Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Evolutionary Finance and Dynamic Games


Hens, Thorsten; Evstigneev, Igor V; Amir, Rabah; Xu, Le (2009). Evolutionary Finance and Dynamic Games. Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper 09-49, University of Zurich.

Abstract

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of an asset market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed and partially reinvested. The investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfolio rules), distributing their wealth between assets, depending on the exogenous states of the world and the observed history of the game. The main goal is to identify strategies, allowing an investor to "survive," i.e. to possess a positive, bounded away from zero, share of market wealth over the whole infinite time horizon. This work brings together recent studies on evolutionary finance with the classical topic of non-cooperative market games.

Abstract

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of an asset market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed and partially reinvested. The investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfolio rules), distributing their wealth between assets, depending on the exogenous states of the world and the observed history of the game. The main goal is to identify strategies, allowing an investor to "survive," i.e. to possess a positive, bounded away from zero, share of market wealth over the whole infinite time horizon. This work brings together recent studies on evolutionary finance with the classical topic of non-cooperative market games.

Statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2009
Deposited On:05 May 2014 15:58
Last Modified:15 Aug 2017 08:51
Series Name:Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper
Official URL:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1536724
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:6005

Download

Full text not available from this repository.

TrendTerms

TrendTerms displays relevant terms of the abstract of this publication and related documents on a map. The terms and their relations were extracted from ZORA using word statistics. Their timelines are taken from ZORA as well. The bubble size of a term is proportional to the number of documents where the term occurs. Red, orange, yellow and green colors are used for terms that occur in the current document; red indicates high interlinkedness of a term with other terms, orange, yellow and green decreasing interlinkedness. Blue is used for terms that have a relation with the terms in this document, but occur in other documents.
You can navigate and zoom the map. Mouse-hovering a term displays its timeline, clicking it yields the associated documents.

Author Collaborations