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A fair mechanism for the efficient reduction of global CO2-emissions


Falkinger, Josef; Hackl, Franz; Pruckner, Gerald (1996). A fair mechanism for the efficient reduction of global CO2-emissions. Finanzarchiv, 53:308-422.

Abstract

Because of the public good character of global emissions it is difficult to implement reduction
targets as formulated at Toronto or Rio. This paper presents a simple mechanism for inducing
efficient contributions to the reductions of emissions as a non-cooperative equilibrium. The
world is partitioned into groups of countries, and then each country is taxed or subsidised
according to its relative performance in the group. We estimate abatement cost- and benefit
functions for 135 countries and simulate the mechanism for different groupings of countries. The simulations show that the involved global budget is the smaller the finer the partition and the more equal the countries within a group. Moreover, with such a partition most countries
profit from the mechanism so that broad political support may be expected. If groups are composed of unequal countries, then the mechanism leads to a more egalitarian distribution of world income and welfare.

Abstract

Because of the public good character of global emissions it is difficult to implement reduction
targets as formulated at Toronto or Rio. This paper presents a simple mechanism for inducing
efficient contributions to the reductions of emissions as a non-cooperative equilibrium. The
world is partitioned into groups of countries, and then each country is taxed or subsidised
according to its relative performance in the group. We estimate abatement cost- and benefit
functions for 135 countries and simulate the mechanism for different groupings of countries. The simulations show that the involved global budget is the smaller the finer the partition and the more equal the countries within a group. Moreover, with such a partition most countries
profit from the mechanism so that broad political support may be expected. If groups are composed of unequal countries, then the mechanism leads to a more egalitarian distribution of world income and welfare.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:1996
Deposited On:18 Dec 2012 14:15
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 16:14
Publisher:Mohr Siebeck
ISSN:0015-2218
Free access at:Related URL. An embargo period may apply.
Related URLs:http://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?PPN345616367_1996_0053

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