Publication: Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies
Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies
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Pradelski, B. S. R., & Nax, H. H. (2019). Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies. International Journal of Game Theory, 49, 275–298. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00694-0
Abstract
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Abstract
In two-sided markets with transferable utility (‘assignment games’), we study the dynamics of trade arrangements and price adjustments as agents from the two market sides stochastically match, break up, and re-match in their pursuit of better opportunities. The underlying model of individual adjustments is based on the behavioral theories of adaptive learning and aspiration adjustment. Dynamics induced by this model converge to approximately optimal and stable market outcomes, but this convergence may be (exponentially) slow. We intro
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- Pradelski, Bary S R
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Pradelski, B. S. R., & Nax, H. H. (2019). Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies. International Journal of Game Theory, 49, 275–298. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00694-0
