Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Truth without people?


Glock, Hans Johann (1997). Truth without people? Philosophy, 72(279):85-104.

Abstract

There is a venerable tradition according to which the concept of truth is totally independent of human beings, their actions and beliefs, because truth consists in the correspondence of mind-independentpropositions to a mind-independent reality. For want of arespect. One way of doing so is relativism, the idea that whether a belief is true or false depends on the point of view of individuals or communities. A closely related position is a consensus theory of truth, according to which a belief is true if it is held by a (suitably qualified) group of people. In a similar vein, the pragmatist theory maintains that a true belief is one which it is expedient for us to accept.

Abstract

There is a venerable tradition according to which the concept of truth is totally independent of human beings, their actions and beliefs, because truth consists in the correspondence of mind-independentpropositions to a mind-independent reality. For want of arespect. One way of doing so is relativism, the idea that whether a belief is true or false depends on the point of view of individuals or communities. A closely related position is a consensus theory of truth, according to which a belief is true if it is held by a (suitably qualified) group of people. In a similar vein, the pragmatist theory maintains that a true belief is one which it is expedient for us to accept.

Statistics

Citations

8 citations in Web of Science®
6 citations in Scopus®
Google Scholar™

Altmetrics

Downloads

102 downloads since deposited on 15 May 2012
22 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Language:English
Date:1997
Deposited On:15 May 2012 07:01
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 15:26
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISSN:0031-8191
Additional Information:Copyright: Cambridge University Press.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100056667

Download

Preview Icon on Download
Preview
Content: Published Version
Filetype: PDF
Size: 399kB
View at publisher