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Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary?


Krupka, Erin L; Weber, Roberto A (2013). Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3):495-524.

Abstract

We introduce an incentivized elicitation method for identifying social norms that uses simple coordination games. We demonstrate that concern for the norms we elicit and for money predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game, including data from a novel experiment and from prior published laboratory studies, that are unaccounted for by most current theories of social preferences. Moreover, we find that the importance of social norm compliance and of monetary considerations is fairly constant across different experiments. This consistency allows prediction of treatment effects across experiments, and implies that subjects have a generally stable willingness to sacrifice money to take behaviors that are socially appropriate.

Abstract

We introduce an incentivized elicitation method for identifying social norms that uses simple coordination games. We demonstrate that concern for the norms we elicit and for money predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game, including data from a novel experiment and from prior published laboratory studies, that are unaccounted for by most current theories of social preferences. Moreover, we find that the importance of social norm compliance and of monetary considerations is fairly constant across different experiments. This consistency allows prediction of treatment effects across experiments, and implies that subjects have a generally stable willingness to sacrifice money to take behaviors that are socially appropriate.

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52 citations in Web of Science®
57 citations in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:June 2013
Deposited On:07 Aug 2013 07:30
Last Modified:10 May 2016 07:25
Publisher:MIT Press
ISSN:1542-4766
Additional Information:The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12006

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