Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game


Engelmann, Dirk; Fischbacher, Urs (2002). Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 132, University of Zurich.

Abstract

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

Abstract

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

Statistics

Downloads

0 downloads since deposited on 29 Nov 2011
4 downloads since 12 months

Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:November 2002
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 21:26
Last Modified:12 Aug 2017 12:53
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

Download

Preview Icon on Download
Preview
Filetype: PDF
Size: 753kB