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Creating a ‘We-feeling’ in Heterogeneous Nations: A Cross-country Investigation of the Impact of Inclusion and Autonomy on the National Pride of Ethnic Minorities

Marc Bühlmann and Miriam Hänni

Abstract
In this contribution, we investigate the impact of different institutions on ethnic minorities’ political support. Based on a hierarchical cross-country comparison, we first show that individuals belonging to ethnic minorities have less national identity than the majority groups within the same country. We then test whether this negative effect of belonging to ethnic minorities can be attenuated by institutions. First, we argue that the inclusion of ethnic minorities by power-sharing institutions gives them the possibility to have a say in politics and, therefore, they develop a sense of common identity. Second, when minority groups are given the autonomy to preserve their group identity, e.g., in federal units, they develop positive feelings for the whole nation and finally a national identity. Our multi-level analyses show that autonomy indeed attenuates the negative effect of minority status on national pride, but that this is not the case for inclusive institutions. In light of increasing heterogeneisation of societies because of migration and denationalization, our findings contribute to the discussion on the relationship between growing ethnic pluralism and good functioning of democratic regimes.

Keywords
comparative institutionalism, diffuse support, ethnic minorities, autonomy, power-sharing
In research on political culture, diffuse support is defined by affective orientations towards the whole political community (Dalton, 1999). Diffuse political support is seen as an important feature of political legitimacy and stability. According to Easton (1965a, p. 124), a political system with declining diffuse support must ‘either provide mechanisms to revive the flagging support or its days will be numbered’.

In this study, we investigate diffuse support among ethnic minorities. We suppose that ethnic minorities have less affective orientation towards the political community than do the dominating ethnic majorities. However, we expect that the gap in national identity between ethnic minorities and majorities can be bridged by political institutions that either include the preferences of minorities or allow them to autonomously organize their political life.

We argue that knowing how one can strengthen the diffuse support of ethnic minorities is increasingly relevant. We suggest that increasing ethnic heterogeneity due to migration and denationalization puts the development of diffuse support in terms of national identity in danger. If this is true, the growing ethnic heterogeneity of democratic nations, i.e., the increasing number of different ethnic minorities within a country, should lead to a loss of common national identity. Among most immigrant countries, right wing parties stir up the debate about whether settled immigrants endanger national cohesion. Furthermore, in countries with historical ethnic divisions, there is a (sometimes even violent) trend toward more autonomy for ethnic minorities. Both developments endanger the formation of diffuse support. More concretely, ‘a decline in national identities would spell a crisis for the nation state and not just a crisis of the political system’ (Dalton, 1999, p. 72).

Of course, one could argue that multicultural developments will lead to more cosmopolitan forms of democracy and that diffuse support for

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2) In a recent debate in Germany, there is even a fear that the growing number of immigrants will lead to a stultification of the whole nation and that ‘Germany will abolish itself’ (‘Deutschland schafft sich ab’). This is the title of the book by the advocate of this thesis, Thilo Sarrazin (2010).
nation states is not as important anymore as was suggested in the second half of the 20th century (Held, 2006, p. 290ff.). However, even if denationalization in terms of supranationalization as well as regionalization of politics is an ongoing process, important political decisions are still made at the national level. And it is exactly these decisions that further foster the decline of feelings of national identity among ethnic minorities. The probability that ethnic minorities also often show up as political losers is high. In the long run, this adds to a decline of diffuse support among ethnic minorities. Facing the challenge of growing heterogeneity thus means finding ‘mechanisms to revive the flagging support’ (Easton, 1965a, p. 124).

In this study, we investigate two such mechanisms that are based on Lijphart’s (1977, 1999) idea of consociationalism. We argue that the national identification of ethnic minorities can be strengthened on the one hand when their status as political minorities is diminished thanks to better political inclusion. On a psychological level, this mechanism should create a national ‘we-feeling’ that is shared between ethnic minorities and the majority population, because the former are allowed to proportionally bring their preferences into the national political decision-making process. The second aspect we want to investigate in our study is based on federalism. Here, ethnic minorities are allowed to arrange their affairs in a more or less autonomous way at a subnational level (Lijphart, 1977). Through this mechanism, minorities feel they belong to a given nation, because – in a preliminary step – they are allowed to live in their own sub-society that forms a part of the whole nation. In a nutshell, we test whether the diffuse support of ethnic minorities can be influenced by inclusion and autonomy.

The tests of the impact of inclusion and autonomy on the national identity of ethnic minorities are based on a cross-country comparison with about 30,000 individuals in 30 countries. We use those democratic countries in the World Values Survey Five Aggregated File 1981–2005 (WVS 2009), in which there are respondents belonging to an ethnic minority (see table 1). We then test whether belonging to an ethnic minority does indeed negatively affect an individual’s national pride, whether the strength of this effect varies between countries, and whether this variance can be explained by institutions that allow for inclusion and autonomy.

In other words, unlike previous studies (Anderson, 1998; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Norris, 1999, 2004), we do not expect that institutions have the same impact on the diffuse support of all individuals. In contrast,
we argue that institutions differently influence the development of national identity, depending on whether an individual belongs to an ethnic minority or the majority. More precisely, the (assumed) negative effect of belonging to ethnic minorities on national identity is supposed to be attenuated by inclusion and federalism.

It is important to note that the respondents in the WVS who belong to ethnic minorities all are citizens of a country. We do not have data on current immigrants who are building new ethnic groups within a country. The ethnic minorities in our sample are indigenous groups, people within a country who have different cultural or linguistic backgrounds or who are naturalised immigrants or naturalised children of migrant parents. Thus, our results must not be interpreted as an immediate solution to the challenge of growing heterogeneisation due to immigration. However, our analyses exemplify how problems of interaction and relationships between different ethnic groups are solved in countries with more or less established ethnic minorities. Thus, they serve to enlarge the discussion about mechanisms that can counter the challenge of the possible decline of national ‘we-feelings’.

Our contribution is composed of five sections. In section 1, we elaborate on the idea of lower diffuse support of ethnic minorities; in section 2, we consider the possible institutional mechanisms that attenuate the negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on national identity. Section 3 describes the method and the data. In section 4, we present the empirical tests. Section 5 offers our conclusions.

1. Minorities’ Diffuse Support

The concept of political support is generally associated with David Easton (1965b; 1975; 1976). Easton mentions three objects of political support: the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities. The political community, which is the most important object of political support, represents the nation or the political system in broad terms and is defined as ‘a group of people who come together to draw up some kind of constitution to regulate their political relationship’ (Easton, 1965b, p. 178).

‘Regime support’ refers to attitudes towards the constitutional order of a political system. Easton distinguishes between three elements of the
regime. First, values and principles define how the political system should function, e.g., whether it should be democratic or autocratic; second, the norms of the system involve the specific rules that govern the political process; finally, the political regime includes attitudes toward political institutions, such as the evaluation of the parliament or political parties (Easton, 1965b; Dalton, 2004, p. 6).

The dimension ‘political authorities’ as the third object of political support focuses on individuals who currently hold positions of political authority, e.g., as prime minister or parliamentarian. Unlike the political regime, the focus of the third object lies on the individuals themselves and not on the institutions within which they work (Easton, 1965b, p. 206). In sum, Easton (1965a, b) distinguishes between diffuse support for the whole nation and specific support directed toward individuals.

In this study, we focus on diffuse support, which is essential for the survival of political systems because it is relatively stable. In contrast to diffuse support, specific support fluctuates and depends on the performance of the political authorities. Consequently, diffuse support is important to compensate for temporarily low specific support (Easton, 1965b, p. 272). In this regard, we concentrate on support for the political community because this is one of the most significant sources of diffuse support, which can stabilize a political system during times of political stress (Dalton, 1999, p. 72). Diffuse support for the political community can manifest itself in a sense of ‘we-feeling’, common consciousness or group identification (Easton, 1975, p. 447). As we focus on the level of nation states, pride in one’s own nation comes close to these feelings. Individual national pride is one of the most common indicators for support for the political community (Westle, 2009, p. 252; Dalton, 2004; Klingemann, 1999). As Westle (1999, p. 117) indicated, national pride is an aspect that refers to emotional ties to the national community, which is similar to what Easton calls ‘a sense of we-feeling’. Hence, our analysis focuses on support for the political community, measured by the level of national pride.  

Of course, the use of ‘nation pride’ as a measure of national identity has been disputed. The discussion centers on the difference between national identity and patriotism (see Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Smith & Kim, 2006). We argue that nation pride can – as one of the only indicators in a cross-country survey – serve as a proxy for the concept of national identity. As Westle (1999, p. 117) underlined, national pride refers to a feeling of emotional ties towards the national community. In the case of ethnic minorities, we expect national pride to be an important indicator of a ‘we-feeling’ that decreases the risk of
below shows, national pride is high in most states. However, support for the political community has not been unaffected by the general decline of other aspects of political support (Dalton, 1999, 2004; Holmberg, 1999). According to Dalton (1999, p. 72), the growing emphasis on multiculturalism in many societies has questioned the breadth and depth of a common national identity.

Political support mainly depends on whether people feel that their interests are well protected. In democratic states, there are always people who win and people who lose. However, if one group persistently wins and another permanently loses, the losers tend to feel excluded from the political decision-making process, which can lead to dissatisfaction (Anderson and Guillory, 1997, p. 68; Norris, 1999, p. 219). Ethnic minorities have a high probability of being permanently excluded, especially in majoritarian electoral systems. Therefore, majority rule in plural societies not only harm the quality of democracy or even be ‘undemocratic’ (Lijphart, 1984, p. 22) but can also be dangerous as minorities that are continuously denied access to power feel excluded and lose their allegiance to the regime (Lijphart, 1984, p. 22f). If such excluded groups fear for their cultural and physical safety, this can even lead to civil wars. Though civil wars are rare in consolidated democracies, the exclusion of minorities is, nevertheless, problematic. Low political support and feelings of political distrust can increase unconventional and elite-challenging actions such as protests, demonstrations, or political violence (Dalton, 2004, p. 11). The management of such conflicts and the integration of different ethnic groups are considered some of the most serious problems facing democracies (Norris, 2004, p. 209).

Table 1 mostly supports our assumptions. It shows the degree of national pride in the overall population and among people belonging to an ethnic minority. We used the question of the World Values Survey on national pride, which we binomially recoded. A value of 0 summarizes the two categories expressing low pride in one’s nationality whereas a value of 1 expresses (quite) high pride in one’s own nationality. As for our main

independent movements, civil wars, or unrest due to exclusion. In other words, if people feel connected to their country regardless of their ethnic identity, the problems of heterogeneous societies mentioned above are likely to be less salient.

4) G006: How proud are you to be [nationality]? Very proud/quite proud (1) versus not very proud/not at all proud (0).
independent variable, ‘belonging to an ethnic minority’, we used the questions of the World Values Survey on the language spoken at home and, in seven cases, on ethnicity. Respondents who speak a language that is spoken by less than 50% of the population are counted as belonging to an ethnic minority. The same rule was used to recode the variable of ethnicity: people belonging to an ethnic group that composes less than half of the population are coded as belonging to an ethnic minority.

According to the table, most people state that they are ‘very proud’ or ‘quite proud’ of their nationality. However, there are significant differences between countries as well as between ethnic minorities and the majority of a given country. Focusing on the overall sample, Thailand indicates the highest, and Taiwan and Moldova the lowest, amount of national pride. The column on ethnic minorities indicates – in accordance with our expectations – that in most countries, ethnic minorities are less proud of their nationality than is the overall population. Exceptions are Australia, Brazil, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela, where people belonging to an ethnic minority are prouder of their nationality than their compatriots.

Most of these countries – Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, and Australia – have introduced measures to integrate potentially excluded groups or to provide them with territorial autonomy. As we suggest that such institutions should enhance the national pride of ethnic minorities these results seem plausible. Furthermore, exactly such consensual institutions are assumed to decrease the political support of the majority groups (Anderson & Guillery, 1997, p. 68f). This could explain

5) G016: What language do you normally speak at home?
7) Our sample includes 30 countries. In some countries – Japan, South Korea, or Finland – no or only few individuals belong to an ethnic minority group, despite our relatively unrestrictive operationalisation. Therefore, we excluded such countries from our analysis to protect the results from biases. Furthermore, as can be seen in table 1, Belgium is not part of the sample. Of course, it would be necessary to analyse the example of Belgium since it is one of the prototype of consociational democracy. However, to our regret, we must exclude Belgium due to missing data: it was not possible to construct the variable “Ethnic minority”, because the question considering the language spoken at home was not asked. Nevertheless, we thank our anonymous reviewer for the valuable suggestion to include this country in our analysis.
the comparatively higher aggregate political support of ethnic minorities. In contrast, in Mali and Moldova, no such measures exist. At least in the case of Mali, the difference between national pride of ethnic minorities and the overall population is only small. The case of Moldova, however, needs to be explained. According to the Minority at Risk (MAR) Project two relevant ethnic minority groups exist in this country – the Slavic minority and the Gagauz (a Turkish-orthodox minority). The latter and the major part of the former are well integrated into the Moldavian political life and even enjoy widespread autonomy (in the case of the Gagauz). This might explain, why these groups show no less support for the political community than their compatriots.8

Returning to the differences between the two samples, it can be seen that the gap is quite small in some countries – as, for instance, in Italy, South Africa, Sweden, or the United States – whereas in others, the degree of nation pride varies considerably between ethnic minorities and majorities, as in Estonia or Slovakia. However, this pattern does not seem to be due to characteristics of the respective ethnic minorities (e.g. due to the size or territorial concentration of ethnic minorities).9 Thus, there should be other factors, which might explain the observed pattern. Therefore, in

8) The Gagauz enjoy widespread autonomy since Moldavia’s independence and are momentarily satisfied with the existing arrangements. They are represented by political parties and organisations and, thus, well integrated in the political system of Moldavia (MAR 2011). The Slavish minority group is politically and geographically divided between the secessionist Transdniestr region and major cities within the rest of Moldavia. The Slavic minority living in the cities of Moldavia is well integrated in the social and political system and faces no government repressions or discrimination (MAR 2011). The Slavic minority living in the region of Transdniestr, however, tries to build its own independent state, with its own government, currency and armed forces. Even though this group enjoys widespread autonomy it still requests complete independence (MAR 2011). However, the Slavic minority living in Transdniestr is rather small and does, therefore, probably not affect the pattern of national pride in the overall country. All in all it seems reasonable that the well included minority groups do not possess of less national pride than the rest of the population.

9) We conducted further analysis to examine whether the heterogeneity of a country affected the results discussed below. We used the data from Alesina et al. (2003), which assess the heterogeneity of a country. Of course this data measures not exactly the effect of the group size. However, it comes close to what we want to measure and can thus be used as a proxy. According to this analysis, our results seem to be stable. No major changes occur through the introduction of the measure of the heterogeneity of a country.
the next paragraphs we consider factors that could be responsible for these country-differences.

2. ‘Mechanisms to Revive the Flagging Support’

The pattern in table 1 shows that the overall national pride in our country sample is quite high. However, as a rule of thumb, ethnic minorities show lower national identity than does the whole population. Given the increasing heterogeneity, this should give us pause for reflection. Taking the idea of Easton for granted that low diffuse support can lead to political instability, heterogeneity can be seen as a potential danger because it also means a differentiation of the society into several ethnic groups. If these groups do not develop a feeling of national identity, the whole political community is endangered. We thus should search for ‘mechanisms to revive the flagging support’ (Easton, 1965a, p. 124).

Theoretically, a country has three possible ways to react to the challenge of growing heterogeneity, i.e., to the danger of decreasing national cohesion. First, it could try to preserve its national homogeneity by closing
its borders. The remaining two ethically more justifiable possibilities correspond to Lijphart’s (1969, 1977, 1999) idea of consociationalism: Accordingly, second, a country could try to strengthen the national identity of ethnic minorities by including them in the national decision-making process (inclusion). Third, it could tolerate the ethnic minorities as an autonomous group and give them political autonomy at a subnational level (autonomy). Let us briefly discuss these possibilities.

1. Most Western democracies seem to try to opt for the ‘closing the borders’ idea by adopting restrictive immigrant policies. Supported by right-wing parties that benefit from the fear of heterogeneity, governments justify such policies by arguing that more ethnic diversity puts national identity in danger. However, we argue that this solution is not apt to revive national identity. Most countries already have a fairly high number of ethnic minorities. These can be immigrants (e.g., people of Turkish descendants in Germany, the people of former colonies in the UK) or indigenous peoples (e.g., the Maori in New Zealand). Of course, closing the borders will have no effect, or even a negative effect, the national identity of these groups we are most interested in.10

2. The second possibility is inclusion of ethnic minorities. From a social constructivist perspective, one can argue that a national identity of minority groups can be developed by permitting them to participate in national political decision-making. In heterogeneous societies the voting right alone is often not sufficient to guarantee the political inclusion of ethnic minorities. Instead, as Lijphart (1977, 1999) argues, power-sharing institutions are needed, which enhance the representation – and thus the political inclusion – of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, power-sharing can help to construct an ‘imagined community’, i.e., a perception that the minority group has something in common with the majority (Anderson, 1991; Risse, 2002). Likewise, Lijphart (1999) underlines that group cooperation depends on power-sharing and adequate representation of minorities. Accordingly, ethnic minorities develop a national identity when they are given incentives to share

10) One could argue that the ‘closing borders’ idea would cause immigrants to leave the country. The examples of the French expatriation of the Roma or the Swiss Peoples Party’s initiative for a deportation of criminal immigrants show that this argument is not so far off. However, these examples remain very questionable from a moral point of view.
‘an interest in playing by the rules of the game’ (Norris, 2005, p. 4). Contrarily, the permanent exclusion of ethnic minorities – be it voluntary or due to majoritarian institutions – fortifies the minority status: ethnic minorities also become political minorities. Permanent exclusion, however, might not only lead to a withdrawal of diffuse support, but even to unrest or violence (Lijphart, 1999).

3. The third possibility is giving autonomy to ethnic minorities. We argue that it is easier for ethnic minorities to develop a national identity when they are allowed to create a group identity on their own. According to Risse (2002), this argument is based on an essentialist concept of collective identity. The development of a national identity is only possible after a period of stable group identity. Group identity, however, can only develop when there is cultural autonomy. According to Lijphart (1977), a high degree of cultural autonomy is primordial for political stability in socially segmented societies. The most important institution guaranteeing autonomy is federalism. Federal units within a nation state are – to a defined degree – allowed to govern themselves. Thus, Federalism ensures that minority groups exercise control over some aspects of policies that are relevant to them. One could argue that this argument holds only for minorities that are geographically concentrated within a certain territory of the nation state (typical examples within our sample are India or Switzerland). However, we identify three reasons why subnational autonomy also provides advantages for ethnic minorities within a subnational federal unit (also see Norris, 2005). First, smaller units enhance the chances for a minority to be heard and to get at least cultural autonomy. To put it simply, in a small unit, a minority becomes a more important group than within the whole nation, and, consequently, its chance of getting autonomy increases. Of course, the precondition is that the subnational unit has a certain degree of autonomy. Second, subnational autonomy can be an opportunity for minorities to have more political say at the subnational level because federalism promotes policy experimentation, and federal units can have different minority policies (Riker, 1975).\footnote{In Switzerland, for example, there is a variation of voting rights for foreigners among the cantons (the federal units). Some cantons allow voting right for foreigners. In these cantons, ethnic minorities have better opportunities for having political say.} Third, the
smaller a unit is, the higher is the probability that closeness leads to
tolerance and mutual respect between minority and majority groups
(Dahl, 1967). Whether this tolerance also lead to effective policies that
allow the minority group to gain political or cultural autonomy and
then more national pride, depends on the degree of federalism, i.e., the
possibility for the subnational unit to install such policies.

This discussion makes clear that institutions do not have a direct impact
on an individual’s national identity. Inclusion and autonomy do not
strengthen the ‘we-feeling’ of all individuals, but have different effects on
minorities and majorities. More precisely, inclusion and autonomy do not
increase the national identity of all citizens, but they can attenuate the
negative effect of ethnic minority status on national identity. Technically
speaking, we suspect a cross level interaction between institutions aiming
at inclusion and autonomy and belonging to an ethnic minority.

3. Research Design, Data and Method

To test our assumptions about the interactive institutional impact on the
diffuse support of ethnic minorities, we proceed in two steps, using the
following determinants. First, we test whether belonging to ethnic minor-
ities indeed has a negative impact on the feeling of national identity, i.e.,
national pride, and whether this impact varies between the different coun-
tries in our sample. If this was not the case, it would make no sense to
suggest a differing cross-level impact of institutions.

Additionally, we control for the most important individual determin-
ants of diffuse support. In the literature, socio-economic variables such as
gender$^{12}$, age$^{13}$, education$^{14}$ and income$^{15}$ as well as political factors such as

$^{12}$ X001: sex: 1 = female; 0 = male.
$^{13}$ X003R: This means you are ___ years old. The variable was recoded into six intervals
(15–24; 25–34; 35–44; 45–54; 55–64; and 65 and older).
$^{14}$ X025R: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? This variable was
recoded into three levels: lower, middle, higher.
$^{15}$ X047: Scale of income: 1–10, where 1 indicates the lowest 10 the highest income
level.
the level of political interest\textsuperscript{16} and the level of confidence in parliament,\textsuperscript{17} are often found to influence political attitudes (Norris, 1999; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Waldron-Moore, 1999). It is expected that women show a lower level of political support than men since they are still politically underrepresented and therefore partially excluded from the political process (Norris, 2004, p. 179). Furthermore, various studies indicate that younger people evaluate the political system generally more critically than do older people, which can lead to a lower level of political support if young people’s expectations remain unfulfilled (Waldron-Moore, 1999, p. 37). The effect of educational level appears less clear. On the one hand, it is possible that less educated people feel disadvantaged and become marginalized, which leads to a decrease in their political support. On the other hand, more educated people tend to be more critical of the political system, because they support strong democratic ideals that compete with the actual practice of democratic politics (Dalton, 2004, pp. 83–86). The effect of economic well-being on support is a widely studied aspect in political science (Dalton, 2004; McAllister, 1999; Alesina & Wacziarg, 2000). Many studies indicate that the support of the government is significantly influenced by an individual’s economic situation because voters expect the government to ensure a high level of economic development. This would mean that individuals with high incomes show more diffuse support than low income individuals (Clarke et al., 1993).

Both political factors are expected to increase the level of support for the political community. First, high political interest should foster political support because it affects political understanding and strengthens a feeling of being able to influence the political process (Anderson & Guillory, 1997, p. 72). Second, Easton (1965b, 1975) argued that ongoing low specific support should eventually lead to an individual’s loss of diffuse support. We account for this factor by controlling for an individual’s confidence in the national parliament.

\textsuperscript{16} E023: How interested would you say you are in politics? Low values indicate low political interest.

\textsuperscript{17} E075: I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence/quite a lot of confidence (1), not very much confidence or none at all (0)?
To sum up, in the first step we test the following hypotheses:

H1: Individuals belonging to ethnic minorities have less national pride than do individuals belonging to the national ethnic majority.

H2: The strength of the negative effect of belonging to ethnic minorities varies between countries.

In the second step, we model the interactive effect of the institutional determinants. More precisely, we investigate whether a political system enabling political inclusion and political autonomy attenuates the negative effect of belonging to minority groups on national pride. Thus, we are not interested in the direct effect of institutions on diffuse support, but on the indirect interactive one. In other words, we do not assume that institutions foster diffuse support, but that they have a moderating impact on effects of individual characteristics on individual behaviour and attitudes.

The two mechanisms are measured with three institutions each:

For inclusion, we based our investigation on Lijphart’s (1977, 1999) original idea of consociationalism and argue that it is the electoral system as well as the type and the size of the government that can have a more or less inclusive character (Anderson, 1998). First, Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems are more inclusive than majoritarian systems because they enhance the probability that more parties and politicians representing diverse ethnic groups are included in the policy-making process. In turn, the danger of marginalising ethnic minorities concerning their political preferences decreases, and diffuse support increases (Banducci et al., 1999).18 Second, the probability that all parties continue to have a stake in the policy-making process is higher in parliamentary systems than in winner-take-all presidential systems. ‘As the cabinet in a parliamentary system is a collegial decision-making body – as opposed to the presidential one-person executive with a purely advisory cabinet – it offers the optimal setting for forming a broad power-sharing executive’ (Lijphart, 2004, p. 101).19 Third, even if there are several parties in the parliament, the most important indicator of effective political inclusion is the size of the

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18) Keefer (2009): Database of political Institutions: Proportional Representation? (1 if yes, 0 if no).
government coalition, i.e., the number of effective parties in the government. It is argued that consensual and inclusive power-sharing works best within a large executive.\(^{20}\)

To measure the degree of autonomy in a given country, we draw upon research on federalism (Gerring & Thacker, 2005). Lijphart (1999) argued that federalism is invaluable for group autonomy in divided societies. For our purposes, we concentrated on institutional settings that allow spatially concentrated but also spatially dispersed ethnic minorities the freedom to manage their own affairs, to protect their cultural autonomy, or give them at least a chance to get minority rights. Drawing upon Gerring and Thacker (2005), we highlight three ideas. First, autonomy is higher when there is the possibility for subnational elections. Local electoral competition can increase the incentives of public officials to be responsive to the preferences of local inhabitants (Qian & Weingast, 1997), including the preferences of minorities. More responsiveness should then lead to more diffuse support for all ethnic groups.\(^{21}\) Second, to be effectively autonomous, federal units must have authority over taxing, spending, and legislating.\(^{22}\) A third indicator for the importance of subnational units is bicameralism. Bicameralism is seen as a determinant of ‘a permanent and highly institutionalized sharing of responsibilities between a national authority and semi-autonomous regional units’ (Gerring & Thacker, 2005, p. 304).\(^{23}\)

As we do for the individual level, we also control for several country characteristics that are supposed to influence national identity at the macro level. Klingemann (1999) for instance argued that the age of a democratic system and the wealth of a nation are determinants of the overall diffuse support within this nation: older and established democracies\(^{24}\) as well as


\(^{21}\) Keefer (2009): Database of Political Institutions: State: Are there state/province governments locally elected? (0) if neither local executive nor local legislature are locally elected, (1) if one or both are locally elected.

\(^{22}\) Keefer (2009): Database of Political Institutions: Author: Do the state/provinces have authority over taxing, spending, or legislating? If 1 for any of these, category gets a 1. Authority over ‘cultural affairs’, or ‘planning’ in Communist systems does not qualify.


\(^{24}\) Treisman (2006): The number of consecutive years since 1930 that the system had been democratic as of 2000, updated for the current study.
countries with a high GDP per capita\textsuperscript{25} show a higher mean diffuse support than younger and poorer democracies. We further control for population size. Matsubayashi (2007) for instance showed that diffuse support increases with decreasing population size.\textsuperscript{26}

In the second step, we test these hypotheses:

\textbf{H3}: The negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on an individual’s national pride is attenuated by inclusive institutions, i.e., PR instead of majoritarian electoral systems, parliamentary instead of presidential systems, and a high number of effective governmental parties.

\textbf{H4}: The negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on an individual’s national pride is attenuated by institutions allowing autonomy at a federal unit, i.e., elections for subnational authorities, subnational authority, and bicameralism.

To test hypotheses 1 to 4, we use multilevel analysis that allows us to model a varying effect of the belonging to ethnic minorities on national pride (step 1) and explaining this variance by the interactive impact of inclusion and autonomy (step 2).

The underlying principle of multilevel modelling is that intercepts of common linear ordinary least square (OLS)-regression analysis are allowed to vary around an overall mean:

\begin{align}
    y_{ij} &= \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1} X_{1ij} + \epsilon_{ij}, \text{whereas} \\
    \beta_{0j} &= \beta_{0} + \mu_{0j} (\mu_{0j} \text{stands for the residuals at the contextual level}).
\end{align}

Additionally, multilevel models allow for modelling of cross-level interaction, thus measuring the influence of contextual factors on the strength of the connection between response and predictor variables on the lower level – methodologically speaking, the steepness of the slope.

Our dependent variable has a dichotomous form. Therefore, we do not use OLS regression for our estimation, but transform the dependent variable in a logit structure. Estimation and interpretation for logit-multilevel analysis are similar to conventional logit analysis (see, for example, Long, \textsuperscript{25} World Bank (2010): World Development Indicators: GDP per Capita (current US$) in 1000. \textsuperscript{26} World Bank (2010): World Development Indicators. Population in 1000.
Schematically, the models on which our analyses are based will have this form:

\[
\log\it (\pi_{ij}) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \ldots + \beta_n X_{nij} + \alpha_1 W_{ij} + \ldots + \alpha_n W_{nj} + \gamma_1 W_{kj} X_{kij} + \epsilon_{ij} + \mu_{kj} X_{kij} + \mu_{ij}
\]

The national pride (\(y\)) of an individual i within a country j is explained by an overall mean of nation pride (\(\beta_1\)), individual characteristics (\(X\), their estimates \(\beta\) respectively), contextual factors (\(W\), their estimates \(\alpha\) respectively), cross-level interaction terms of the minority status (\(X_k\)) and the respective institutional variables (\(W_k\)) (\(W_{kj} X_{kij}\), their estimates \(\gamma\) respectively), whereas the effect of the estimate is randomised (\(\beta_{kj}\)), contextual variation (\(\mu_{ij}\) with an assumed mean of 0 and a total between context variance of \(\sigma^2_{\mu}\)), individual variation (\(\epsilon_{ij}\) with an assumed mean of 0 and a total within context variance of \(\sigma^2\)), and slope variation (\(\mu_{kj} X_{kij}\)). The overall variation (\(\sigma^2_{\mu} + \sigma^2\)) is divided into differences at the individual level (level 1 variance), which will be explained by individual characteristics, and differences between contexts (level 2 variance), which will be explained by contextual factors, whereas the slope variance shall be explained by the interaction terms.

We defer to a more thorough discussion on the method and refer to the relevant literature on multilevel analysis (Hox, 2010; Jones, 1997; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Teachman & Crowder, 2002).

4. Empirical Results

The first step is depicted in table 2. As one can observe from the null model (model 1), national pride varies significantly between the countries. According to this model, one fourth of the overall variance of individual national pride is due to contextual differences.\(^{27}\) Furthermore, belonging to ethnic minorities indeed reduces the national pride of an individual (model 2): Individuals belonging to an ethnic minority have a lower probability of being proud of the nation than do individuals belonging to the

\(^{27}\) In a logit-model, the share of variance of the individual level accords to 3.29 (Snijders & Bosker, 1999, p. 224); the overall variance \((3.29 + .97 = 4.26)\) thus can be attributed to 23\% to the context (.97/4.26) and to 67\% to the individual characteristics \((3.29/4.26)\).
majority group. More precisely, all other things being equal, our models predict a probability to have national identity for minorities of 83%, whereas the probability of majorities being proud of the nation is 88%. As suggested, model 3 shows that the strength of this effect differs significantly between the countries (model 3). This means that there are countries where the negative effect of belonging to ethnic minorities is stronger than in other countries. In the second step, we will test whether this variance can be explained by inclusion and autonomy.

The negative impact of belonging to ethnic minorities and the significant variance of this impact persist when we control for important individual and contextual characteristics (model 4). Women are less proud of their nation than men, and a high education level lowers national identity, whereas more income increases one’s national pride. Additionally, older people tend to be prouder of their nation than younger people. Both political factors have an impact on national pride, too: the more an individual is interested in politics and the higher his or her confidence in the parliament is, the more likely it is that this person will be proud of his or her nation. The latter indicator is by far the strongest. This could be interpreted as a confirmation of Easton’s (1965 a, b) idea that specific support in the long run influences diffuse support. What is most important for our purposes is that the negative effect of minority status is not influenced by the other individual factors. Furthermore, table 2 reveals that national pride of all individuals is higher in older than in younger democracies. However, wealth seems not to have a positive effect on national pride. On the contrary, the higher the GDP per capita in a country, the lower is the probability that an individual living in this country is proud of it. Further analyses not presented here show that it is not the wealth of a nation but the economic growth that is important for diffuse support (measured as the average of the growth rates of the GDP of the past 10 years). Thus, the actual situation compared with other countries does not seem to be important for the development of national pride; instead, it is the long-term development of the economic situation which affects diffuse support.

Table 3 shows the results of the second step of our investigation. For each of the six institutions, we model a cross-level interaction. In other words: we test whether the existence of an institution indeed diminishes the negative effect of the minority status on national pride. This is indicated by a positive and significant interaction term (built with the minority
variable and the corresponding institution). As one can observe from table 3, two out of the six institutions exert the supposed attenuating effect: authority (model 9) and bicameralism (model 10). In countries where federal units have authority over taxing, spending, and legislating, the negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on national pride is weaker
than in countries without subnational entities that dispose of such authority. The same holds true for bicameralism: an individual belonging to an ethnic minority has a higher probability of being proud of his nation when he lives in a country where the protection of the autonomy of federal units is guaranteed by bicameralism. Current discussions regarding interaction models propose more precise interpretations (see Brambor et al. 2005). It is argued that one needs to calculate marginal effects and the corresponding standard errors to interpret the interaction effects correctly. Strictly speaking, our interaction results only show the results for the absence of the two power dividing institutions. In other words: the effect of belonging to a minority group is negative in countries without subnational authority and bicameralism. However, we have to admit that the interaction terms are not significant any more at the presence of the institutions. This simply means that the variance of the effect in the countries with the two institutional settings is too large to have a significant effect. We can interpret these findings alternatively, stating that subnational authority and bicameralism are necessary but not sufficient conditions for moderating the negative effect of belonging to minority groups on national pride. Nevertheless, we still consider our results as a sign of a moderating effect of authority and bicameralism foremost because the number of countries is relatively small.

The significant negative covariance terms within the autonomy-models (models 9 to 12) show an interesting pattern. When we group the countries with and without bicameralism/authority, it leads to the interesting situation that the negative effect of minority status in countries with subnational entities that dispose of authority over taxing, spending, and legislating even becomes positive (see figure 1). This result is in line with the finding of Anderson and Guillory (1997) concerning the differing impact of consensual institutions on minorities and majorities: In our analyses, the national pride of an individual belonging to an ethnic minority and living in a country with bicameralism and regional authority is not only higher than that of an individual living in a unicameral and centralized country, but on average, it is even higher than that of an individual living in the same country but belonging to the ethnic majority group.

The remaining four institutions do not show the assumed attenuating effect. None of the three institutions measuring inclusion has an effect on the relationship between ethnic minority status and national identity
## Table 3
Explaining national pride, the interactive impact of institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
</tr>
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<td>.74 (.33)**</td>
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<td>.92 (.28)**</td>
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<td>Ethnic Minority</td>
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<td>-.15 (.23)</td>
<td>-.30 (.18)</td>
<td>-.56 (.22)*</td>
<td>-.54 (.18)**</td>
<td>-.62 (.20)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.09 (.04)*</td>
<td>-.09 (.04)*</td>
<td>-.09 (.04)*</td>
<td>-.09 (.04)*</td>
<td>-.09 (.04)*</td>
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<td>.50 (.06)**</td>
<td>.50 (.06)**</td>
<td>.50 (.06)**</td>
<td>.50** (.06)</td>
<td>.50** (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.37 (.06)**</td>
<td>-.37 (.06)**</td>
<td>-.37 (.06)**</td>
<td>-.37 (.06)**</td>
<td>-.37 (.05)**</td>
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<td>.26 (.07)**</td>
<td>.26 (.07)**</td>
<td>.26 (.07)**</td>
<td>.26 (.07)**</td>
<td>.26 (.07)**</td>
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<td>.31 (.06)**</td>
<td>.31 (.06)**</td>
<td>.31 (.06)**</td>
<td>.30 (.06)**</td>
<td>.30 (.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in parliament</td>
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<td>.59 (.04)**</td>
<td>.59 (.04)**</td>
<td>.59 (.04)**</td>
<td>.59 (.04)**</td>
<td>.60 (.04)**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.28 (.38)</td>
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Table 3 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>-.51 (.85)</td>
<td>.14 (.88)</td>
<td>.01 (1.06)</td>
<td>.02 (.88)</td>
<td>-.10 (.90)</td>
<td>-.07 (.78)</td>
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<td><strong>GDP pc</strong></td>
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<td>-2.66 (.87)**</td>
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<td><strong>Age of Democracy</strong></td>
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<td>2.44 (.56)**</td>
<td>2.63 (.69)**</td>
<td>2.35 (.62)**</td>
<td>2.42 (.61)**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.38 (.30)</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Number of Parties</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-.03 (.65)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Local Elections</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bicameralism</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.56 (.27)*</td>
</tr>
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<td>1 (0)**</td>
<td>1 (0)**</td>
<td>1 (0)**</td>
<td>1 (0)**</td>
<td>1 (0)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual level</strong></td>
<td>.67 (.18)**</td>
<td>.76 (.21)**</td>
<td>.75 (.20)**</td>
<td>.76 (.21)**</td>
<td>.72 (.20)**</td>
<td>.71 (.19)**</td>
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<td><strong>Slope Variance</strong></td>
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<td>.45 (.15)**</td>
<td>.49 (.16)**</td>
<td>.41 (.14)**</td>
<td>.38 (.13)**</td>
<td>.39 (.13)**</td>
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<td><strong>Covariance</strong></td>
<td>-.29 (.13)*</td>
<td>-.29 (.14)*</td>
<td>-.28 (.14)**</td>
<td>-.26 (.13)*</td>
<td>-.23 (.12)*</td>
<td>-.24 (.12)*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Number of cases</strong></td>
<td>32170 (30)</td>
<td>32170 (30)</td>
<td>32170 (30)</td>
<td>32170 (30)</td>
<td>32170 (30)</td>
<td>32170 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wald (Joint Chi²)</strong></td>
<td>629.8 (13)</td>
<td>591.1 (13)</td>
<td>587.9 (13)</td>
<td>588.1 (13)</td>
<td>593.3 (13)</td>
<td>600.9 (13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Not standardised coefficients with standard errors in brackets; all independent variables rescaled on a scale of 0–1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 the highest value of the variable. Coefficients therefore indicate the change associated with moving from the lowest to the highest value. The Wald test is an approximate Chi² based test of the fit of the model; * significant at the 95% level; ** significant at the 99% level.
measured by national pride. The interaction effects of the electoral and the governmental system are even negative. If these effects were significant, this would mean that within PR and parliamentary systems, the negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority on a national ‘we-feeling’ would be even more aggravated. Of course, both interactive effects do not meet the significance criterion. Nevertheless, given the overall results, we conclude that autonomy seems to work better than inclusion in integrating minorities into the political community. In other words, the negative effect of minority status on a national we-feeling might be attenuated by giving autonomy to federal units. Contrarily, political inclusion and power-sharing seem to have no effect on the development of national identity of minority group members.

Figure 1
The interactive impact of bicameralism and authority on the national pride of ethnic minorities

Notes: the x-axis depicts the majority on the left side and the minority groups on the right side; the y-axis depicts the probability of having national pride for minorities/majorities in bicameral systems (smoother slope) and in unicameral systems (steeper slope) at the left and the probability of having national pride for minorities/majorities in countries where the federal units have authority over taxing, spending, and legislating (smoother slope) and in countries without such authority (steeper slope), all other things being equal (models 9 and 10 with all individual variables (except minority and the interaction variable) = 0).
5. Concluding Remarks

The main aim of our study is the investigation of the determinants of a common national identity. We argue that growing heterogeneity due to growing migration and denationalization challenges the national cohesion. Bas- ing on Easton’s (1965a, b) argument that low diffuse support endangers the stability of a democratic regime, we analyse the different national we-feelings of ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities. We show that individuals belonging to ethnic minorities normally have a lower propensity to develop a national identity than their compatriots belonging to the ethnic majority of a given country. Even if our data consists of established minorities, i.e., ethnic minorities that are (naturalized) citizens, we argue that this result can be seen as a sign that growing ethnic heterogeneisation in terms of an increase in the number of different ethnic minorities could have a negative effect on the development of overall diffuse support and could finally destabilize democracies. It is therefore important to investigate possible remedies to the suggested decline of diffuse support due to low national identity of minority groups.

In this article, we focused on two possible institutional remedies. Based on Lijphart’s (1977, 1999) idea of consociational democracy, we argue that inclusion and autonomy can attenuate the negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority group on national identity. We model interactive impacts of institutions allowing for power-sharing and subnational autonomy. Our results show that autonomy might help to strengthen the national identity of minorities: The negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority is attenuated by bicameralism and local authority. In other words, an individual belonging to an ethnic minority and living in a country where federal units have authority over taxing, spending, and legislating and where the autonomy of federal units is ensured by a second chamber has a higher propensity of being proud of the nation he or she lives in than a member of a minority group with exactly the same individual characteristics who lives in a centralized country with no or non-autonomous federal units with unicameralism. Our results further suggest that inclusion does not have the same effect. Power-sharing institutions such as PR, parliamentary instead of presidential systems, and the number of effective parties in the government do not attenuate the negative impact of ethnic minorities on national identity. These results show that the
different dimensions of consociational democracy must not necessarily exert the same impacts.

These results also can be taken as a sign that the development of national identity of ethnic minorities is more probable when they are given the possibility of living autonomously in their own culture in subnational entities, whereas political inclusion in terms of power-sharing has no effect. We conclude that giving autonomy to ethnic minorities can be a promising ‘mechanism to revive the flagging support’ (Easton, 1965a, p. 124), i.e., to strengthen the development of a ‘we-feeling’ of ethnic minorities.

Of course, the results must be interpreted with caution. At least three critical points must be taken into consideration. First, the results assume a zero-sum game: higher diffuse support of ethnic minorities thanks to decentralisation goes hand in hand with a lower diffuse support of majorities. Second, negatively interpreted, our results suggest the installing of potentially dangerous parallel societies as a possible remedy. Third, the data we use can only give a vague insight into the complexity of ethnic heterogeneity. Hereafter, we discuss these three drawbacks.

• First, our results assume a zero-sum game. As figure 1 shows, rendering autonomy for ethnic minorities, on the one hand, seems to foster the development of diffuse support of individuals belonging to ethnic minorities. On the other hand, vertical power-sharing also goes at the expense of the majority group’s national pride. In fact, bicameralism and local authority seem to foster the ethnic minorities’ diffuse support while simultaneously lowering the national identity of the ethnic majority. However, Figure 1 also reveals that the difference in we-feeling between ethnic majorities in countries with local authority and bicameralism and ethnic majorities in countries without these institutions is quite small. The gap in national identity between ethnic minorities that are given autonomy to live their own culture and those that live in a country without such permissions, however, is huge. We therefore argue for more subnational autonomy in favour of ethnic minorities: With regard to growing heterogeneity, the small loss of national pride of the ethnic majority is outweighed by the benefit of the growing we-feeling by the ethnic minorities.

• Do our results propagate parallel societies? In fact, giving autonomy to ethnic minorities to live their own culture for strengthening national
cohesion seems to be a contradictory suggestion. One could argue that federalism and autonomy harm a national and collective identity. This could also lead to parallel societies of ethnic minorities that are cut off from their neighbours with other ethnic backgrounds, and this could lead to claims for even more autonomy, and finally even to secession. However, our results can be seen as a sign for a more optimistic view: autonomy leads to a more positive view of the country that allows that freedom. Based on these results, we argue that tolerance in terms of allowing for cultural independence is not only a sign of respect, but also bear fruits in terms of growing national identity.

Finally, ethnic minorities are often heavily underrepresented in surveys. Taking part in surveys normally depends on the ability to speak one of the official languages of a country in which the survey is conducted. Furthermore, individuals who do not act upon their political rights are often not even surveyed. As mentioned, the minorities in our sample are not immigrants, or at least are not first-generation immigrants. Thus, our results must be taken as an example of how democracies with ‘established’ minorities face the challenge of ethnic diversity. The results can nevertheless be taken as a sign of long term integration: in the long run, ethnic minorities develop a ‘we-feeling’ when they are allowed to first live their original culture. Of course, the data does not allow for longitudinal developments. However, the cross-country analysis with younger and older democracies can at least serve as a first approach to such long-term integration. To conduct better investigations of the challenge of growing heterogeneisation for national cohesion, we need better data. Such data should for instance allow the inclusion of the size or the power of an ethnic minority group. Furthermore, such data should include immigrants and allow for long-term observation. Finally as discussed above, the results of the interaction terms have to be interpreted with caution, since we cannot observe significant effects for all relevant values. Since the data sample is quite small, however, we believe that we might still interpret our results as signs of moderating effects. To summarize, our results cannot offer more than first tentative insights into an increasingly important and complex field.
References


