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Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests


Ewerhart, Christian (2015). Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests. Economic Theory, 60(1):59-71.

Abstract

Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (“ \(2 ”) has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being “halfhearted,” which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction.

Abstract

Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (“ \(2 ”) has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being “halfhearted,” which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Tullock contest, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, analytical functions
Language:English
Date:2015
Deposited On:29 Aug 2014 09:39
Last Modified:21 Nov 2017 17:26
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0938-2259
Additional Information:The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0835-x
Related URLs:http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-93905

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