Publication: Who gains from non-collusive corruption?
Who gains from non-collusive corruption?
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Foellmi, R., & Oechslin, M. (2007). Who gains from non-collusive corruption? Journal of Development Economics, 82(1), 95–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.10.002
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Non-collusive corruption, i.e., corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity, is particularly widespread in low-income countries. We build a macroeconomic model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of corruption. We find that credit market imperfections, by generating rents for the incumbent entrepreneurs, create strong incentives for corrupt behavior by state officials. However, non-collusive corruption not only redistributes income from non-
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- Foellmi, R
- Oechslin, M
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Foellmi, R., & Oechslin, M. (2007). Who gains from non-collusive corruption? Journal of Development Economics, 82(1), 95–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.10.002
