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Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information


Kriss, Peter H; Nagel, Rosmarie; Weber, Roberto A (2013). Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 93:337-346.

Abstract

We explore bargaining, using ultimatum games, when one party, the proposer, possesses private information about the pie size and can either misrepresent this information through untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-revealing actions (implicit deception). Our study is the first such direct comparison between two ways in which people can deceive. We find that requiring informed parties to make an explicit statement yields greater deception than when information is communicated implicitly, particularly for larger stakes. However, allowing the explicit statement to be accompanied by a promise of truthfulness reverses this effect. In contrast with many previous studies, we generally observe very high frequencies of dishonesty.

Abstract

We explore bargaining, using ultimatum games, when one party, the proposer, possesses private information about the pie size and can either misrepresent this information through untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-revealing actions (implicit deception). Our study is the first such direct comparison between two ways in which people can deceive. We find that requiring informed parties to make an explicit statement yields greater deception than when information is communicated implicitly, particularly for larger stakes. However, allowing the explicit statement to be accompanied by a promise of truthfulness reverses this effect. In contrast with many previous studies, we generally observe very high frequencies of dishonesty.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2013
Deposited On:07 Aug 2013 07:11
Last Modified:16 Feb 2018 17:29
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0167-2681
OA Status:Green
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.024

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