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Fair wages and effort provision: Combining evidence from the lab and the field


Cohn, Alain; Fehr, Ernst; Goette, Lorenz (2013). Fair wages and effort provision: Combining evidence from the lab and the field. Working paper series / Department of Economics 107, University of Zurich.

Abstract

The presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important consequences for labor markets. Knowledge about the determinants of reciprocal effort choices is, however, incomplete. We investigate the role of fairness perceptions and social preferences in workers’ performance in a field experiment in which workers were hired for a one-time job. We show that workers who perceive being underpaid at the base wage increase their performance if the hourly wage increases, while those who feel adequately paid or overpaid at the base wage do not change their performance. Moreover, we find that only workers who display positive reciprocity in a lab experiment show reciprocal performance responses in the field, while workers who lack positive reciprocity in the lab do not respond to the wage increase even if they feel underpaid at the base wage. Our findings suggest that fairness perceptions and social preferences are key in workers’ performance response to a wage increase. They are the first direct evidence of the fair-wage effort hypothesis in the field and also help interpret previous contradictory findings in the literature.

Abstract

The presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important consequences for labor markets. Knowledge about the determinants of reciprocal effort choices is, however, incomplete. We investigate the role of fairness perceptions and social preferences in workers’ performance in a field experiment in which workers were hired for a one-time job. We show that workers who perceive being underpaid at the base wage increase their performance if the hourly wage increases, while those who feel adequately paid or overpaid at the base wage do not change their performance. Moreover, we find that only workers who display positive reciprocity in a lab experiment show reciprocal performance responses in the field, while workers who lack positive reciprocity in the lab do not respond to the wage increase even if they feel underpaid at the base wage. Our findings suggest that fairness perceptions and social preferences are key in workers’ performance response to a wage increase. They are the first direct evidence of the fair-wage effort hypothesis in the field and also help interpret previous contradictory findings in the literature.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C93, J31, M52
Uncontrolled Keywords:Fairness Perception, Positive Reciprocity, Field Experiment, Wage Increase
Language:English
Date:January 2013
Deposited On:09 Jan 2013 16:22
Last Modified:07 Dec 2017 18:15
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:40
ISSN:1664-7041
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp107.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php

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