Publication: Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
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Ewerhart, C., & Quartieri, F. (2020). Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information. Economic Theory, 70(1), 243–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01209-4
Abstract
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Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete information admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, provided that all players have positive budgets in all states of the world, existence requires only the usual concavity and convexity assumptions. Information struct
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- Quartieri, Federico
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Citations
Ewerhart, C., & Quartieri, F. (2020). Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information. Economic Theory, 70(1), 243–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01209-4
