Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence


Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick (2016). An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence. Working paper series / Department of Economics 153, University of Zurich.

Abstract

Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players’ motives to affect other players’ monetary payoffs. One example is externalities due to spite, which has been used to explain overbidding in second-price auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting that both dimensions of robustness are equally important. Our results are relevant for mechanism design in general, because the concept of externality-robustness is applicable to arbitrary mechanism design problems.

Abstract

Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players’ motives to affect other players’ monetary payoffs. One example is externalities due to spite, which has been used to explain overbidding in second-price auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting that both dimensions of robustness are equally important. Our results are relevant for mechanism design in general, because the concept of externality-robustness is applicable to arbitrary mechanism design problems.

Statistics

Downloads

22 downloads since deposited on 16 Apr 2014
3 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C91, D03, D44, D82
Uncontrolled Keywords:Robust mechanism design, spiteful preferences, experimental auctions
Language:English
Date:April 2016
Deposited On:16 Apr 2014 14:51
Last Modified:08 Dec 2017 05:24
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:35
ISSN:1664-7041
Additional Information:Revised version
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp153.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers-new.php

Download

Filetype: PDF (Revised version November 2015) - Registered users only
Size: 732kB
Download PDF  'An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence'.
Preview
Filetype: PDF (Revised version April 2016)
Size: 731kB