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Evolutionarily stable strategies in sports contests


Grossmann, M (2015). Evolutionarily stable strategies in sports contests. Journal of Sports Economics, 16(1):108-121.

Abstract

Most articles on sports economics presume the well-known Nash equilibrium concept. In this article, however, we apply evolutionary game theory in a sports-contest model. If clubs follow evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), then ESS generate greater investments and smaller profits than predicted by Nash’s strategies, independent of whether a club is win-maximizing or profit-maximizing. Overdissipation of the rent is possible for Nash strategies and for ESS.

Abstract

Most articles on sports economics presume the well-known Nash equilibrium concept. In this article, however, we apply evolutionary game theory in a sports-contest model. If clubs follow evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), then ESS generate greater investments and smaller profits than predicted by Nash’s strategies, independent of whether a club is win-maximizing or profit-maximizing. Overdissipation of the rent is possible for Nash strategies and for ESS.

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2 citations in Web of Science®
1 citation in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Business Administration
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2015
Deposited On:19 Mar 2013 13:56
Last Modified:07 Dec 2017 19:44
Publisher:SAGE Publications
ISSN:1527-0025
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/1527002512470957
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:7976

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