Publication: Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three - Person Generosity Experiments
Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three - Person Generosity Experiments
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Güth, W., Pull, K., Stribeck, A., & Stadler, M. (2010). Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three - Person Generosity Experiments. Games, 1, 89–102. https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020089
Abstract
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Abstract
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether t
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- Güth, Werner
- Pull, Kerstin
- Stribeck, Agnes
- Stadler, Manfred
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Güth, W., Pull, K., Stribeck, A., & Stadler, M. (2010). Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three - Person Generosity Experiments. Games, 1, 89–102. https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020089
