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The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests


Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon (2007). The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 314, University of Zurich.

Abstract

"Consider a society where all agents initially play ""fair"" and one agent invents a ""cheating"" strategy such as doping in sports. Whichnfactors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with local information. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of thenmodel: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the agents. In particular wenfind that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents arenmaximally segregated."

Abstract

"Consider a society where all agents initially play ""fair"" and one agent invents a ""cheating"" strategy such as doping in sports. Whichnfactors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with local information. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of thenmodel: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the agents. In particular wenfind that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents arenmaximally segregated."

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:February 2007
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:47
Last Modified:07 Dec 2017 10:14
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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