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Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study


Bartling, Björn; Engl, Florian; Weber, Roberto A (2013). Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study. Working paper series / Department of Economics 125, University of Zurich.

Abstract

This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the dictator after observing the dictator’s decision and the resulting payoffs. On the one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if their actions lead to unfair outcomes than dictators who reveal the consequences before implementing the same outcome. On the other hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished more than revealing dictators if their actions do not lead to unfair outcomes. We conclude that willful ignorance can circumvent blame when unfair outcomes result, but that the act of remaining willfully ignorant is itself punished, regardless of the outcome.

Abstract

This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the dictator after observing the dictator’s decision and the resulting payoffs. On the one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if their actions lead to unfair outcomes than dictators who reveal the consequences before implementing the same outcome. On the other hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished more than revealing dictators if their actions do not lead to unfair outcomes. We conclude that willful ignorance can circumvent blame when unfair outcomes result, but that the act of remaining willfully ignorant is itself punished, regardless of the outcome.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C91, D63
Uncontrolled Keywords:Willful ignorance, third party punishment, dictator game, fairness
Language:English
Date:June 2013
Deposited On:25 Jun 2013 12:18
Last Modified:14 Aug 2017 12:58
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:40
ISSN:1664-7041
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp125.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php

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