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Coordination in a Repeated Stochastic Game with Imperfect Monitoring


Gerber, Anke; Hens, Thorsten; Vogt, Bodo (2006). Coordination in a Repeated Stochastic Game with Imperfect Monitoring. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 126, University of Zurich.

Abstract

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection argumentsneither have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in actual plays of the game. We give experimental evidence for a unique equilibrium selection and explain this very robust finding by equilibrium selection based on behavioral arguments, in particular focal point analysis,nprobability matching and over-confidence. Our results have interesting applicationsnin finance because the observed equilibrium exhibits momentum,nreversal and excess volatility. Moreover, the results may help to explain why technical analysis is a commonly observed investment style.

Abstract

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection argumentsneither have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in actual plays of the game. We give experimental evidence for a unique equilibrium selection and explain this very robust finding by equilibrium selection based on behavioral arguments, in particular focal point analysis,nprobability matching and over-confidence. Our results have interesting applicationsnin finance because the observed equilibrium exhibits momentum,nreversal and excess volatility. Moreover, the results may help to explain why technical analysis is a commonly observed investment style.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:January 2006
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:47
Last Modified:07 Dec 2017 10:12
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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