Publication: A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games
A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games
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Mäs, M., & Nax, H. H. (2016). A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 195–208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010
Abstract
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Abstract
‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on ‘how noise matters’ for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions () constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur with probabilities that are sensitive to their
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- Mäs, Michael
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Citations
Mäs, M., & Nax, H. H. (2016). A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 195–208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010
