Publication:

Lawyer expertise and contract Design - evidence from M&A negotiations

Date

Date

Date
2022
Journal Article
Published version
Simple data Full metadata Statistics
cris.lastimport.scopus2025-06-21T03:33:31Z
cris.lastimport.wos2025-07-28T01:32:56Z
cris.virtual.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-0780-6571
cris.virtualsource.orcid317ed249-3e4d-47ad-824f-6e6f8923b9d7
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of Zurich
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-06T12:25:13Z
dc.date.available2023-07-06T12:25:13Z
dc.date.issued2022-02-22
dc.description.abstract

We argue that the relative expertise of contracting parties strongly affects contractual outcomes. Using unique data on company acquisition contracts, we document that lawyers with higher expertise relative to their counterparties negotiate better risk allocation for their clients and more favourable target prices. The benefits of high expertise outweigh its costs, largely because high-expertise lawyers economise on transaction costs by shortening negotiation times. Our findings suggest a need for explicit modelling of contracting skills, and they help explain heterogeneity in legal fees across law firms and the role of league tables of law firms.

dc.identifier.doi10.1093/ej/ueab047
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133
dc.identifier.othermerlin-id:23838
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85143059604
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.zora.uzh.ch/handle/20.500.14742/208451
dc.identifier.wos000768454200007
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectEconomics and Econometrics
dc.subject.ddc330 Economics
dc.title

Lawyer expertise and contract Design - evidence from M&A negotiations

dc.typearticle
dcterms.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitleEconomic Journal
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number642
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishernameWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend674
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart644
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume132
dspace.entity.typePublicationen
uzh.contributor.affiliationOmx Group, University of California, Berkeley, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
uzh.contributor.affiliationOmx Group, University of California, Berkeley, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
uzh.contributor.affiliationOmx Group, University of California, Berkeley, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
uzh.contributor.authorKarsten, Christel
uzh.contributor.authorMalmendier, Ulrike
uzh.contributor.authorSautner, Zacharias
uzh.contributor.correspondenceNo
uzh.contributor.correspondenceYes
uzh.contributor.correspondenceNo
uzh.document.availabilitypostprint
uzh.eprint.datestamp2023-07-06 12:25:13
uzh.eprint.lastmod2025-07-28 01:38:50
uzh.eprint.statusChange2023-07-06 12:25:13
uzh.harvester.ethYes
uzh.harvester.nbNo
uzh.identifier.doi10.5167/uzh-234542
uzh.jdb.eprintsId21547
uzh.oastatus.unpaywallclosed
uzh.oastatus.zoraGreen
uzh.publication.citationKarsten, C., Malmendier, U., & Sautner, Z. (2022). Lawyer expertise and contract Design - evidence from M&A negotiations. Economic Journal, 132, 644–674. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueab047
uzh.publication.originalworkoriginal
uzh.publication.publishedStatusfinal
uzh.publication.scopedisciplinebased
uzh.relatedUrl.typeorg
uzh.scopus.impact2
uzh.scopus.subjectsEconomics and Econometrics
uzh.workflow.chairSubjectoecIBF1
uzh.workflow.doajuzh.workflow.doaj.false
uzh.workflow.eprintid234542
uzh.workflow.fulltextStatuspublic
uzh.workflow.revisions44
uzh.workflow.rightsCheckkeininfo
uzh.workflow.sourceCrossref:10.1093/ej/ueab047
uzh.workflow.statusarchive
uzh.wos.impact1
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