Publication: Animal minds: a non-representationalist approach
Animal minds: a non-representationalist approach
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Glock, H. J. (2013). Animal minds: a non-representationalist approach. American Philosophical Quarterly, 50(3), 213–232. http://apq.press.illinois.edu/50/3/glock.html
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Do animals have minds? We have known at least since Aristotle that humans constitute one species of animal. And some benighted contemporaries apart, we also know that most humans have minds. To have any bite, therefore, the question must be restricted to non-human animals, to which I shall henceforth refer simply as "animals." I shall further assume that animals are bereft of linguistic faculties. So, do some animals have minds comparable to those of humans? As regards that question, there are two basic stances. Differentialists maint
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Glock, H. J. (2013). Animal minds: a non-representationalist approach. American Philosophical Quarterly, 50(3), 213–232. http://apq.press.illinois.edu/50/3/glock.html