What does a nation owe non-citizens? National attachments, perception of threat and attitudes towards granting citizenship rights in a comparative perspective

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Abstract: In this article we test the effects of national attachments (patriotism and chauvinism) and perception of threat on citizens' willingness to concede citizenship rights to immigrants in France, Germany (West and East), the USA and Israel. Our findings show that despite marked differences in countries' migration policies and conceptions of nationhood, no significant differences were found in attitudes towards the allocation of citizenship rights to immigrants. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that contrary to our expectations, 1) the effects of both chauvinism and patriotism on willingness to grant citizenship rights to immigrants were rather low in Germany and Israel — the two ethno-national states, and strongest in France and the USA — which stand for republican and multicultural models of incorporation, respectively; 2) the effects of threat on exclusion of immigrants from citizenship rights was weaker in Israel (ethnic democracy) but stronger in the liberal democratic countries. In the conclusion, we suggest possible explanations for these rather intriguing and paradoxical findings.

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What Does a Nation Owe Non-citizens? National Attachments, Perception of Threat and Attitudes towards granting Citizenship Rights in a Comparative Perspective

Immigration is changing the face of most Western countries. Despite restrictive immigration policies, migrant populations in industrialized states have become larger and more diversified, changing the ethnic fabric of host societies. As a result of large immigration flows ‘the immigration problem’ has become more relevant than ever as the presence of migrants has been transformed from a labor market problem to one of national identity (Schnapper, 1994; Fetzer 2000; Favell, 1998; Lahav, 2004).\(^1\)

The massive presence of immigrants in most Western countries has essentially challenged their social and cultural homogeneity and has compelled host societies to reconsider the way of thinking about membership and citizenship (Joppke, 1998; Freeman, 1986). As citizenship is an instrument for social closure, the crucial political issue in host societies is the kind of distinctions that should be drawn between citizens and non-citizens, especially in their access to public goods (i.e. rights) (Brubaker, 1989, 1992). What sort of membership status should immigrants enjoy in the host countries?

Here we compare attitudes towards the extension of citizenship rights to immigrants in four countries: France, Germany (treated as former East and West), the USA and Israel. We do so by using a comprehensive model that includes conceptions

\(^1\) Recent studies have shown a dramatic increase in anti-foreigner sentiment in Europe in the last three decades (Semyonov, Rajman and Gorodzeisky, 2006) and strong opposition by the native population to a multicultural society and granting civil rights to legal migrants (Gijsberts et al., 2004).
of national attachments (chauvinism and patriotism) and perceptions of socio-economic threat to disentangle the specific relevance of each theoretical approach in explaining attitudes to access to the goods of citizenship in each of the selected countries.

The choice of countries was based on the different policy regimes implemented in the areas of immigration and citizenship in each one of them, which exemplify different conceptions of the nation-state in the different social settings. By emphasizing the comparative perspective our study goes beyond the conventional single case-study, to provide solid ground for understanding how different conceptualizations of the nation-state and policies of immigrants' integration affect exclusionary attitudes towards migrants' incorporation into the polity of the host societies. As immigration and citizenship regimes are informed by distinctive traditions of nationhood, that is, deep-rooted understandings about what constitutes a nation (Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 1999), the question that arises is whether different conceptions of the nation-state prevailing in host societies affect how individuals' think about granting immigrants access to citizenship rights.

Although most academic work has stressed citizenship as a macro-phenomenon of the society, mainly on the institutional level (see e.g. Shafir and Peled, 2002; Alekinoff, 2003; Hansen, 2003; Joppke, 1999, 2005; Brubaker, 1992; Soysal, 1994), we suggest that a different way of looking at what citizenship means is through the examination of the way individuals (in a given society) define the boundaries of the collective: in this specific case, through their level of willingness to share their national benefits (e.g. citizenship rights) with out-group populations. In that way analysis of public opinion allows us to inquire into the extent to which institutionalized policies and public discourses about citizenship and membership are reflected in the attitudes of
ordinary people (Svallfors, 1996; Jones and Smith, 2001). As Lahav (2004) has suggested, by bringing individuals' attitudes back in we can understand an important layer of the social climate surrounding ethnic minorities and migrants in modern societies.²

After presenting the comparative setting we review previous theories and research to formulate a comprehensive model that focuses on determinants of exclusionary attitudes towards immigrant populations. Next we describe the data set and test the cross-cultural equivalence of the measurement of the latent variables. Subsequently, we estimate a structural equation model to examine the effects of the individual level and the explanatory variables (chauvinism, patriotism and perception of threat) on attitudes towards granting immigrants citizenship rights in the different countries. Finally, we discuss the findings in light of sociological theory by stressing differences and similarities in the mechanisms underlying the exclusionary attitudes towards out-group populations in France, Germany (East and West), the USA and Israel.

**The Comparative Setting**

The four countries selected exhibit similarities and differences that permit significant comparisons. The fundamental similarity is that all four are developed Western states, considered the largest immigrant-receiving countries.³ Yet because of

² Bobo and Fox (2003) have also emphasized the need to focus on the micro social processes that explain discrimination, which is basically a social psychological phenomenon.

³ The high percentage of foreign-born population (40%) situates Israel at the top of the list of major traditional countries of immigration like the United States (8%) and well above immigration countries in Western Europe (e.g. France (10%) and Germany (6%)) (Raijman and Kemp, forthcoming).
the different histories of nation building each country approximates a distinct context of reception toward immigrants.

The USA is a very large, pluralistic immigrant society with a long history of massive immigration; France, Germany and Israel are three much smaller nation-states and culturally more homogeneous. The USA is the classic settler society, with immigration forming part of the national myth (Simon and Lynch, 1999). Although immigration is a salient fact in countries such as Germany and France it has not been central to nation-building. No European country exhibits immigration in the classic sense. 4 As for Israel, Jewish immigration played a key role in nation-building and the national myth. Although in the last decade it has become de facto an immigration country – due to the mass arrival of non-Jewish overseas labor migrants – the state defines itself as an aliya country but not an immigration country 5 (Raijman and Kemp, forthcoming). Finally, whereas the USA and the European countries are liberal democracies Israel is defined as an ethnic democracy with a strong ethno-religious component (Joppke, 2005; Smooha, 1997; Shafir and Peled, 1998).

Students of ethnic relations tend to agree that the normative context of a society as reflected by attitudes, beliefs and actions is greatly influenced by its prevailing conception of citizenship and nationality (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994; Soysal, 1994; Castles and Miller, 1993; Brubaker, 1989, 1992). Researchers accordingly tend to distinguish basic models of incorporation, from the exclusion (folk or ethnic) model at one end of the continuum to the inclusion (multicultural) model at the other (Castles

4 For both countries large-scale immigration started after World War II in the 1950s. For a detailed analysis of the differences between the countries see e.g. Brubaker 1992; Joppke, 1999; 2005; Joppke and Rosenhek, 2002.

5 Jewish immigration is designated by the Hebrew word aliya, which means going up.
and Miller, 1993). The USA represents the latter, Germany and Israel the former. France has been characterized as a republican model, meaning a community based on participation and cultural unity. The nation has been conceived in relation to the institutional and territorial frame of the state and the country relies on a universal, secular and republican understanding of nationhood and citizenship (Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 1998). France is described as a country which combines a civic conception of citizenship (e.g. based on jus solis) with an assimilationist model of nationhood in which immigrants are more or less forced to become French and lose their distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics (Castles and Miller, 1993; Jennings, 2000). Still, French nationality is considered a question of voluntary adherence,\(^6\) not ethno-national belonging as in Germany and Israel.

Israel and Germany then, can be seen as countries in which the dominant definition of the nation is based on community of birth and descent. Both countries rely mainly on the system of jus sanguinis to determine the citizenship status of immigrants and their descendants.\(^7\) However since the 3 January 2000 a new law has changed the prerequisites for gaining citizenship in Germany. Children of foreign parents obtain German citizenship by birth if one of the parents has lived at least eight years in

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6 The French state refuses recognition of minorities as such for the purpose of state action. This stand is evident in the neglect to collect in census data any kind of ethnic classification, other than distinguishing whether the person had any grandparent of non-French origin (Favell, 1998:71). This lack of concern for the ethnic categories stands in deep contrast to Germany, Israel, and the USA.

7 In Germany, ethnic German immigrants (mostly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, since 1988), are immediately accorded all citizenship rights (Munz, 2002). However, the vast majority of non-German immigrants, even of the second and third generation, still remain outside the community of citizens. The number of foreigners in East Germany was considerably lower than in West Germany, and this has not changed since unification.
Germany. German law is starting to combine principles of jus sanguinis and jus solis in granting citizenship.  

Israel actively encourages Jewish immigration. According to the law of return (1950) and the law of nationality (1952) every Jew has the right to settle in Israel; Jewish immigrants can be awarded Israeli citizenship upon arrival. The current migration regime is highly exclusionary toward non-Jews and also forecloses a priori any possibility of incorporation for non-Jewish migrants (Shafir and Peled, 2002). Consequently, questions of foreigners’ entitlement to social, political, and economic rights are of special significance in Israel since non-Jews are to date excluded from the dominant regime of incorporation in the country.  

Although Germany is considered Israel's "sister ethnic state" (Joppke, 2005:160), the resilience of ethnic migration in Israel stands firm as against its decline in Germany (see Joppke, 2005, chapter 4).

In sum, the conception of the nation-state as institutionalized in the different policy regimes is decisive in shaping attitudes and public policies. We can relate to the four countries as ideal types, which enables us to assess the relationship between different forms of national attachments, perceptions of socio-economic threat and exclusion of migrants from access to citizenship. Next we present the theoretical background and derive explicit hypotheses on the expected impact of chauvinism, patriotism and perception of threat on attitudes towards immigrants' access to citizenship and rights in the countries under review.

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8 A 1993 law limits the status of ethnic Germans to persons born before 1993. This law may be signaling the demise of ethnic-priority migration policy in Germany. By contrast, Jewish priority in Israel continues unabated (for a comparison of Israel and Germany on policies on ethnic-priority immigration in see Joppke and Rosenhek, 2001).

9 Non-Jewish labor migrants were recruited during the 1990s, comprising by the beginning of the 21st Century some 9 percent of the Israeli labor force (Raijman and Kemp, 2002).
Theoretical Background

Two sets of theoretical explanations are most frequently advanced to explain exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants. The first stresses the role of national attachments in explaining discrimination against out-group populations; the second stresses the role of perceptions of competition on the socio-economic level on exclusionary attitudes towards migrants.

The Role of National Attachments: or 'Does in-group love lead to out-group hate'?\(^\text{10}\)

Social Identity theory (SIT) provides an analytical framework for understanding the ways national attachments affect attitudes towards minorities and immigrants (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). According to this approach social identities are defined on a comparative basis, which creates a distinction between in-groups and out-groups. As every individual strives for a positive social identity, which is apparent in the idealization of the in-group and the devaluation of the out-group, the mere perception of belonging to two different groups is sufficient to produce in-group favoritism and discrimination toward out-groups.\(^\text{11}\) In the literature the combination of the two – in-group favoritism and out-group denigration – is labeled ethnocentrism (Campbell and Levine, 1972).

Although ethnocentrism is a common phenomenon in a wide range of societies its presence is not universal. For example, Turner (1999) recognizes that individuals

\(^{10}\) See Brewer, 1999.

\(^{11}\) Tajfel et al. (1971) ascertained the minimal sufficient conditions for in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination. In their experiments - the so called "minimal group paradigm" – they were able to show that it is sufficient to divide the subjects into anonymous groups to observe the effect of in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination. In their view, processes of group categorization do not only serve for structuring the cognitive organization but always lead to discrimination of out-group members.
identifying with their in-group may not necessarily tend to contra-identify with out-
groups. Along this line, the necessary condition for the emergence of discrimination of
out-groups is inter-group competition, this acting as a catalyst for out-group hostility.

Attitudes towards the in-group are multidimensional and they have been
conceptualized as national attachments, a general concept that describes an emotional
bond with an in-group, in this case the nation. Scholars tend to distinguish two types or
forms of national attachments – chauvinism and patriotism, differing in their
conception of how the relation between the individual and the nation is structured
(Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). Patriotic "requires balancing attachment to and
consideration for the well-being of one's own group with an inclusive orientation to
human beings, with respect for the rights and welfare of all people" (Staub, 1997:214);
chauvinism manifests itself in exclusionary attitudes towards out-groups, leading to
hostility and conflict (Blank and Schmidt 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989;
Mummendey et al., 2001).

Chauvinism represents the detrimental facet of positive in-group evaluation and
is described as "the view that one's ethnic in-group and country are unique and

\[ \text{12 From an analysis of the literature the ambiguous use of the terms nationalism, national identity and}

\text{patriotism becomes evident.}

\[ \text{13 The different effects of nationalism and patriotism on exclusionary attitudes to foreigners derive}

\text{from the different types of inter-group comparisons involved in the two cases. Relational orientation,}

\text{that is, identification with and evaluation of one's nation that implies derogation of other nations leads to}

\text{chauvinism and rejection of the out-group (Mummendey et al, 2001). By contrast a non-relational or}

\text{autonomous orientation corresponds to patriotism, which consists in a national identification and}

\text{positive evaluation which is independent of simultaneous derogation of other nations (Mummendey et}

\text{al. 2001: 161-62). Empirical research supports these two dimensions of national attachments}

\text{(chauvinism and patriotism), which can be empirically distinguished (see e.g. Schatz and Staub, 1996;}

\text{Blank and Schmidt, 2003).}

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superior. This downward comparison of other ethnic groups and countries is combined with a blind, uncritical attachment to one's own group and country" (Staub, 1997:214). According to this view, people who tend to idealize their nation in relational terms are more inclined to feel threatened by outsiders, even though these threats may not be real, and therefore are more prone to discriminate out-group populations (Blank and Schmidt, 2003).

By contrast, patriotism reflects an attachment to the nation-state that rejects the idealization of the nation and is based on critical consciousness of and critical loyalty to the group (Bar-Tal, 1997; Staub, 1997; Schatz and Staub, 1996). Previous research has argued that patriotism can be understood as part of a positive in-group evaluation that leads to positive attitudes towards out-group members and is not conducive to their derogation (Brewer, 1999). Empirical studies have found a negative correlation (Blank et al., 2001; Blank and Schmidt, 2003) or no significant correlation between patriotism and the discrimination of foreigners (see e.g. Schatz and Staub, 1997).

It has been argued that the intensity of national attachments or people's identification with a certain group affects the way individuals perceive competition and threat from out-group populations (Blank and Schmidt 2003). Perceived threat may be said to mediate the relationship between national attachments and discriminatory attitudes, and operate as a catalyst for the emergence of ethnic exclusionism.

**Perceived Threat and Exclusionary Attitudes**

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14 It has also been labeled, civic or political national pride based on being proud of the country's political institutions, economy and social welfare system (Hjerm, 1998).

15 Some scholars have argued a different causal order, where the presence of actual competition induces specific types of national attachments. Whatever the causal order, competition and national attachment have been found as reinforcing each other (Coenders et al. 2004:18).
Perception of threat from, or fear of, individuals or groups that are in some sense (real or imagined) different from oneself or the groups to which one belongs, has also been advanced as an important explanation for exclusionary attitudes towards foreigners and migrants (Stephan and Stephan, 1985; Quillian, 1995; Esses et al., 2001; Semyonov et al., 2002; Raijman et al., 2003; Raijman and Semyonov, 2004; Stephan et al., 2005; Kunovich, 2004).

According to this approach, discriminatory attitudes and prejudice against the out-group population can be a result of threats posed to the individual or the group in the economic and the social arena (Blalock 1967; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Taylor, 1998; Scheepers et al., 2002). The logic embodied in this framework contends that fear and sense of threat mediates the relation between individuals' socio-economic position and level of their hostility to out-group populations. For example, citizens of low social and economic status fear that more immigrants means more competition over scarce resources, that is, fewer jobs, lower wage rates, fewer opportunities for mobility, more competition for housing and social services, and rise in crime rates (Gaashlot and Togeby, 1995; Quillian, 1995; Raijman et al., 2003; Raijman and Semyonov, 2004). By this logic we expect that perception of threat rationalizes the exclusion of immigrants from access to citizenship rights.

Intensity of national attachments has also been suggested to affect how individuals perceive competition and threat from out-group populations (Blank and Schmidt, 2003). Therefore we expect the effect of both chauvinism and patriotism on exclusionist attitudes towards immigrants to be mediated by perceived socio-economic threat (see Appendix 1 for the theoretical model).

In keeping with theoretical expectations summarized previously (e.g. Bar-Tal, 1997; Staub 1997; Blank and Schmidt 2003), we expect opposite effects of
chauvinism and patriotism on threat and on exclusionary attitudes to migrants. Specifically, we expect chauvinism to increase feelings of threat, hence to heighten opposition to granting migrants citizenship and equal rights. Conversely, we expect patriotism to exert a negative effect on the perception of threat, thus decreasing opposition to granting immigrants citizenship and equal rights.

To date, most research has focused on the impact of socio-economic threat on exclusionary attitudes (see e.g. Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, 2002; Rajman and Semyonov, 2004; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Semyonov et al., 2006) or on the role of national attachments in the derogation of out-groups (Blank et al., 2001; Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Mummendey et al., 2001). Only few studies have combined the two approaches into one integrative model to explain discriminatory attitudes towards immigrants (see e.g. Blank and Schmidt, 2003). This lack of concurrent consideration of the two theoretical approaches is surprising given that questions of labor market competition and questions of national identity tend to mobilize sentiments against immigrants (Schnapper 1994; Fetzer 2000).  

Hypotheses

The theoretical review leads to a series of general propositions on the determinants of attitudes towards granting migrants access to citizenship rights.

First, perception of threat derived from the presence of foreigners is expected to decrease with higher levels of patriotism but to increase with higher levels of chauvinism as such feelings tend to ignite in citizens fear of the presence of foreigners.

16 In addition, many scholars have focused either on the explanation of nationalistic attitudes (chauvinism and patriotism) or the explanation of exclusionary attitudes to minorities and immigrants (see e.g. Coenders, 2001; Gijsberts et al. 2003). These influential studies have suggested that people who support nationalist attitudes also tend to support ethnic exclusionism. However, these studies have not integrated both phenomena within a single theoretical model in order to test whether national identities and exclusionary attitudes are empirically related (see e.g. Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Hagendoorn and Poppe, 2003)
in their societies and their visualizing them as a threat to their socio-economic well-being. **Second,** regardless of patriotism and chauvinism, support for exclusionary policies (i.e. denial of citizenship and rights) on migrants is expected to increase with level of perceived threat; the higher this is, the more likely are respondents to deny citizenship rights to immigrants. **Third,** we expect that threat will mediate the relations between individuals’ socio-economic position and national attachments and attitudes towards granting social rights.

Our purpose is to test for country differences in the effects of chauvinism, patriotism and threat on attitudes towards granting citizenship rights to immigrants in France, Germany (East and West), the United States and Israel.\(^{17}\) The different conceptualizations of the nation state and philosophies of immigrants’ integration in each of the selected countries lead us to expect differences in levels of chauvinism and patriotism as well as perception of threat. We may also expect that countries differ not only in respect of public views on immigrants (mean levels) but also in respect of the mechanisms driving anti-immigrant sentiment at the structural level, that is, the relationships between the explanatory and the dependent variables.

By this logic we expect attitudes towards migrants to be more exclusive in the countries defined as ethno-national states (Germany and Israel) and more inclusive in the societies identified as close to the multicultural and republican models (the USA and France, respectively). Likewise, we expect the effects of chauvinism, patriotism and threat to be more intense in ethno-national states but weaker in the countries characterized by multicultural or republican regimes of incorporation.

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\(^{17}\) Different conceptualizations of the nation-state do not necessarily lead to different relationships between national pride and exclusion of foreigners. For example, in his comparative study Hjerm found that despite differences in nationhood models no differences appeared in the relationship between national pride and exclusion of foreigners (Hjerm, 1998).
Methodology

The recent release of the ISSP (International Social Survey Program) National Identity Module collected in 2003 offers us an opportunity to examine comparatively the effects of individual-level variables, national attachments (chauvinism and patriotism) and socio-economic threat on attitudes towards citizenship rights. The ISSP module on national identity (2003) included questions on national identity, chauvinism, patriotism and perception of threat, as well as items related to citizenship: criteria for citizenship and extension of citizenship rights to immigrants. So for the first time we can examine the relationship between different forms of national attachments (chauvinism and patriotism) and support for the extension of citizenship rights to non-citizens. The sample sizes (after calculating missing values and conducting pair-wise deletion) were 1,206 in Israel, 785 in Germany (West), 432 in Germany (East), 1,601 in France and 1,168 in the USA. 18

Dependent Variable

The rules for acquiring citizenship center on two main principles: territory and descent. In the territorial frame of citizenship the relations between the state and its population are based on two criteria: birth in the territory and permanent residency. The first criterion – that any individual born in a state's territory becomes its permanent citizen – is labeled the jus solis principle. The second criterion recognizes as a citizen any individual who has established a home or has resided in the state for a long period: the jus domicili principle. The principle of descent is based on the rule of jus sanguinis: that citizenship is transferred through family ties (Baubock, 1994).

18 We include in our sample only respondents who are citizens. It is important to note that it is the case that foreign-born people who acquired citizenship in all countries are included in the sample. However, the lack of information on the year of immigration is a constraint enforced by the ISSP, which did not include it.
In the ISSP three questions were asked about criteria for citizenship in respect of the above three principles. The dependent variable in the analyses was accordingly support for the extension of citizenship and rights to immigrants. It was measured as a latent variable composed by the following questions (measured on a 1-5 scale from 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree): (a) Children born in [country] to parents who are not citizens should become citizens of [country] at birth. This question reflects support for the jus solis principle; (b) Children born abroad should become [country] citizens if at least one of their parents is a citizen of [country]. This question reflects support for the jus sanguinis principle; (c) Legal immigrants should have the same rights as citizens. This question reflects support for jus domicile principle. Confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS 6.0 (Arbuckle 2005) procedures lent support to the argument that these items measured the latent variable access to citizenship.¹⁹

\textit{Explanatory variables}

Following previous research (see e.g. Coenders, 2001; Blank and Schmidt, 2003) chauvinism is measured here by two items referring to the superiority of one's own country and its residents. (1) "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [Country nationality]"; (2) "Generally, [Country] is a better country than most other countries". Responses were measured on a five-point scale from 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree). Confirmatory factor analysis lent support to the argument that these items measured the latent variable chauvinism (see factor loadings in Appendix A).

Patriotism was measured on a 1-4 scale (from 1= strongly disagree to 4= strongly agree) based on responses to questions related to civic or political pride: "How

¹⁹ See appendix A for detailed information on factor loadings.
proud are you of [country] in each of the following? (a) The way democracy works; (b) its social security system; (c) its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society". All three indicators measure pride in the democratic institutions and the achievements of the welfare state (Blank and Schmidt 2003). A high score on these items is considered an indicator of high levels of patriotism. Confirmatory factor analysis lent support to the argument that these items measured the latent variable patriotism (see factor loadings in Appendix A).

Perception of threat is a variable measuring perceptions of the consequences of the presence of immigrant minorities, especially its association with social problems for the host societies, like crime, welfare use, and unemployment, among others. It was measured on a 1-5 scale (from 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree) based on response to the questions: “How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (a) Immigrants improve [Country's] society by bringing in new ideas and culture; (b) immigrants are generally good for [Country's] economy; (c) immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country]; (d) immigrants increase crime rates; (e) government spends too much on assisting immigrants”. The first two items were used to construct a latent variable "positive threat”, indicating the contribution of immigrants to the economic and cultural aspects of society. The last three items were used to construct the latent variable "negative threat", which measures the negative impact of migrants on the receiving society. Both latent variables were used to construct the second-order factor THREAT (Bollen 1989). The "positive threat" first-order factor loads negatively on THREAT, whereas the "negative threat" first-order factor loads positively on it. Consequently, the substantial meaning of the second-order factor THREAT can be understood as a real (negative) sense of threat from foreigners (see factor loadings in Appendix A).
The background variables included in the analysis are: age (in years), gender (male=1), political orientation (1=left), missing data in political orientation (1=0), and attend religious services (interval scale from 1 =several times a week to 8=never). Respondents' socioeconomic characteristics are education (years of formal schooling) and labor force position defined by a set of dummy variables representing white-collar employment plus two additional categories: not in the labor force and unemployed. Blue-collar employment is the omitted category. Occupations were classified according to ISCO.  

**Data analysis**

In Table 1 we present a descriptive overview of the mean values for the indicators that compose the latent variables chauvinism, patriotism, socio-economic threat and access to citizenship rights for the four countries analyzed. The data reveal that in general national attachments (both chauvinism and patriotism) are stronger in the USA than in the European countries and Israel.

Chauvinistic feelings were rather high among US respondents ($\bar{x}=3.7$), followed by Israeli citizens ($\bar{x}=3.07$). The two German populations were the least

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20 In France, Germany and the USA the variable “political orientation” was measure on a 1-8 scale, where 1=far left and 8=far right. Respondents answering 1 (far left) or 2 (left, center left) received the value 1 for left, otherwise zero. For Israel such a scale is missing so we had to use the variable ”party voted for” in last elections. We coded the following parties as left: Israel Ahat, Meretz, Am Ehad, Hadash. Left =1, otherwise zero).  
21 Information on background characteristics of country samples and response rates could be seen at http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/issp/data/2003_National_Identity_II.htm  
22 ANOVA analysis was conducted in order to test for mean differences between the countries. Significant differences were found for all variables with the exception of the general mean for the variable citizenship.  
23 As chauvinism was found to be connected to militarism (Kosterman and Fesbach, 1989) these high values could possibly be explained by the armed conflicts in which both countries are involved. In the USA, the 9/11 attacks are suggested to have had a strong impact on national identity and attachment by giving rise to a clearer definition of in-group boundaries (Esses, Ovidio and Hodson, 2002:73). The average level of chauvinism (measured through the same items) in the USA in 1995 was 3.5. See Coenders, 2001:82).
chauvinistic ($\bar{x}$=2.74 and $\bar{x}$=2.83 in the East and West, respectively), with the French slightly more so ($\bar{x}$=2.86).  

Patriotism was also high in all countries. Specifically, US and French citizens were very proud in all three indicators of civic or political patriotism ($\bar{x}$=3.88 and 3.63, respectively). Contrastingly, Israelis displayed the lowest levels of patriotism as evinced by the lower levels of pride reported on all three indicators ($\bar{x}$=2.16). The distinction between citizens in the two parts of Germany becomes evident in the indicators of patriotic pride; in all items East Germans were much less proud than their Western counterparts ($\bar{x}$ = 3.18 and 3.53 respectively). According to Blank and Schmidt (2003) this difference results from the shorter period of reference whereby citizens of former East Germany can judge these institutional aspects.

In all countries respondents were more likely to view the impact of foreigners in negative than in positive terms. With only one exception (foreigners’ impact on cultural life) respondents were more likely to express negative than positive views on foreigners’ impact on society. Negative views were most pronounced with regard to crime, the labor market and the welfare system (on average over 3 points on a 5-point scale across countries) and least pronounced with regard to foreigners' contribution to society in general (economy and culture) (on average less than 3 points on the scale).

The data in Table 1 reveal considerable cross-national variations in the public's views of foreigners’ impact on society. Negative views were most intensive in

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24 The comparatively lower levels of chauvinistic feelings in Germany can be explained by the delegitimation of nationalist feelings after the Second World War that were seen as a negative phenomenon that should be restrained (Blank, Schmidt and Westle 2001).

25 Levels of patriotism in 1995 were much lower in the USA, circa 3.0 points (see Coenders 2001:82).

26 These lower levels of civic pride probably derived from citizens' feelings in connection with the retrenchment of the welfare state and the consequent increasing socio-economic inequality during the last decade (Shalev, 2000).
Germany ($\bar{x} = 3.71$ in the East and $3.50$ in the West), followed by the USA ($\bar{x} = 3.18$); they were less pronounced in France ($\bar{x} = 3.01$) and Israel ($\bar{x} = 3.25$).  

Table 1 about here

The bottom panel of Table 1 furnishes information on support for immigrants' access to citizenship and rights in each of the analyzed countries. Note that despite different conceptions of the nation-state and different migration regimes prevalent in the four countries, we found no marked differences on average levels of willingness to grant citizenship rights to immigrants. Differences were more evident in citizens' attitudes towards the different rules for granting citizenship, although the variation in scores was low.

In all countries the data show higher support for jus sanguinis (“law of blood”) and jus solis (“law of the soil”) rules than for the jus domicile principle (“law of residence”). This is not surprising given that in almost all the compared countries citizenship laws are based on some combination of jus solis and jus sanguinis principles. However, support was relatively stronger for the latter – the ethnic or descent rule. Support for jus sanguinis was in fact fairly high in the US ($\bar{x} = 4.05$) and Israel ($\bar{x} = 3.91$), followed by Germany (West) ($\bar{x} = 3.88$), France ($\bar{x} = 3.86$) and Germany (East) ($\bar{x} = 3.72$).

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27 The measurement of socio-economic threat is problematic in the case of Israel. Because respondents were asked about immigrants' impact on society, without specifying whether the question referred to immigrants arriving under the law of return or to non-Jewish labor migrants, we are not sure what type of immigrants the respondents had in mind when they reacted to items measuring socio-economic threat. However, in-depth interviews conducted in Israel using the same questions suggest that when asked about "immigrants" most respondents relate to non-Jewish migrants, as they designate Olim those of Jewish origin who enter under the law of return and are immediately granted citizenship rights.

28 These findings resemble those of Simon and Lynch (1999) who compared public attitudes in seven countries that have had different policies and practices of migration regimes. Despite major differences in policies, practices, size of the migrant population and type of immigrants, there is consensus in the way immigrants are perceived by the publics in all the analyzed countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan and the USA).

29 Even in countries committed to the civic-territorial principle, members' access to citizenship is also based on family ties: the jus sanguinis principle (Joppke, 2005:241).
As already stated, one indicator of tolerance for the incorporation of foreigners is the predisposition to grant citizenship to newborn children of immigrant parents (i.e., second- or third-generation immigrants) by the jus solis principle. This is considered the most crucial test of a liberal attitude to foreigners' incorporation into the host society, reflecting a more expansive and assimilationist understanding of membership. The data show that in all countries citizens' support for locally-born children of immigrant parents enjoying access to citizenship is quite high, above 3.7 points in all countries.

The rather high levels of support for access to citizenship for second-generation immigrants stands out against the much lower levels of support for conceding rights to the first generation of migrants. Support for the jus domicile principle, that is, rights based on residency, was low, oscillating between low support in Germany (West) and the USA (\( \bar{x} = 2.80 \) and \( 2.89 \) respectively), followed by Israel (\( \bar{x} = 3.01 \)), to moderate in France and Germany (East) (\( \bar{x} = 3.05 \) and 3.04 respectively).

Although interesting, the descriptive data do not tell us whether and to what extent attitudes towards granting access to citizenship are affected by chauvinism, patriotism and socio-economic threat. To learn this we estimate a SEM model that allows assessment of the effects of socio-economic characteristics and the explanatory variables suggested in the theoretical model.

**Structural Equation Model (SEM)**

Although the ISSP data collection is mainly for purposes of international comparative studies, attitudes are context-dependent which makes the comparison problematic (Svallfors, 1996). To ensure comparability of data it is necessary first to establish equivalence of measurement models across cultures (Vandenberg and Lance,
Establishing the equivalence of measurements is essential since we must confirm that the concepts of chauvinism, patriotism, threat and attitudes towards citizenship rights are identical across countries. This is critical for the legitimacy of the comparison of relations between these constructs across groups or countries (see e.g. Coenders, 2001; Harkness et al. 2003). The invariance of the latent variables across cultural settings could be examined by a test of whether the relationships between these latent variables and their indicators are identical across countries or not (see e.g. Billiet, 2003).

We started the analysis by testing the conceptual model across the five groups. The path model is described in figure 1. In this model we hypothesize that patriotism and chauvinism have a direct effect on THREAT and that THREAT in turn has a direct effect on the variable CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS. Patriotism and chauvinism are assumed to have only an indirect effect on CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS (via THREAT).  

We estimated this model in a series of multiple group structural equation models (MGSEM) (see Bollen 1989 for a detailed overview of MGSEM; Billiet 2003). We used the Amos 6.0 program (Arbuckle 2005), which is especially efficient for this purpose. MGSEM is a powerful tool for cross-national comparison. It facilitates comparison of measurements across nations, and testing whether the meaning of the

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30 Researchers differentiate between three types of equivalence: configural, metric and scalar. The second (metric) is a necessary condition for the comparability of relationships between constructs. For a thorough description of measurement invariance issues see De Beuckelaer, 2005.

31 A series of theoretically postulated socio-demographic and other background variables are regressed on the endogenous variables in the model, patriotism, chauvinism, and THREAT. Labor market position, age, political orientation and education are assumed to have a direct effect on Patriotism, Chauvinism, and THREAT, whereas attendance in religious services and gender are assumed to have a direct effect on Chauvinism and Patriotism but not on THREAT. We assume that individual socio-economic characteristics do not have a direct effect on “CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS” but only an indirect one via the variables chauvinism, patriotism, and THREAT (see Figure 1).
latent constructs is the same across groups, and simultaneously estimating the relationships between theoretical constructs.

If all factor loadings are equal across nations we identify a model of full metric invariance\(^{32}\) (Billiet and McClendon 2000; Vandenberg and Lance 2000; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). If only part of the factor loadings is equal, we identify a model of partial metric invariance (Byrne et al., 1989).\(^{33}\) We proceed step-wise, setting additional constraints on the model. Each of the two models is described in table 2, followed by its global fit measures.

In the first model, which we called the configural invariant model (model A in table 2), we compared the model structure across countries, and did not set any equality constraints on the factor loadings of the latent variables across countries.\(^{34}\) The global fit measures were good enough not to reject the model (Bollen 1989; Hu and Bentler 1999; Marsh et al., 2004). However, in this model we cannot be sure that the meaning of the constructs is the same across countries.

**Table 2 about here**

In the second model (model B in table 2), which we called the measurement (metric) invariant model, we set the factor loadings between the latent variables and the indicators to be the same across groups. In such a way we guarantee that the relations and also the content of the latent variables are the same in the four countries.\(^{35}\) The global model fit measures suggested that the model cannot be rejected (Hu and Bentler 1999; Marsh et al., 2004). Therefore, we concluded that the content of

\(^{32}\) Metric invariance guarantees that the relationship between constructs and indicators is the same across groups. This is a necessary condition for the equivalence of meaning and for a meaningful comparison of relationships between constructs across groups.

\(^{33}\) Byrne et al. (1989) also argue that it is enough to have two factor loadings which are equal across groups in order to assess equivalence of meaning.

\(^{34}\) Configural invariance means that the causal structure of the model is the same for all groups but not the coefficients themselves, which can vary.

\(^{35}\) This is a necessary condition for equivalence of meaning of latent variables across groups.
the latent variables is the same across the countries. Now we could confidently compare relations between the constructs chauvinism, patriotism, THREAT and CITIZENSHIP across countries. Ensuring metric invariance guarantees that such a comparison is meaningful.  

**Determinants of Access to Citizenship and Rights for Immigrants**

Here we discuss the effect of patriotism and chauvinism on perception of threat and the effects of chauvinism, patriotism and perception of threat on attitudes towards granting citizenship rights to migrants in France, Germany (East and West), the USA and Israel. The unstandardized regression coefficients for the model are presented in Table 3.  

As outlined in the theoretical background, because chauvinism and patriotism differ in their conception of how the relation between the individual and the nation is structured (Blank et al., 2001) we also expected them to differ in the way they unleash perceptions of socio-economic threat from immigrants' presence. In line with the

36 The unstandardized factor loadings of the indicators of the latent variables for model B are presented in Appendix A. As the results show, the indicators display strong and significant loadings on their corresponding latent variables (chauvinism, patriotism, thr+, thr- and CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS) across countries. This guarantees that the constructs have the same meaning over the countries. Furthermore, thr+ loads negatively on the second-order latent variable threat, and thr- loads on it positively. Consequently, the substantial meaning of the second-order factor threat can be understood as a real (negative) feeling of threat from foreigners.

37 For reasons of parsimony we will not discuss the effects of the exogenous variables on national attachments and perceptions of threat. The data in Appendix B and Table 3 suggest that in all countries chauvinism, patriotism and perception of threat were associated with individual characteristics in largely predictable ways.
literature, we found that chauvinism and patriotism have significant but opposite effects on the perception of socio-economic threat from immigrants' presence. Whereas chauvinistic feelings have a positive effect and increase perceptions of threat, patriotic feelings have a negative effect thus reducing the feelings of threat derived from the presence of foreigners.

The positive effect of chauvinism was the most pronounced in the USA and Israel (b=.665 and .602, respectively), the least pronounced in Germany (East) (b=.284) and Germany (West) (b=.3334), with France in the middle (b=.475). The strong and significant effect of chauvinism on threat in Israel and the USA suggests that feelings of "country superiority" coupled with the country's involvement in armed conflicts might have a much greater impact on the way they activate the sense of threat derived from the presence of foreigners in the country. 38 The negative effect of patriotism on threat was more pronounced in the USA (b=.614), behind which came France (b=.510), Israel (b=.505) and Germany (West= -.416 and East= -.361).

As expected, socio-economic threat exerted a negative effect on "CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS" in all countries. Namely, people with a higher level of sense of threat were less willing to grant citizenship rights to immigrants. The data show that the direct and negative effect of threat on "CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS" differed across countries. It was moderate in Israel (b=.476) and the USA (b=.594), strongest in France (b=.902) and less so by Germany (East) (b=.772), and Germany (West) (b= -.664).

Because we assume that the effects of patriotism and chauvinism are mediated by the perception of threat we proceed next to analyze the total (direct and indirect)

38 Li and Brewer have argued that the 9/11 attacks resulted in a distinct increase in expressions of national identification and unity in the USA (2004:728).
effects of these variables on willingness to grant immigrants access to citizenship and rights (see Table 4).

**Table 4 about here**

The data in Table 4 show that in all countries patriotism had a positive total effect on citizenship, with chauvinism exerting a negative and significant effect on attitudes towards granting immigrants access to citizenship rights. Namely, the higher the feelings of patriotism, the higher the willingness to grant such rights. By contrast, the higher respondents' chauvinistic attitudes, the lower the willingness to grant such rights.

These findings lead to several conclusions. First, the opposite (direct) effects of chauvinism and patriotism on threat and (indirect effects on) support for granting citizenship rights to immigrants in all countries confirm the need to distinguish the two dimensions of national attachments: chauvinism and patriotism (see e.g. Coenders, 2001; Schmidt and Blank 2003).

Second, chauvinism does not directly lead to the rejection and exclusion of immigrants. It is rather an indirect causal effect through the perception of threat. As suggested by Brewer (1999), in-group favoritism is fertile ground for perceived threat and antagonism to out-groups. In other words, the need to justify in-group values in the form of moral superiority to others increases the perception that immigrants are a threat to the interests of the in-group, leading to the exclusion of immigrants from access to citizenship and rights.

Third, as expected the stronger the respondents' degree of patriotism, the lower the perception of socio-economic threat posed by the presence of foreigners, and consequently the higher the disposition to grant immigrants access to the goods of

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39 Only in the USA did both patriotism and chauvinism have substantially larger direct effects, negative and positive respectively, on the variable "CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS".
citizenship. As patriotism is based on a humanist moral concept (see Schwartz, 1992), it is associated with support for democratic principles which in turn favor cultural and societal diversity. Therefore, patriotism is connected with only weak feelings of threat, or none at all, hence only to a slight tendency to exclusionism, or its complete absence (see e.g. Blank et al., 2001).

**Conclusions**

In this paper we tested the effects of national attachments (patriotism and chauvinism) and perception of threat on citizens’ willingness to concede citizenship rights to immigrants in France, Germany (West and East), the USA and Israel. Because the selected countries differ in their immigration policies and philosophies of immigrants' integration, we expected them also to differ in the ways citizens view immigrants' access to citizenship and rights. However, contrary to our expectations, and despite their marked differences in migration policies and conceptions of nationhood, no significant differences were found in attitudes towards the allocation of citizenship rights to immigrants in the countries under review.

Citizens' attitudes towards criteria for acquiring citizenship reflect in all countries a combination of two main principles: jus sanguinis and jus solis. Thus both, descent and territory (birth but not residence) are identified as principles for social inclusion, and this was true even in the ethno-national states. As our findings suggest, the first generation of immigrants were considered "outsiders" in all countries as citizens were resistant to accept foreigners as equal members in their societies. Contrastingly, willingness to grant citizenship to the second generation was widely supported in all countries. Based on these findings, we can conclude that different conceptualizations of the nation-state – at the macro-level – do not necessarily lead to
different attitudes towards immigrants' inclusion/exclusion at the micro-level of analysis.

However, regarding the strength of the relationship between explanatory and dependent variables we uncover some interesting and unexpected differences among the four countries, which we summarize in Table 5.

Our theoretical expectation was that the effects of national attachments and perceptions of threat on respondents' attitudes towards granting migrants citizenship rights would be stronger in ethno-national states and weaker in countries characterized by multicultural or republican regimes. However, our analysis suggests that contrary to our expectations, the effects of both chauvinism and patriotism on willingness to grant citizenship rights to immigrants were rather low in Germany and Israel – the two ethno-national states, and strongest in France and the USA – which stand for republican and multicultural models of incorporation, respectively. Furthermore, the effects of threat on exclusion of immigrants from citizenship rights was weaker in Israel (ethnic democracy) but stronger in the liberal democratic countries.

What then are the mechanisms driving these differences among the different receiving societies? Our findings imply that the French republican-held concept of citizenship, which presupposes that without a common culture and a sense of common identity the integrity of the nation could be threatened, might be exclusionary toward foreigners (Jennings, 2000:581). Indeed, some scholars have suggested that despite the republican model and its cultural and ethnic diversity French citizens might fear the loss of national identity, and therefore tend to be less tolerant of migrants' incorporation into French society (2000:576).  

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40 Indeed, Muslim immigration and the viability of their integration into French society has been lately a focus of great concern in the country. According to de Wenden (1998) immigrants in France are mostly identified with Muslims; these also perceived by the native population as fundamentalist, anachronistic and dangerous. Furthermore, France has the highest percentage of Muslim population in Europe (circa
The pattern of moderate and strong effects of national attachments and perception of threat on granting citizenship rights in the USA tends to resemble that in France. Although the USA has made the immigrant experience part of its national identity, the issue of illegal immigration and the country's changing demographic structure are also factors that can ignite threat and lead to the exclusion of immigrants from the access to citizenship. For example, Burns and Gimpel (2000:203) argued that labor market competition resulting from a generous immigration policy can also result in deep hostility toward immigrants as they are perceived as competitors in the social and economic spheres. Furthermore, as Joppke has suggested, the public's views on foreigners cannot be dissociated from America's longstanding and unresolved race problem (1996:454).41

The lower impact of national attachments on exclusionary attitudes towards foreigners in Germany (both West and East) confirms that in this country the delegitimation of nationalist feelings (after 1945) affect both, the sense of threat caused by immigrants' presence and willingness to grant them access to citizenship rights. By contrast, the rather strong effect of perception of threat on exclusionary attitudes towards granting citizenship rights to immigrants was high, especially in former East Germany, where the percentage of foreigners is rather low. This finding illustrates that even in the absence of actual threat (low number of foreigners in former East Germany) it is the perceived threat (Semyonov et al., 2004) – that results in a

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3.7 percent in 2003). Although Germany also has a large Turkish immigrant population, one has to take into account that the Islamic orientations of Turkish immigrants in Germany are perceived as less radical than those of the Algerian and Moroccan immigrants in France.

41 The relatively high effects of the variable threat in the USA can also be explained as a "9/11" effect as the terrorist attacks committed by Muslim immigrants heightened the identification of foreigners – especially those of Muslim background – with the threat of America's values (Li and Brewer 2004).
higher disposition to exclude immigrants from access to the goods of citizenship ("xenophobia without strangers").

Finally, the lower effect of perceptions of socio-economic threat on attitudes towards granting citizenship rights to immigrants in Israel could be explained by the strong exclusionary policy displayed by this nation-state toward non-Jewish migrants. Although non-national workers have become an integral part of the Israeli economy, they are excluded from the dominant regime of incorporation in the country. They hold the least desirable jobs, suffer from the worst working conditions, and (unlike the situation in the other countries), and do not benefit from the welfare system and union protection accorded Israeli citizens. Furthermore, they have no possibility for becoming citizens. Perhaps the citizens' perception of secure "closed doors" for non-ethnic migrants in Israel is expressed through the relatively lower impact of socio-economic threat on their willingness to grant access to citizenship rights to migrants.

So we confront the paradox that in countries that are liberal democracies and tend to display a civic or republican model of nationhood, the effect of threat on the citizens' willingness to grant citizenship rights is stronger than in Israel, an ethno-national state with a strong religious exclusivist component. Therefore, it can be said that in societies characterized by relatively "open doors" to immigrants, and relatively easy access to citizenship, yet at the same time by a strong emphasis on assimilation (e.g. France), the effect of national attachments and perception of threat might be much stronger than in countries with secure "closed doors" and restrictive admission policies and citizenship regimes for non-ethnic migrants (i.e. Israel).

We suggest that future research address this intriguing paradox and elucidate (1) the complex ways whereby individuals construct boundaries and social identities in specific socio-economic and political contexts, and (2) the ways these impinge on
perceptions of and behaviors toward out-groups. To achieve this aim we should combine survey data with qualitative data (e.g. in-depth interviews, focus groups) that would allow deeper understanding of how national attachments and socio-economic threat intertwine in the explanation of exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants in different social settings.

References


Perceived Threat, and Endorsement of Economic Discrimination against Foreign Workers in Israel." Social Problems, 49, 3.


Table 1: Chauvinism, patriotism, socio-economic threat and access to citizenship rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany (East)</th>
<th>Germany (West)</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chauvinism (x)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [Country nationality]</td>
<td>2.86 (1.04)</td>
<td>2.74 (0.92)</td>
<td>2.83 (0.95)</td>
<td>3.07 (1.00)</td>
<td>3.70 (0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Generally, [Country] is better than most other countries</td>
<td>2.54 (1.18)</td>
<td>2.56 (1.03)</td>
<td>2.61 (1.03)</td>
<td>2.74 (1.13)</td>
<td>3.27 (1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patriotism (x)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- How proud: The way democracy works</td>
<td>3.63 (0.66)</td>
<td>3.18 (0.60)</td>
<td>3.53 (0.61)</td>
<td>2.16 (0.69)</td>
<td>3.88 (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How proud: Its social security system</td>
<td>3.52 (0.82)</td>
<td>3.19 (0.68)</td>
<td>3.61 (0.80)</td>
<td>2.38 (0.93)</td>
<td>4.19 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How proud: Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society</td>
<td>3.99 (0.86)</td>
<td>3.27 (0.77)</td>
<td>3.64 (0.82)</td>
<td>2.09 (0.95)</td>
<td>3.55 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive threat (x)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Immigrants are generally good for [Country’s] economy</td>
<td>3.04 (1.09)</td>
<td>3.04 (0.86)</td>
<td>2.86 (0.85)</td>
<td>2.76 (1.06)</td>
<td>2.68 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Immigrants improve [Country nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures</td>
<td>2.99 (1.23)</td>
<td>2.77 (1.01)</td>
<td>2.62 (0.99)</td>
<td>2.80 (1.25)</td>
<td>2.56 (0.96)</td>
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<td><strong>Negative threat (x)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Immigrants increase crime rates</td>
<td>3.01 (1.18)</td>
<td>3.71 (0.92)</td>
<td>3.50 (0.90)</td>
<td>3.25 (1.08)</td>
<td>3.18 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country]</td>
<td>3.10 (1.38)</td>
<td>3.74 (1.01)</td>
<td>3.62 (1.01)</td>
<td>3.32 (1.28)</td>
<td>2.83 (1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Government spends too much money assisting immigrants</td>
<td>2.56 (1.34)</td>
<td>4.47 (1.11)</td>
<td>3.12 (1.14)</td>
<td>3.33 (1.41)</td>
<td>3.19 (1.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Threat Index (x)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Government spends too much money assisting immigrants</td>
<td>3.37 (1.35)</td>
<td>4.03 (0.97)</td>
<td>3.82 (1.05)</td>
<td>3.09 (1.26)</td>
<td>3.52 (1.08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Children born in [Country] to parents who are not citizens should have the right to become [Country nationality] citizens. <em>Jus solis</em></td>
<td>3.02 (1.06)</td>
<td>3.45 (0.81)</td>
<td>3.25 (0.79)</td>
<td>3.05 (0.95)</td>
<td>2.98 (0.79)</td>
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<td><strong>Citizenship (x)</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Children born in [Country] to parents who are not citizens should have the right to become [Country nationality] citizens. <em>Jus solis</em></td>
<td>3.54 (1.02)</td>
<td>3.47 (0.81)</td>
<td>3.51 (0.79)</td>
<td>3.54 (0.87)</td>
<td>3.59 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Children born abroad should have the right to become [Country nationality] citizens if at least one of their parents is a [Country nationality] citizen. <em>Jus sanguinis</em></td>
<td>3.73 (1.28)</td>
<td>3.67 (0.99)</td>
<td>3.90 (0.92)</td>
<td>3.73 (1.25)</td>
<td>3.83 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Legal immigrants to [Country] who are not citizens should have the same rights as [Country nationality] citizens. <em>Jus domicil</em></td>
<td>3.86 (1.09)</td>
<td>3.72 (0.92)</td>
<td>3.88 (0.81)</td>
<td>3.91 (1.07)</td>
<td>4.05 (0.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Legal immigrants to [Country] who are not citizens should have the same rights as [Country nationality] citizens. <em>Jus domicil</em></td>
<td>3.05 (1.40)</td>
<td>3.04 (1.20)</td>
<td>2.80 (1.22)</td>
<td>3.01 (1.25)</td>
<td>2.89 (0.21)</td>
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<td>Chi square / degrees of freedom</td>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>PCLOSE</td>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>SRMR</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MODEL A</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configural</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>invariance</td>
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<td><strong>MODEL B</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Measurement</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<td>(metric) invariance</td>
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<td>model</td>
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</table>
Table 3: Unstandardized regression coefficients of social-structural variables on theoretical variables in the partially structural invariant model (MGSEM of Israel, Germany (West), Germany (East), France and USA)

| Variables | Israel | | | | Germany (West) | | | | | Germany (East) | | | | | France | | | USA |
|-----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|           | B      | S.E    | B      | S.E    | B      | S.E    | B      | S.E    | B      | S.E    | B      | S.E    | B      | S.E    | B      | S.E    |
| threat <-- left | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | -.529* | .055 | .000 | | | | | | |
| threat <-- age | -.008* | .002 | .005* | .002 | .001 | .002 | .004* | .001 | .002 | .001 | | | | | | |
| threat <-- educ | -.028* | .008 | -.040* | .008 | -.054* | .011 | -.030* | .005 | -.024* | .009 | | | | | | |
| threat <-- out | .204* | .080 | .032 | .067 | -.105 | .094 | -.039 | .078 | -.078 | .064 | | | | | | |
| threat <-- unemployd | -.174 | .121 | -.182 | .115 | -.209* | .109 | .004 | .106 | -.152 | .117 | | | | | | |
| threat <-- white | .142 | .081 | -.036 | .067 | -.124 | .095 | -.129 | .074 | -.194* | .059 | | | | | | |
| threat <-- vote_mis | -.188* | .059 | .022 | .049 | .048 | .064 | -.131* | .050 | -.029 | .192 | | | | | | |
| threat <-- patr | -.505* | .082 | -.416* | .066 | -.361* | .078 | -.510* | .052 | -.614* | .084 | | | | | | |
| threat <-- chauv | .602* | .077 | .334* | .043 | .284* | .060 | .475* | .037 | .665* | .068 | | | | | | |
| cit. <-- threat | -.476* | .046 | -.664* | .057 | -.772* | .071 | -.902* | .038 | -.594* | .043 | | | | | | |

* P<0.05

cit.=citizenship; thr=threat; patr=patriotism; chauv=chauvinism
Table 4. Unstandardized total effects of patriotism and chauvinism on citizenship rights by country (SE in brackets estimated by the bootstrap procedure)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total effects</th>
<th>Patriotism</th>
<th>Chauvinism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
<td>.240*</td>
<td>-.287*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.089)</td>
<td>(.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany (West)</strong></td>
<td>.276*</td>
<td>-.222*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany (East)</strong></td>
<td>.279*</td>
<td>-.219*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.070)</td>
<td>(.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>.460*</td>
<td>-.428*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USA</strong></td>
<td>.364*</td>
<td>-.395*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.058)</td>
<td>(.050)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* P<0.05
Table 5. Summary of strength of effects on exclusionary attitudes to migrants by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Effects</th>
<th>Patriotism</th>
<th>Chauvinism</th>
<th>Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (West)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (East)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A: Unstandardized factor loadings of indicators on latent variables or on socio-demographic characteristics in the partially structural invariant model (MGSEM of Israel (total population), Germany (West), Germany (East), France and USA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor loadings</th>
<th>Israel B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Germany (West) B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Germany (East) B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>France B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>USA B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V59 &lt;-- cit.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V60 &lt;-- cit.</td>
<td>.678*</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.678* .024</td>
<td>.678* .024 .678* .024 .678* .024 .678* .024</td>
<td>.678* .024 .678* .024 .678* .024 .678* .024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V61 &lt;-- cit.</td>
<td>1.081*</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>1.081* .036</td>
<td>1.081* .036 1.081* .036 1.081* .036 1.081* .036 1.081* .036</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V50 &lt;-- thr-</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V54 &lt;-- thr-</td>
<td>1.154*</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>1.154* .029</td>
<td>1.154* .029 1.154* .029 1.154* .029 1.154* .029 1.154* .029</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V51 &lt;-- thr+</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V53 &lt;-- thr+</td>
<td>1.022*</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>1.022* .022</td>
<td>1.022* .022 1.022* .022 1.022* .022 1.022* .022 1.022* .022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V22 &lt;-- chauv</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V21 &lt;-- chauv</td>
<td>1.274*</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>1.274* .043</td>
<td>1.274* .043 1.274* .043 1.274* .043 1.274* .043 1.274* .043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V35 &lt;-- patr</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V29 &lt;-- patr</td>
<td>.821*</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.821* .035</td>
<td>.821* .035  .821* .035 .821* .035 .821* .035 .821* .035</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V26 &lt;-- patr</td>
<td>.989*</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.989* .039</td>
<td>.989* .039 .989* .039 .989* .039 .989* .039 .989* .039</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V52 &lt;-- thr-</td>
<td>1.255*</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>1.255* .031</td>
<td>1.255* .031 1.255* .031 1.255* .031 1.255* .031 1.255* .031</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V50 &lt;-- chauv</td>
<td>.216*</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.216* .026</td>
<td>.216* .026 .216* .026 .216* .026 .216* .026 .216* .026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V50 &lt;-- attend1</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.014    -.021</td>
<td>.014    -.072</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* P<0.05

cit.=citizenship; thr=threat; patr=patriotism; chauv=chauvinism
### Appendix B: Unstandardized regression coefficients of socio-demographic variables on Patriotism and Chauvinism (MGSEM of Israel, Germany (West), Germany (East), France and USA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Germany West</th>
<th>Germany East</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patr &lt;-- white</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patr &lt;-- unemployd1</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>-.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patr &lt;-- out</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patr &lt;-- educ</td>
<td>-.016*</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.026*</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patr &lt;-- sex</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>-.111*</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>-.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patr &lt;-- age</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patr &lt;-- attend1</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-.024*</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>-.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patr &lt;-- left</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chauv &lt;-- white</td>
<td>-.130</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>-.108</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>-.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chauv &lt;-- unemployd1</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chauv &lt;-- out</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chauv &lt;-- educ</td>
<td>-.041*</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.036*</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-.039*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chauv &lt;-- sex</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>-.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chauv &lt;-- age</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chauv &lt;-- attend1</td>
<td>-.077*</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>-.027*</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.048*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chauv &lt;-- left</td>
<td>-.197*</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>-.174*</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>-.248*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patr &lt;-- vote_mis</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>-.215*</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>-.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chauv &lt;-- vote_mis</td>
<td>-.146*</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>-.058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* *P<0.05

patr=patriotism; chauv=chauvinism
Figure 1: The full model

Exogenous variables
(Socio-demographic characteristics)

Positive threat

Negative threat

Threat

Citizenship rights

Patriotism

Chauvinism