament, contestants use a focal principle and coordinate on one of the multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies by eliminating the weakest member of the team. However, in the later rounds, contestants switch to playing a mixednstrategy Nash equilibrium.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:February 2009
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 20:09
Last Modified:07 Dec 2017 10:02
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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