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Why solvency regulation of banks fails to reach its objective


Zweifel, Peter; Pfaff, Dieter; Kühn, Jochen (2012). Why solvency regulation of banks fails to reach its objective. UZH Business Working Paper Series 303, University of Zurich.

Abstract

This paper contains a critique of solvency regulation such as imposed on banks by Basel I and II. Banks’ investment divisions seek to maximize the expected rate of return on risk-adjusted capital (RORAC). For them, higher solvency S lowers the cost of refinancing but ties costly capital. Sequential decision making by banks is tracked over three periods. In period 1, exogenous changes in expected returns dμ and in volatility dσ occur, causing optimal adjustments dS* / dμ and dS * / dσ in period 2. In period 3, the actual adjustment dS* creates an endogenous trade-off with slope dμ / dσ. Both Basel I and II are shown to modify this slope, inducing top management to opt for a higher value of σ in several situations. Therefore, both types of solvency regulation can run counter their stated objective, which may also be true of Basel III.

Abstract

This paper contains a critique of solvency regulation such as imposed on banks by Basel I and II. Banks’ investment divisions seek to maximize the expected rate of return on risk-adjusted capital (RORAC). For them, higher solvency S lowers the cost of refinancing but ties costly capital. Sequential decision making by banks is tracked over three periods. In period 1, exogenous changes in expected returns dμ and in volatility dσ occur, causing optimal adjustments dS* / dμ and dS * / dσ in period 2. In period 3, the actual adjustment dS* creates an endogenous trade-off with slope dμ / dσ. Both Basel I and II are shown to modify this slope, inducing top management to opt for a higher value of σ in several situations. Therefore, both types of solvency regulation can run counter their stated objective, which may also be true of Basel III.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Business Administration
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2012
Deposited On:12 Dec 2012 08:30
Last Modified:17 Feb 2018 00:22
Series Name:UZH Business Working Paper Series
Number of Pages:26
ISSN:ISSN 2296-0422
OA Status:Green
Related URLs:http://www.business.uzh.ch/forschung/wps.html (Organisation)
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:7709

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