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Unique Equilibrium in Contests with a Continuum of Types


Ewerhart, Christian (2014). Unique Equilibrium in Contests with a Continuum of Types. Economics Letters, 125(1):115-118.

Abstract

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Abstract

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

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5 citations in Web of Science®
5 citations in Scopus®
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21 downloads since deposited on 29 Aug 2014
8 downloads since 12 months
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Date:23 August 2014
Deposited On:29 Aug 2014 10:14
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 18:21
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0165-1765
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.019

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