Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Preference signaling in matching markets


Coles, Peter; Kushnir, Alexey; Niederle, Muriel (2013). Preference signaling in matching markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2):99-134.

Abstract

Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets.

Abstract

Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets.

Statistics

Citations

9 citations in Web of Science®
12 citations in Scopus®
Google Scholar™

Altmetrics

Downloads

85 downloads since deposited on 06 Nov 2012
22 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2013
Deposited On:06 Nov 2012 15:06
Last Modified:07 Dec 2017 16:02
Publisher:American Economic Association
ISSN:1945-7669
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.99
Related URLs:http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51767
http://www.zora.uzh.ch/51767/

Download

Download PDF  'Preference signaling in matching markets'.
Preview
Content: Accepted Version
Filetype: PDF
Size: 603kB
View at publisher