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Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types


Ewerhart, Christian (2014). Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types. Working paper series / Department of Economics 159, University of Zurich.

Abstract

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Abstract

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C7, D7, D8
Uncontrolled Keywords:Rent-seeking, private information, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, existence, uniqueness
Language:English
Date:May 2014
Deposited On:26 May 2014 15:10
Last Modified:15 Aug 2017 11:56
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:11
ISSN:1664-7041 (P) 1664-705X (E)
Free access at:Official URL. An embargo period may apply.
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp159.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php

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