Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Job Design and Randomization in Principal Agent Models


Köhler, Wolfgang R (2008). Job Design and Randomization in Principal Agent Models. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 381, University of Zurich.

Abstract

We analyze task allocation and randomization in Principal Agent models. We identify a new rationale that determines the allocation of tasks and show that it can be optimal to assign tasks that are very different to one agent. Similar to randomization, the reason to assign several tasks to one agent is to mitigate the effect of the participation constraint. We show that the allocation of tasks can be used as a substitute if randomization is not feasible.

Abstract

We analyze task allocation and randomization in Principal Agent models. We identify a new rationale that determines the allocation of tasks and show that it can be optimal to assign tasks that are very different to one agent. Similar to randomization, the reason to assign several tasks to one agent is to mitigate the effect of the participation constraint. We show that the allocation of tasks can be used as a substitute if randomization is not feasible.

Statistics

Downloads

440 downloads since deposited on 29 Nov 2011
6 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:July 2008
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:47
Last Modified:07 Dec 2017 10:16
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

Download

Download PDF  'Job Design and Randomization in Principal Agent Models'.
Preview
Filetype: PDF
Size: 149kB